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Abstract 
The development of a SME sector is widely recognised as being essential to overcome the problems 
countries face as they are transformed from centrally planned into market economies. Therefore. 
sustaining the growth of the private SME sector is important. 
The shortage of external finance is reported to be one of the main constraints SMEs are facing and 
opportunities for SMEs to access credit facilities from banks and financial support programs are still 
limited, especially for long-term credit. The creation of an efficient working financial market in 
Poland therefore is a very important part in the transition to a market economy. 
However, if such a financial market is to be established successfully, the needs and motivations of both 
small business owner-manager and banks have to be taken into accomlt. In other words, government 
programmes and policies as well as support programmes by other organisations should consider these needs 
and motivation to contribute effectively to the development of the financial market and thus to the 
development of the SME sector in Poland. 
The thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the operation of the financial market with respect 
to SMEs in Poland, focusing on the role of banks. This includes considering the factors influencing the 
demand for finance by fimls, factors influencing the practices of banks with respect to supplying finance to 
these finns and the relationship between the two. The main findings in this respect are that owner-managers 
have to focus on their relationship to banks, whereas banks need to recognise the small business sector as an 
important fragment of the lending market, and, if they want to penetrate this market, they have to adjust 
their lending policies accordingly. 
With regard to policy makers it appears that they need to improve their understanding of the small business 
sector in order to realise the effect general regulations have on small firms and in order to provide suitable 
support programmes to eliminate size related disadvantages experienced by SMEs. Moreover, policy makers 
should consider the low level of interest that currently exists among conullercial banks in dealing with SME 
when choosing chatillels for their support schemes. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims of the thesis 
The aims of the thesis are to contribute to a better understanding of the nature and extent of finance 
available to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Poland, the factors influencing whether or not 
firms are able to secure it and the types of strategies used by entrepreneurs to deal with a shortage of 
external finance. A key aim is to make recommendations to policy-makers, bank managers and other 
intermediaries (supply side of external finance) as well as to entrepreneurs (demand side of external 
finance) to improve the efficiency of the market for small business finance. 
More specifically the objectives of the thesis may be summarised as follows: 
1. To analyse the factors influencing the decisions made by Polish SME owners with regard 
to their sources of finance 
2. To analyse the factors influencing the policies of Polish battles and bank behaviour with 
respect to small firms in Poland. 
3. To analyse the role of the government and other organisations in relation to the supply of 
finance to SMEs in Poland. 
4. To make recommendations to entrepreneurs, bank managers and policy-makers about 
the types of strategies that could be used to increase the rate of bank finance to SMEs 
1.2 Aims in context 
The development of a SME sector is widely recognised as being essential to overcome the problems 
countries face as they are transfonned from centrally planned into market economies. Even in Poland, 
where the operation of private firms owned by individuals or partnerships was permitted during the 
communist period to a certain extent, the SME sector only played a minor role in the economy. I) Indeed, it 
has been suggested that tillS low ratio of small firms has been one of the major reasons for the inefficiency 
of the economy because of the lack of competition as well as the extremely high degree of concentration of 
the state owned firms and following this, their inflexibility and bureaucracy (piasecki 1991). 
Sustaining the growth of the private SME sector is therefore important, not only because the right of private 
property is indispensable in a market economy but also to correct the distortion in the firm-size-structure of 
the economy. In economics in transition SMEs contribute to the development of the economy by absorbing 
human resources which are set free by the closure or restructuring of large state owned companies. They 
also play an important potential role in changing export patterns, thus contributing to the international 
1) About 25 percent of the labour force was employed in the private sector, mainly in agriculture (Maczynske et al 
1993). 
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competitiveness of the economy. Another effect of SME development is the increasing number of people 
with a direct stake, as owners, in the economy and therefore with a vested interest in social stability (HObner 
1996). 
Fonner surveys (OECD 1996, Smallbone et al 1996, Smallbone et al 1995, RWI 1994a, Grabowski et al 
1992 and Grabowski & Kulawczuk et al 1991a) have shown that there are problems in the financing of 
SMEs in Poland which have a negative impact on SMEs for both business start up and development. 
Indeed, the shortage of external finance is reported to be one of the main constraints SMEs are facing 
(OECD 1996a pp 47-48, Smallbone et al1996 pp 40-41 and Grabowski et a11992 p 50). The opportunities 
for SMEs to access credit facilities from banks and financial support programs are still limited, especially 
for long-tenn credit. Therefore start-up finance is provided mainly from personal sources, investments are 
funded mainly from retained profits, own savings and/or mainly short-term bank loans. This undoubtedly 
has negative consequences for the development of SMEs, as personal sources are not sufficient and short-
term credits are unsuitable for long-term investments, particularly where the income generating benefits 
occur only after a considerable time lag. The creation of an efficient working financial market in Poland 
therefore is a very important part of the transition to a market economy. 
However, if such a financial market is to be established successfully, the needs and motivations of both 
small business owner-manager and banks have to be taken into account. Only then can one be sure, that 
government programmes and policies as well as support programmes by other organisations contribute 
effectively to the development of the financial market and thus to the development of the SME sector in 
Poland. 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology used has four main elements which combine quantitative analysis of survey data (element 
II) with insights into process through qualitative methods. The latter took the form of semi-structured 
interviews with bank managers, small business advisers (element III) and entrepreneurs (element IV): 
I. A literature based review of the factors which are relevant to an understanding of the financial 
needs of SMEs, the positions of the banks and the economic situation in Poland. 
This includes studies of SMEs undertaken in Poland (e.g. Smallbone et al 1996, RWI 1994a, 
Webster 1992), literature about the banking system and the economic and political changes in 
Poland as weB as a review of literature that deals with the western experience of the relation 
between SMEs, banks and government regulations. 
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The aim was to summarise the already existing knowledge of factors influencing the behaviour of 
SMEs, banks, the government and other organisation in relation to the supply of finance to SMEs 
in Poland. 
II. Additional and more in depth analysis of a survey of 300 face-to-face interviews with SME 
managers in Poland, carried out by the Department of Entrepreneurship and Industrial Policy, 
University of Lodz, Poland in association with the Centre for Enterprise and Economic 
Development Research, Middlesex University, between May and June 1995. Throughout the thesis, 
this study will be referred to as the" 1995 study". 
The database, which is one of the richest empirical databases available in Poland at present, had 
been analysed by Smallbone et al (1996). However, as the database had not been fully analysed 
with respect to the financing of SMEs, further analysis provided a more detailed picture 
concerning the financial constraints on SMEs in Poland. Analysis of these data focused on the 
following research questions 
A. What are the characteristics of firms that have been successful in raising bank loans compared to 
those who were not successful? 
B. On what terms are finns interested in raising additional finance for their business? 
(amount, repayment period, interest rate) 
C. To what extent are firms willing to consider external equity and what are the characteristics of 
finns with a strong interest compared to others? 
Even though data were gathered in the survey to throw some light on these questions, the analysis 
is limited by the fact that the survey was undertaken for a study examining the survivability and 
growth of SMEs in Poland and the Baltic States, rather than specifically to investigate the 
financial sources of SMEs in Poland. For example, question about the year in which firms tried to 
access external finance, the amount of collateral and the interest rates that were required by the 
batiks were not included in the survey. 
III. Key informant interviews were undertaken with four bank representatives and four small business 
advisers in the Lodz region, Poland, with the support of the Centre for Enterprise and Economic 
Development Research, London, and the Department of Entrepreneurship and Industrial Policy, 
University of Lodz, Poland. The main aim here was to obtain more qualitative data about the 
position of the banks with respect to the small business sector, as well as details from small 
business advisers about their experience with regard to SME finance. Therefore, interviews with 
the banks representatives included a discussion about their lending policy in general and their 
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lending policy towards SMEs in particular. Additionally, bank representative were asked to report 
about their experience in lending to SMEs. Small business advisers were asked questions about the 
service offered to SMEs and their experience in dealing with SMEs. The interview also covered 
the business advisers point of view with regard to the attitude of banks towards SMEs and the 
working relationship between bank managers and SME managers. Finally, concepts of how to 
improve the flow of bank finance to SMEs were discussed. 
Banks were selected from those that include small firms among their clients. The bank 
representatives that were interviewed were all personnel that were involved in decision making 
with respect to credit applications by small firms. As small business departments do not exist in 
Polish banks, the person interviewed was either the head of the credit department or the director of 
the branch. In addition, small business advisers were selected from organisations that aim to 
develop and support the small business sector in Poland. These interviewees were either the 
director of the organisation or worked as a business adviser in the organisation. 
Because of language problems, the interviews were arranged and undertaken with the assistance 
of Pawel Glodek from the Department of Entrepreneurship and Industrial Policy, University of 
Lodz, Poland. Pawel is a PhD Student in the field of SME financing, with whom I have co-
operated through an exchange organised as part of the co-operation between CEEDR and the 
Department of Entrepreneurship at the University of LOdz' 
All interviews were conducted by Pawel in Polish in my presence, based on a topic guide which I 
produced (see appendices III and IV). Pawel made detailed notes in Polish during the interviews. 
He also translated the main points into English in order that I could actively participate by asking 
follow up questions. A simultaneous translation of the interview would not have been practical, 
considering the fact that Pawell is not a trained translator. 
After each interview, I undertook a de-briefing session with Pawel to discuss the interview in 
detail, which took approximately 2 hours in each case. An alternative method would have been to 
employ a professional translator to carry out the interviews, although resource constraints did not 
make this a feasible option. Moreover, the fact that a professional translator is not likely to be an 
expert in the subject of small business finance, and hence not familiar with the terminology used, 
might led to misunderstandings during the translation and therefore to inaccurate or incomplete 
results. 
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IV. Seven company case studies in the Lodz region, Poland, with the support of the Centre for 
Enterprise and Economic Development Research, London, and the Department of 
Entrepreneurship and Industrial Policy, University of Lodz, Poland. 
The role of these case studies is to provide insights into the nature of the relationship between the 
finn and banks, based on the firm's actual experience. As a consequence, these interviews 
included a discussion of the firms experience in approaching bank managers for finance, together 
with details of the banks treatment of their application for credit 
Firms were selected from the original survey (undertaken in 1995) from those that had tried to 
access external finance, aiming to interview both firms that were successful and unsuccessful in 
raising external finance. The person interviewed was the owner or a partner of the small business. 
The method used for the interview was the same as described for the key informant interviews and 
those with bank representatives (element III). 
1.4 SME Characteristics and Definition 
The major characteristics of SMEs which distinguishes them from large firms with regard to their sources 
of finance are as follows: 
• SMEs have more limited financial and human resources than larger companies (Keasey et al 
1993). 
• Because of their size, smaller firms have more limited choices of external sources of finance. For 
example, larger firms have the possibility to use the stock market, whereas shares of smaller 
firms are not traded (Murray 1995, Ang 1991). 
• The level of business failure within the SME sector is higher than in that of larger companies 
(Keasey et al 1993). Therefore dealing with smaller firms is more risky for providers of external 
finance compared with dealing with larger firms. 
• In the majority of cases SMEs usually are managed and owned by the same person, in contrast to 
larger companies where these roles are typically split between the professional management and 
the shareholders. Therefore, owner-managers of SMEs are not accountable for their actions 
towards any third parties where as managers of larger companies have to justify their decisions 
in front of their share holders (Winborg 1997). In result, proceedings within larger firms are 
likely to be more formal, which makes it more easy for outside investors to monitor the business 
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activities of larger firms than those of smaller firms. Because of the fixed cost factor in 
adequately monitoring the business activities of firms, it is also relatively more costly for outside 
investors to monitor SMEs than to monitor larger companies (as the amount of business possible 
with larger firms is typically greater then with smaller firms). 
• In SMEs the owner-manager's personal approach towards issues such as debt financing as well 
as his/her knowledge of sources of external finance directly influences the company's behaviour. 
In larger companies, on the other hand, decisions may be made in teams thus reducing the 
influence of single persons. 
• Because of these characteristics and their lack of bargaining power SMEs often have more problems 
and/or higher costs than larger firms in attracting extemal finance, conducting negotiations and 
complying with (some) regulations (Scherr er al. 1993). 
The situation [or SMEs in Poland is further worsened because of the existing network of relationships from 
the centrally planned economy between managers of state firms and bank employees which can lead to the 
favouritism of (former) state finns by banks in the approval of credits. The lack of institutional 
infrastructure at regional level, the still underdeveloped competitive structure and the lack of expertise in 
the area of small-scale credit provision in the banking industry creates further difficulties for SMEs (OECD 
1996b, Polanski 1995). It is therefore necessary to distinguish between small and large firms in Poland in 
respect of their financial problems, their relations to banks as well as the effects of political decisions. 
During the transition period the definition o[ SMEs in Poland changed within the scope of re-c1assification 
of the private sector, which was influenced by West European standards. According to the main Statistical 
Office finns with less than 50 employees are defined as small and finns with more than 50 and less than 
200 employees are defined as mediulU sized finns. But tlus is not the only defilution. Other criteria were 
used for various reasons which can make comparison difficult (Kanvowska et al 1993). The same problem 
occurs in western literature where different definitions are sometimes used for different surveys or for 
different govemment programmes. 
In order to achieve the best possible homogeneity within the thesis, the SME definition used for the case 
studies was influenced by the definition used for the survey of the 300 face-to-face interviews. According to 
this definition, firms had to be independently owned (i.e. not part of a larger organisation), at least 50% of 
the ownership in private and domestic hands and employ not more than 100 employees in 1995. 
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1.5 Structure of the report 
The rest of the thesis is divided into four main chapters, followed by conclusions and implications for 
policy. 
The second chapter is about SMEs in transition in Poland, describing the situation of SMEs during 
the communist period, the growth of SMEs during the transformation period and the role of the 
government in relation to SME development. Changes and trends of the economic environment will 
be mentioned where appropriate. This is necessary to understand the current financial position of 
SMEs in Poland which is influenced by the former and present economic and political environment. 
Chapter three reports about the availability of different sources of finance as well as the different 
types of finance in terms of their suitability for the financial needs of SMEs. 
Chapter four is concerned with the demand side of finance, the preferences of SMEs for certain types 
and amounts of finance as well as strategies of finns in accessing finance or dealing with a shortage 
of finance. This is based on data from the survey mentioned under 1.3.1I as well as the data collected 
from the case studies mentioned under 1. 3.IV and existing literature. 
Chapter five deals with the supply of finance, describing the changes in the banking system, bank 
policy and bank behaviour. For this, data from the key informant interviews mentioned under 1.3.III 
was used as well as existing literature. 
Chapter six is about the interrelations between SMEs and banks, including an analysis of the key 
informant interviews and the case studies. 
Chapter seven includes conclusions and implications for policy. 
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2. SMEs IN POLAND 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter two reviews the development of the SME sector from World War II up to the present. Political and 
economic changes are mentioned as far as relevant for the private sector. This is followed by a description 
of the characteristics of SMEs, the current barriers to SME development and trends in policies regarding 
SMEs. 
2.2 SME development 
Exact statements about the number of small private firms during the communist period and the early years 
of transformation are nearly impossible. Not only did standardised definitions for small and medium sized 
business not exist in Poland, they also changed over the years, partly to match EU standards (RWI 1994a, 
Karawowska et a1. 1993). It is therefore appropriate to investigate the development of the private sector 
instea~ especially as it consisted solely of small finns during the communist period and has only slightly 
changed since. In 1995 and 1996, SMEs contributed to 99.9 per cent to the private sector, most of which 
were very small firms (Piasecki et a1. 1998). Another problem is that fonner state finns were to be included 
in the private sector as soon as they are completely privatise~ which in practise is often difficult to assess. 
National statistics might also be inaccurate due to the large number of illegal private activities, especially 
towards the end of the 1980s. In 1989, estimates of the so called 'shadow economy' ranged between 10 and 
60 per cent of GNP (Grabowski et a1. 1992, RWI 1994a, Ministry of Industry and Trade 1995). Moreover, 
Polish statistics were based on registered firms, many of which were not actually existing (R WI 1994a, 
Scase 1997). The presented data therefore should be approached with considerable caution, as it indicates 
more the trend of SME development in Poland then providing exact figures. 
The nationalisation of larger finns, which marked the beginning of the conunWlist era in Poland after 
World War II, did not affect SMEs for two to three years, during which time the private sector accounted for 
approximately 70 per cent of the GNP. By 1968 however, this figure had declined to less than 20 per cent of 
GNP, following the take over of many private co-operatives by the state as well as campaigns against private 
enterprise, for example the campaign against shop owners and large farmers in the early 1950s (Grabowski 
et al. 1992, Tamowicz et al. 1992). Even so, the operation of private finns owned by individuals or 
partnerships was permitted in fields such as agriculture, craft2 (services and production), small scale 
retailing, freight and passenger transport, renovation of flats and houses, certain professional services, e.g. 
dental surgeries and design studios, the government, following the commWlist doctrine, tried to minimise 
the number of private firms (Smallbone & Piasecki 1995). Legal, fiscal and political regulations forced 
2) Thereby crafts were defined as "a type of economic activity, in which a craftsman -owner of the finn participated 
directly perfomling the same operations as employees hired by him" hence quiet a few small manufacturing finns 
existed in Poland which were relatively modem and well equipped (Smallbone et al1995). 
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many entrepreneurs into bankruptcy. For example, some economic activities such as foreign trade and some 
transportation serviccs were lcgally rcserved for state finns, the maximum level of rctail prices allowed to be 
used in the private sector was determined by the Minister of Trade and Commerce and the size of a private 
business was limited by law (Grabowski et a1. 1992, Tamowicz et a1. 1992). Moreover the whole 
infrastructure serving the private sector was eliminated and a system of central planning authorities 
established which decided the flow of goods, including credits (Chiechocinska 1992). In spite of that, the 
regulations regarding the private sector were periodically loosened, allowing SMEs to expand, particularly 
in periods of economic hardship such as during the crises in 1970 and 1976. In 1976 for example, the start 
up of unincorporated finns by non-residents, the so called 'Polonia finns', was permitted, although only a 
few were actually established until the 1980s (Maczynska & Musial 1993, Chiechocinska 1992, Grabowski 
et a1. 1992). 
Economic difficulties increased in the 1980s with agriculture and industrial subsidies presenting a heavy 
burdcn for thc budgce, resulting in both price inflation and shortages of goods (G2 Economics of Transition 
1995). This led to a change in the economic strategy of the government, which introduced a new law on co-
operatives in 1982 (allowing the start up of busincsscs independent from the state apparatus) and a law on 
foreign investment in 1986 (permitting incorporated finns to use foreign start up capital - Grabowski et a1. 
1992). As a result, the number of registered private sector firms grew [rom 357,142 in 1981 to 572,451 in 
1988, which is described by Pisasecki & Rogut (1993) as "the initial phase of development o[ 
Entreprcneurship". Ncverthelcss, thc administrative allocation o[ rcsources favouring the public sector still 
existed, making the success of a private firm more dependent on its informal relations to state-owned finns 
or local authorities than on management skills and marketing strategies (Tamowicz et a1. 1992, Grabowski 
et al. 1992). 
Finally in December1988 the Law on Economic Activity abolished most permits and licenses formerly 
needed to set up a businesses by stating that " everyone is free and allowed to undertake and carry out 
economic activity on equal rights" (piasecki 1992). Thus, for the first time since 1947, private businesses 
were treated equally to state-owned firms which led, in combination with political and economic changes, to 
"a period of explosion of Entrepreneurship" (Pisasecki & Rogut 1993) between 1989 and 1991 as illustrated 
in Table 2.1. In 1989, the 1.7 million people employed in the non-agricultural private sector constituted 
approximately 10 per cent of all labour in Poland (Grabowski ct a1. 1992). 
3) The Polish budget deficit reached 10 per cent in 1989 (02 Economics of Transition 1995). 
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Table 2.1: Changes in the private sector in 1976-1991 
1976 
Incorporated firms 
no of employees 
-
no of firms -
Polonia firms 
no of employees -
no of firms 3* 
Joint- Ventures 
no of employees -
no of firms -
Unincorporated firms 
no of employees • 
no of firms 250,000 
Total number of firms 250,000 
* in 1977 
• non available 
Note: This refers to registered enterprises. 











SMEs in Poland 
1989 1990 1991 
134,718 306,240 • 
11,807 29,650 45,077 
100,240 83,230 • 
847 862 787 
29,902 88,070 • 
416 1,645 4,796 
1,515,300 1,915,462 2,591,071 
845,677 1,135,500 1,420,000 
858,747 1,167,657 1,470,660 
The most significant political change took place in 1989, when the first non-communist government since 
1947 was elected, legally ending the existence of Poland as a conunillllst state by declaring a democratic 
state of law (Wedlawowiz 1996). In order to transfer Poland's economy into a market-base system, a 
comprehensive economic reform (the Balcoerowicz Plan) was launched on the first of January 1990. The 
plan, which was strongly influenced by the IMF stabilisation and Iiberalisation programme, included the 
following measures: 
Liberalisation measures: 
• abolition of the administrative supply allocation system 
• deregulation of domestic and foreign trade 
• Iiberalisation of most prices 
• restructuring and commercialising of the financial sector 
Stabilisation measures: 
• reduction of most subsidies for state-owned enterprises 
• freezing of salaries in the state sector 
• positive real interest rates 
• internal convertibility of the Zloty, devaluation and a stable exchange rate 
(Grabowski & Kulawczuk 1991a, Gomulka 1992, G2 EconOlnies of Transition 1995) 
As a result of the reform programme prices rose by 80 per cent in January 1990 (in comparison with 
December 1989), the industrial output declined by about 30.4 per cent between January and Jillie 1990 and 
unemployment rose by about 0.5 nlillion persons. Between January and September 1990 the purchasing 
power of the society declined by approximately 28 per cent (G2 Economics of Transition 1995, Piasecki 
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1991). The effect of these economic factors on the development of SMEs was mixed. While the total number 
of SMEs increased rapidly, almost 60 per cent of new start ups between January and August 1990 were 
established in commerce, where as the number of production and service firms actually declined. The start 
o[ the small privatisation programme (Le. the start-up o[ new small enterprises or the development o[ 
existing ones by purchasing, hiring or leasing state-owned co-operative or communal property) contributed 
to the increase of small retail firms as 12,000 formerly state-owned shops were transfonned into private 
ownership in the first half year of 1990. Moreover, the deregulation of foreign trade created profitable 
opportunities in dealing with cheap imports. The decrease of production and service firms, on the other 
hand, occurred mainly because of high rents, high production costs, lack of demand for goods and services 
as well as due to mismanagement of owners who could not adapt to the new conditions of a market economy 
(Piasecki 1991). Under communism, selling was not a problem for small firms as they supplied mainly 
state-finns and sometimes even received the raw materials needed from the state. In the new market 
environment however, with collapsing state firms and the closure of the CMEA trade, firms had to search 
for customers and suppliers which required knowledge and management skills that were neither needed nor 
developed under communism (Kanvowska & Mrozinska 1993, Smallbone & Piasecki 1995). 
In 1991, further decreases in consumer purchasing power, increased competition and rising tax and interest 
rates led to a "slowing down in the rate of development of the SME sector" (Pisasecki & Rogut 1993) with 
even negative rates in 1995 (Table 2.2). However, a favourable economic climate in the years 1994-1996 
with a real growth rate of GOP between 5-7 per cent atmually and a steady reduction of the inflation rate 
(from 29.4 per cent in 1994 to 18.5 per cent in 1996) led to an overall increase in the number of private 
firms by 33 per cent between 1992 and 1996 (Piasecki et a1. 1998, European Bank [or Reconstmction and 
Development 1998). 
Table 2.2: Changes in the private sector in 1992-1996 
1992 
Growth rate +18% 
Total number of firms 1,739,091 
* end of June 1993 
Note: This refers to registered enterprises. 








In 1996, 2,310,087 firms employing up to 250 persons were registered in Poland accounting [or 99.9 per 
cent of the private sector, which again contributed to 97 per cent of all economic units. These relations 
between the SME, the private and the public sector are similar to those in the UK as well as in other EU 
countries (Piasecki et a1. 1998). 
Between 1990 and 1995 the Polish private sector increased its share in total work force from about 49 per 
cent to over 60 per cent and nearly doubled its contribution to the GOP (from 30.9 per cent to 58 per cent in 
current prices) (U.S. Agency for International Development 1997). At the same time it should be noted that 
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the per capita GDP according to the purchasing power parity in Poland is at a relatively low level, about 3.5 
times lower than in the UK and almost 4 times lower then in Geonany (piasecki et al. 1998). 
2.3 Characteristics of SMEs 
Following the recent development of the SME sector in Poland it is not surprising that, according to the 
register of the Central Statistical Office and the Ministry of Finance, the vast majority of SMEs in 1995 
were fairly young firms: 63 per cent were established after 1990, 35 per cent started between 1970 and 1990 
and only two per cent were more than 24 years old (The Delegation of Poland 1996). The relatively short 
period of trading of SMEs that is typical and the fact that the development of a private sector requires time 
is reflected in the size structure of the sector. In 1996, the average size of a private firm in Poland was 2.5 
employees, compared with 5.4 employees in the UK and 8.5 employees in Germany. At the same time, as 
illustrated in Table 2.3, the overall structure of the private sector in Poland indicates a general deficit in the 
development of medium sized fions. As the selling up of medium-sized firms tends to be the exception. this 
gap can only be closed if a large number of existing small firms are successful in the market and are willing 
and able to grow into medium-sized firms (OECD 1996a). 
Table 2.3: The size structure of the private sector in 1996 
Poland UK Germany 
share in average share in average share in average 
Firm size in no private no of private no of private no of 
of em ployees sector employee sector employee sector employee 
up to 501) 99.46 % 1.6 99.1 % 2.6 98.1 % 3.7 
51-249 2) 0.46 % 100.5 0.7% 93.1 1.5 % 78.9 
over 249 0.08% 513.0 0.2% 1,113.3 0.4 % 909.1 
Total number of 2,311,988 3,760,000 3,440,000 
private firms 3) 
In the UK and Germany this figure relates to firms with up to 49 employees 
2) In the UK and Germany this figure relates to firms with 50-249 employees 
3) This refers to registered enterprises. 
Source: Statistical appendix in Piasecki et al. 1998 
The growth of small businesses is also desirable because of their potential to create jobs. In other words 
their possible contribution to reducing unemployment rates makes growing small firms of interest to public 
policy makers (Storey 1994). As Polish entrepreneurs are reported to be highly growth orientated (see 
section 3.3.1), the question of whether or not they are actually growing is more related to their ability to 
grow, (hence to the ability of the owner-manager to survive in a market economy) and to barriers outside the 
business (such as legal and financial barriers as well as the to level of competition in the market and the 
macroeconomic conditions). According to a comparison of eighteen empirical studies wldertaken by Storey 
(1994), business growth is positively influenced by the number of founders (firms with more then one owner 
are more likely to grow), motivation (for example entrepreneurs that are desire to make more money are 
more likely to want their business to grow fast than those business owner that just want to earn a living) and 
the educational qualification of the owner-manager. 
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Figure 2.1: Ownership structure 
of Polish SMEs 
Number of individuals in'vOlved in 
the ownership of the firm 
01 person 
34% 
II 5 or more persons 
4% D 3 or 4 persons 
16% 
Note: From one firm the data could not be obtained. 
Source: 1995 study 
SMEs in Poland 
Figure 2.2: Highest level of education 
of Polish entrepreneurs 





II Special secondary 
School 
Q University or other 
higher education 
49% 
Note: From two firms the data could not be obtained. 
Source: 1995 study 
In this respect it is encouraging that, according to the 1995 survey, the majority of Polish firms seem to be 
owned by two or more individuals (Figure 2.1). Furthermore, the level of education among Polish 
entrepreneurs is reported to be high (Figure 2.2), even higher than in more mature market economies 
(Smallbone et aI1996). This is supported by a representative survey of Polish SMEs in 1995 undertaken by 
the Faculty of Economic Science at the University of Warsaw, which reports that 51 per cent of owners had 
higher education (Kubik et a1. 1997). Another survey by Erutku & Vallee (1997) notes that 65 per cent of a 
surveyed sample of 48 SMEs completed their college education, which suggests that entrepreneurs are more 
educated than the Polish population in general (it is estimated that only one-third of Poles stay in school 
until age 18 and that fewer than 10 per cent go to university - Erutku et al 1997). Likewise, Polish 
entrepreneurs tend to be more educated than their American cowlterparts, as a study undertaken by the 
NFIB foundation in America states that 58 per cent of American firm owner had attended college. However, 
the higher education level of entrepreneurs should not be overestimated, as those American entrepreneurs 
who did have higher fonnal education had taken more courses than their Polish counterparts. Moreover, 
formal education is typically the only fonn of education available for Polish entrepreneurs, whereas 
American business owners have the opportunity to receive some vocational or professional training before 
setting up their company (Erutku & Vallee 1997). 
Regarding the motivation of business owners for setting up their firm, it appears from the 1995 study that 
the majority (60 per cent) mentioned the desire to improve their standard of living or to increase their 
income as one of their main reasons. However, as shown in Table 2.4, the aim "to seek independence / 
autonomy" is mentioned even more often, which can be a reason for the owner not expand the business 
beyond a certain size (see section 4.2.1 for more details). 
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Table 2.4: Main reasons for starting the business 
Reason No of firms 
To seek independence I autonomy 209 
To improve living standard I increase income 178 
To gain self-fulfilment 153 
Family tradition 52 




Note: Manager could give up to three reasons. From one firm the data could not be obtained. 
Source: 1995 study 
2.4 Barriers to SME development 








Although the barriers to SME development cited by small business owners changed over the years, 
reflecting the alterations in their economic and political environment, financial problems remained one of 
the main hindrances. A survey of 93 Polish manufacturing SMEs carried out by Webster (1992) in May 
1991 reports that lack of demand was mentioned by 30 per cent of surveyed businesses as the main 
constraint, which is not surprising considering the decline in the purchasing power of the Polish people in 
the early years of transformation. Indeed, 84 per cent of finns citing lack of demand for their product as 
main problem believed that this was caused by a shortage of money among Polish people. However, this can 
also reflect weak market orientation of the businesses, as research in the UK has shown (Smallbone 1990). 
Financial problems ranked second, mentioned by 28 per cent of Polish owner-managers as their main 
constraint, of which more then half reported high interest rates to be the cause for this. The frequent change 
of government regulations was viewed by ten per cent of finns as a main constraint for their business 
activity. Two years later a survey undertaken by the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Institut fur 
Wirtschafts[orschung revealed that the lack of capital is not so much a problem for established firms (only 
22 per cent complained about credit allocation), however that it is one of the major difficulties during the 
start up phase (Figure 2.3 and 2.4). Nevertheless, a third of firms mentioned interest rates and the servicing 
of debt as a current problem, which indicates difficulties related with external finance. 
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Figure 2.3: Problems with the Establishment of new Enterprises 
Unstable political situation 
Confusing legal bars 
Not enough own capital 
No government support (financial means) 
Lack of consultig services by gov . . trade asso. and chambers 
Ignorance of government bodies 
Competitors tried to prevent establishment 
0% 20% 40% 60% 
Percentage of respondents 
Source: Welter 1994 
Figure 2.4: Current problems of Entrepreneurs 
Taxes 
Rate of payment by customer 
Rent rates 
Lack of demand 
Wage costs 
Interest and service of debt 
Social insurance cost 
Administrative prerequisites 
Length of licensing procedures 
Credit allotment 
Resistance in administrative bodies 
No telephone lines 
Rent contacts limits 
Lack of additional business facilities premises 
Lack of adequate consulting 
Disappearance of sales to COMECON 
Competition by state owned companies 
Lack of experience of management 
Lack of foreign currencies 
Slow-downs in construction 
80% 
-r-.... : ...  , :~ ·1 ;~ 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 
Percentage of respondents 
Source: Welter 1994 
In the 1995 study the picture changed as 30 per cent of surveyed firms complained about a shortage of 
external finance, which ranked third after complaints about the level of taxation (40 per cent) and the weak 
domestic demand (33 .7 per cent) (Figure 2.5). This might indicate that compared with the early years of 
transformation, it became more difficult for small businesses to access external finance. However, 
comparisons with the RWI study have to be treated with caution, as this survey included several sectors, 
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whereas in the 1995 study only manufacturing SMEs were interviewed, who have a greater demand for 
capital than for example firms in the retail sector. 
Figure 2.5: Managers Perception of the main Constraint on Business Development 
Level of taxation 
Weak domestic demand 
Shortage of external finance 
Strong competition form abroad 
Obtaining payment for goods sold 
Need to modernise production equipment 
Government regulations and policy 
Premises-related problems 
Workforce related constrains 
Competition form illegal/unregistered activities 
Insufficient production capacity 
Restricted supply of materials/components 
Transport/communications infrastructure 
Exessive debt 
Lack of experienced manager 
Lack of business support services 
Other 
None t~~{~-,[~[· ,.:\l .·· ·. 1" ·F·' ;: t~ .~: I  I I I I I 
0% 10% 20% 30% 
Percentage of respondents 
Note: Managers could give up to three main constrains 
Source: 1995 survey 
40% 
A more recent study undertaken by Smallbone et a1. (1997) investigated the barriers to increasing sales in 
domestic as well as foreign markets for SMEs in the food and clothing industries. The "lack of finance to 
support marketing" was ranked second as a constraint in the domestic market (with half of surveyed firms 
mentioning this as a main barrier), after "problems with delayed payments" (58 per cent) and before 
"strength of competition from abroad" (42 per cent). Delayed payments can hinder the development of firms 
by causing cash flow problems. Tltis is a particular problem for smaller firms, as they typically rely upon 
fewer customers and/or suppliers than larger firms (Keasey & Watson 1993). Therefore, in the case of small 
firms, delayed payments from large customers can even cause the dentise of a business. Moreover, in the 
case of the bankruptcy of the customer, smaller firms are less likely to recover any money than larger firms, 
due to their lack of bargaining power. The lack of finance to llildertake necessary marketing efforts also 
negatively influence the development of firms in a market economy where the survival of the firm depends 
on their ability to compete against domestic and, as mentioned above, foreign compalties. With respect to 
exports financial problems were considered to be even more constraining, mentioned by 53 per cent of 
firms, followed by "domestic taxation" and "lack of information about foreign markets" (43 per cent and 28 
per cent respectively - Smallbone et a1. 1997). In other words, possible business development beyond the 
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borders of Poland might be missed out on because of the lack of financial resources. This again might be 
caused, among others, by the high level of domestic taxation on Polish small firms. High social taxes, for 
example, are a particular burden for smaller firms, because their are typically more labour intensive than 
larger firms (Smallbone et al. 1996). 
2.5 SME policy 
Until 1995, the Polish government based their economic policy on the neo-liberal doctrine which considers 
state intervention in the market process as not appropriate. "For the start-up period the freedom of economic 
activity was the basic stimulus. On the side of the government, refraining from any action was a conducive 
factor. The rapid growth phase then required first of all macroeconomic stabilisation" (Deputy Minister of 
Industry and Trade - HUbner 1996). This in combination with the reluctance of Polish entrepreneurs to co-
operate with the authorities because of their view of government inherited from the socialist period resulted 
in the absence of any comprehensive support programme for SMEs in the first five years of transition 
(Smallbone & Piasecki 1995). Only a small number of reports and statements of support for SMEs were 
produced these years, such as the "Programme assumptions of activities of the Government Plenipotentiary 
for support of Entrepreneurship in the filed of SMEs development" in November 1990 (Piasecki et al. 
1998), the report "Investing in the Future" prepared by the Task Force for SMEs in 1993 (Smallbone & 
Piasecki 1995) and the "Programme proposals supporting SMEs" submitted by the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade in 1994 (pisasecki et al. 1998). Although none of the proposals were followed by real actions 
(Smallbone & Piasecki 1995), various SME support organisations were established on a regional level 
during this period, such as incubators, business support centres and innovation and technology centres. 
Many of these organisations were established through alliances including local businesses, community 
leaders and authorities and most of them were supported by foreign and international organisations. Most 
widely represented were the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), most of which were set up by a 
consortium of community governments, agencies, banks and other actors. In the beginning of 1996, 61 
RDAs existed, 47 of regional and 14 oflocal character (OECD 1997). 
The policy of the government as outlined above and the fact the regional authorities in Poland were not 
representatives of regional interests but responsible for executing legislation initiated by the central 
govenunent meant that regional support initially was also rather weak. The structure of the national income 
contributed to the problem, as the majority of funds were administered by central government (OECD 
1997). In other words, the expenditures made by regional authorities had to be approved by the government, 
which meant that even if support was granted on a regional level, the decision whether or not the necessary 
funds were made available was done by the central authorities. Therefore, changes in the policy of the 
central government were bound to affect regional organisations immediately, as experienced by one of the 
key informants form the Lodz Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation. The foundation was 
established by the local government in 1993 with the aim of financing regional development. Even though 
Martina Freiberg Page 17 
Chapter 2 SMEs in Poland 
sufficient funds were available to the Foundation in the beginning, the budget was reduced drastically when 
political conditions changed, forcing the foundation to adjust their operations accordingly. 
The absence of government policy also led to a lack of co-ordination not only between the various support 
organisations but also among ministers due to conflicts over competencies. Further complications resulted 
from frequent inter-ministerial changes in the responsibility for the SME sector (OECD 1996a). Moreover, 
the distribution of support programmes was not regulated which resulted in foreign organisations being over 
represented in certain areas while lacking in others (OECD 1(97). However, becoming more aware of the 
importance of SMEs in the progress of transformation and the need to co-ordinate SME support, the Polish 
government established the Polish Agency for Regional Development (PARD) in 1993, both to co-ordinate 
action for regional development in six regions with were designated for Programme for Structural 
Development in Selected Regions in Poland (STRUDER) (see chapter 3.4.2.1. for further details) and to 
reinforce the emerging private-public partnerships in the regions. At present PARD continues to support 
regional interests and aims to mediate between the communities and the central government (OECD 1997). 
Poland's desire to enter into the European Community has also fonned an important incentive for the Polish 
Government to develop a comprehensive SME policy. "The development of a Government policy towards 
SMEs has become necessary, also in the light of Poland's admission to the European Community, especially 
when there is a possibility of including Polish enterprises in EC programs"(Ministry of Industry and Trade 
19(5). "The Policy towards small and medium-sized enterprises" a document presented by the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, was approved by the Council of Ministers on 6 June 1995. The aim was to create 
political, legal and economic conditions for the development of the SME sector by applying legal, financial, 
organisational and information and training instruments (The Delegation of Poland 1996, Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 1995). 
The policy programme concentrated on four key areas by intending to create favourable conditions to: 
• facilitate the establishment and development of SMEs, 
• decrease the risk of conducting business activity, 
• increase the competitiveness of SMEs and 
• develop the market of financial services for SMEs 
(Ministry ofIndustry and Trade 1995) 
The policy intended among others to improve the accessibility for SMEs to financial sources, including 
legal regulations to stimulate the development of local guarantee and credit funds. This included the further 
development of the system of credit guarantees for SMEs on the basis of the credit guarantee fund 
established in the Bank of the National Economy (Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego) ill 1994 (see section 6.4 
for further details) as well as the development of a credit re-guarantee system for local institutions granting 
guarantees for SMEs. These local institutions typically have limited assets to be able to issue guarantees for 
credits. By creating a re-guarantee fund which shares the risk undertaken by the local guarantee funds, their 
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capacity to issue further credits guarantees improves, which in turn would increase the accessibility to 
external finance for SMEs (Ministry of Industry and Trade 1995). 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade took upon the responsibility for SME development and policy, whereas 
the Polish Foundation for the Promotion and Development of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises had 
been established by the government to ensure the practical implementation and co-ordination of activities 
and programmes in this area. One of the objectives of Foundation was to ensure the efficient use of foreign 
assistance funds allocated to support SMEs (Hubner 1996, Gurbiel 1996, Ministry of Industry and Trade 
1995). The policy programme was planned to be funded of "resources of enterprises in mutual guarantee 
funds established by the organisations of territorial self government and other local institutions which 
support SMEs", resources from the budget and external resources (Ministry of Industry and Trade 1995). 
The resources form the budget, estimated at 90m ZLP for the period 1995-97, were primarily allocated to 
the planned credit guarantee fund. In terms of external assistance, the main stake was awarded by the 
European Union's PHARE programmes, assigning up to 400 million ECU between 1995 and 1996 for 
technical assistance and development projects (Ministry of Industry and Trade 1995, OECD 1997). 
The financing of the policy programme proved to be problematic. According to the OECD (1997) foreign 
donor agencies typically are more interested in investing in single infrastructural projects with presentable 
results rather than allocating funds to local loan guarantee funds. Moreover, as pointed out by Piasecki et a1. 
(1998), because of the structure of the finances, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, even though responsible 
for the implementation of the policy, did not have complete control of the use of the funds. Another problem 
occurred in assessing the policy implementations, mainly because of the lack of appropriate reporting 
systems and the fact the majority of instruments were directed towards all economic units and not to SMEs 
only (Piasecki et a1. 1998). However, the policy programme certainly is a step in the right towards the 
development of the SME sector. Nevertheless, as mentioned by the Commission dealing with Poland's 
assignment to the European Conlllllmity, some problems concerning co-operation between the ministers and 
the structures involved in this policy continue to appear. Solutions arc still necessary to simplify the 
legislation and to increase the efficiency of legal regulations (Piasecki et a1. 1998). 
Chambers of Commerce and Business associations, who could further represent the interests of SMEs to the 
government, have only limited influence for a number of reasons. The current Chamber systems consists of 
agricultural, industrial, foreign trade and craft Chambers, with the National Chamber of Commerce (KIG) 
acting as umbrella organisation (OECD 1996a). The structure used to build this system dates back to the 
1970s, when Polish craft enterprises were organised in guilds, chambers and umbrella organisations 
(German model - Welter 1994). During the communist period the compulsory membership of the Chambers 
was used to support the Soviet system, thus to simplify state control in businesses. After 1989, membership 
of the Chambers became voluntary for businesses, many of whom decided to withdraw. This in result 
weakened the financial basis of the Chambers, which is why many of them operate only over a limited 
regional range, mainly concentrating on larger cities (OECD 1996a). 
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Business associations, on the other hand, are not as low valued by Polish entrepreneurs as Chambers of 
Commerce. Following the political liberalisation in the late 1980s, an estimated 4,000 business 
organisations have been established (OECD 1997). However, the diversifY of these associations means that 
they do not have the power to represent the interests of the business sector vis-a-vis the state. So far, efforts 
to organise these associations in a wider, national structure, have been limited (OECD 1996a, OECD 
1997). 
Another problem for small business owner to be represented by either Chambers of Commerce or business 
associations lies in the fact that both of these organisations represent large as well as small, state-owned as 
well as private companies. As large firms typically have greater negotiation power, the interests of SMEs 
are only treated as secondary (OECD 1996a). 
2.6 Key points in chapter 2 
• The Polish private sector consists nearly exclusively of finns employing up to 250 persons. 
• Between 1990 and 1995, the Polish private sector increased its share in total work force from about 49 
per cent to over 60 per cent and its contribution to the GDP from 30.9 per cent to 58 per cent. 
• In 1996, the relations between the private and the public sector in Poland were similar to those in the 
UK and other EU countries. 
• When comparing with the UK and Germany, the overall structure of the private sector in Poland 
indicates a general deficit of medium sized finns, employing between 51 and 249 persons. 
• The level of education of Polish entrepreneurs is reported to be higher that in some of the more mature 
market economies. 
• Financial problems are reported to be one of the main hindrances in the development of Polish SMEs. 
• The Polish government launched their first comprehensive SME policy program in 1995, partly because 
of Poland's desire to enter the European Community, thus it remains underdeveloped. 
• Chambers of Commerce and business associations, which could represent SMEs to the government, 
have only limited influence and are mainly dominated by larger firms. 
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3. SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR SMEs 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter three reports on the availability of different sources of finance as well as the different types of 
finance in tenns of their suitability for the financial needs of SMEs. 
3.2 Available sources of finance for SMEs 
Possible source of finance for SMEs consist of internal as well as external sources as outlined in figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Sources of finance 
Sources of finance I 
I Internal sources of finance J External sources of finance I 
I I 
Personal Family Retained Debt finance External equity 
Savings profits 
I 
Banhlng II Trade 
II 
Public II Leasing a~ IFormal venture I. Informal 
sector credit sector hire purchase capital venture capital 
-----_. __ .-
Source: Ang 1991, Sain 1992, Sinks & Ennew 1996 
In this respect it is important to understand that different types of finance are needed for different purposes. 
In other words, the sole availability of financial means does necessarily satisfy the financial needs of a firm. 
The pennanent capital of the business (i.e. funds needed for the start-up or expansion of the firnl) needs to 
be financed with funds that are secured on a permanent or at least long-term bases, as the continued 
availability of this capital is essential for the finn's existence. Personal and external equity are suitable for 
this purpose as well as long-term loan finance and mortgages. In the case of existing firms, retained profits 
are another possible source of permanent capital. For the financing of a specific investment (i.e. the 
purchase of machinery, premises or vehicles) medium-term finance is needed, which secures the funds for 
the period of time necessary. Medium-tenn loans are suitable for this purpose as well as leasing or hire 
purchase agreements. Other financial needs occur such as working capital to finance the time lags between 
payments due to suppliers and incoming funds from customers as well as seasonal fluctuations in profits. 
Martina Freiberg Page 21 
Chapter 3 Sources of finance for SMEs 
Best suited for these needs are short term loans and overdraft facilities supplied by banks as well as trade 
credits (Bain 1992). 
3.3 Sources of finance in the communist period 
Under communism, the authorities tolerated private SMEs only to a certain extent and in line with that 
destroyed the whole infrastmcture catering for the private sector such as banks and credit institutions, 
specialised service firms and self-government bodies and chambers of trade and industry. (Ciechoconska 
1992, Grabowski et al. 1992) Financial institutions such as banks did exist, but they did not act as financial 
intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Instead, they were responsible for the profit transfer of the 
state companies to the government (Monobank and special banks) or the transfer of private household 
deposits to the government (Sparballks). Decisions on the volume and stmcture of crcdits wcrc takcn outsidc 
the banking system by the central planning authorities (Polanski 1995). 
It is therefore not surprising that financing by bank loans was rare and usually short-term. Funds for the 
operation of the few existing SMEs came from the personal resources of owners or their relatives, in other 
words internal sources, or from resources raised through personal (informal) networks. It was also usual for 
SMEs to be in debt to other enterprises (trade credit), to receive advanced payment from the customer, 
normally local authorities or state companies, to delay fiscal payments or social security payments and 
expenses for employees (Grabowski & Kulawczuk 1991a). In the 1980s the step-by-step removal of legal 
barriers made it possible for SMEs or potential entrepreneurs to access financial sources in western market 
economies, i.e. to obtain foreign-exchange credits for purchases of machinery and materials for their export 
production (Piasecki 1991). Furthermorc the gradual Iiberalisation of the passport, foreign exchange and 
customs policy made it possible for numerous Polish people to work (illegally) for western firms, to 
accumulate savings in hard currency and to transfcr thcm to Poland to fund or to set up their own small 
business in Poland (Piasecki 1991, Smallbone et al 1995). 
3.4 Sources of finance since 1989 
After the liberalisation of the banking system and the adoption of market-type banking laws in 1989, banks 
became a more accessible source for e,,1ernal finance for SMEs, especially in the earlier years of 
transformation. A survey undertaken by Webster (1992) of 93 Polish manufacturing firms in 1991 notes that 
68 per cent of entrepreneurs had received bank loan between 1988 and 1991. However, since then the banks 
became more reluctant to lend to SMEs for various reasons, as outlined in chapter five. 
The development of an institutional infrastructure for SMEs by the government, as outlined in chapter two, 
had not been a priority in the early stage of transition. However, by now various institutions, both non-profit 
and commercial organisations cxist to oITcr assistance to SMEs. Thc currcnt focus of these measures lics in 
assistance in accessing financial sources, which only exist because of the availability of international 
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monetary aid (e.g. Phare). Moreover, some of them have been proved to be unsuitable for SMEs (see section 
3.4.2). Certain programmes are designed for large investment projects whereas SMEs tend to be hesitant 
towards long-term investments because of the unstable economic situation, their lack of experience with 
long-term investments as well as the tendency of SMEs to focus on nominal interest rates which are likely 
to be very high in times of high inflation. Other programmes are too bureaucratic and too time consuming 
in the loan application because of the amount of banks involved (RWI 1 994b, OECD 1996a). 
In the section below potential intemal and extemal sources of finance for SMEs are described and discussed 
in terms of their suitability for different funding purposes. 
3.4.1 Internal sources 
Savings from the owner or his/her family are reported to be the main sources of finance for start ups in 
Poland4 (Smallbone et al. 1996, RWI 1994a, The Delegation of Poland 1996). This pattem of finance is 
typical for SMEs in general, in the UK and elsewhere and is partly explained by the reluctance of many 
SME owners towards extemal finance, due to the costs involved and the fear of the owner of losing control 
over the business (Stanworth & Gray 1991). On the other hand, some firms that are interested in raising 
extemal finance might find it difficult in doing so, for example, in the case of debt finance, because they are 
unable to meet the criteria banks use in their lending decision or, with regard to extemal equity, because of 
the lack of a public market for SME shares. It therefore seems reasonable to ague that the actual financial 
stmcture of SMEs may be a result of the behaviour of both the firms and the banks as well as of the 
infrastmcture provided. 
However, it appears that SMEs in Poland have to rely to a greater extent on personal savings, capital from 
family and other personal (informal) networks than their counterpart in more developed market economies, 
as SMEs in Poland almost entirely have to rely on these kind of financial sources. In the 1995 survey, 93 
per cent of firms named personal savings as one of the main three sources of finance during the start up 
period (for 80 per cent, it was the main source), followed by capital from previous enterprises and bank 
finance (both mentioned by 20 per cent of respondents). However only 4 per cent of surveyed firms 
mentioned bank finance as their main source of start up finance. These findings are supported by a study of 
143 SMEs in Poland carried out by the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI) in 
1993/94 which notes that the vast majority of start ups (about 90 per cent) are financed through intemal 
sources, personal savings and capital from friends and family (RWI 1994a). In comparison, small firms in 
more mature market economies supplement their intemal sources with bank overdrafts, loans and trade 
credit. A survey of new manufacturing firms in the UK by Mason in 1989 noted that apart from personal 
savings, capital from family and friends and previous business, a mortgage or second mortgage on the 
founders home was one of the most important sources of start up finance (Stanworth & Gray 1991). Another 
4) Also includes "friends" ill a few cases. 
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study of start-up finance using a nation-wide sample of UK bank data in the early 1990s reported that about 
44 per cent of SMEs used balUc finance to commence their business (Cressy 1993). 
As the owner's personal sources of capital are likely to be used up completely (or to a great extent) for the 
start up expenses of the business, the owner has to use (if possible) retained profits and/or other, additional 
sources of finance for the necessary working capital, further investments or expansion of the firm. However, 
in 1993-1994 Polish SME owners relied mainly on internally generated finance for investments, namely 
retained profits and personal savings, which typically accounted for 50 per cent and 20 per cent (mediani 
respectively of the total amount invested during that period. Bank loans were used only to a small extent. In 
just 53 firms (20 per cent) reported banks as a source of finance for investment, however in these cases the 
loan typically accounted for about 40% (median) of the total investment (Smallbone et al. 1996). By 
comparison, a study by Mason in 1989 noted that in the UK the financial sources of SMEs after start up are 
equal proportioned on internally generated finance (namely retained profits) and external finance such as 
bank loans, financing houses and bank overdrafts (Stanworth & Gray 1991). Another survey by Keasey and 
Watson (1986-1990)6 notes that bank debt represents in the region of 31 per cent of business liabilities and 
in that sense was as important as internal equity as a source of funds to small businesses. According to 
Cressy (1993) about 50 per cent of mature SMEs borrow at some stage from their bmUc. It therefore appears 
that whereas small firms in the UK make increasing use of external sources of finance after their start up 
period, Polish SMEs still rely to a much greater extent on internal sources, even when they become 
established. 
The strong reliance on internal sources of finance of both start ups and investments can lead to serious 
financial problems for finns with negative consequences for the development of the SME sector. This can be 
the case, for example, if internal funds are insufficient to finance the gap between being paid by debtors and 
paying suppliers or to invest in machinery and equipment which might be necessary to compete in the 
market. Indeed, even in the UK, where small firms can access external finance more easily than in Poland, 
directors of companies tend to quote insufficient working capital and insufficient capital overall as two of 
the major reasons for business failure (Storey 1994). Moreover, the reliance on retained profits of Polish 
firms means that the investment must be funded from the current income, hence is limited by the 
profitability of the firms. Even though the vast majority (80 per cent) of surveyed firms (225 firms) reported 
a profit after tax in the year ending December 1994, with half of the firms even reporting a profit of more 
than five per cent of sales turnover in that year, it is not likely that these profits were sufficient to meet the 
financial needs of the finns, especially as the vast majority of surveyed firms (88 per cent) has been growth 
orientated in 1993-94; in fact, nearly two third of the firms (62 per cent) considering growth as an 
important objective. The extent to which personal savings are available depends on the accumulated 
resources of the owner. However, the level of per capita gross saving is relatively low in Poland, accounting 
5) Figures relate to 264 of the surveyed finns that did invest in the 1993-94 period. 
6) See Keasey & Watson 1995. 
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for USD 1,162 which is three times lower than in the UK and over four times lower than in Germany 
(piasecki et al. 1998). This is not surprising, bearing in mind the abolition of private ownership during the 
communist period and the fact that money was only used to a limited extent as a store of value, combined 
with high inflation rates in the 1980s and early 1990s (Buch 1996, Wyczanski 1993, G2 Economics of 
Transition 1995). It is therefore also not surprising that Polish small start-ups are less capitalised than those 
in more mature market economies. A survey of 48 small Polish fions undertaken by EOItku & Vallee (1997) 
notes that 63 per cent of firms started trading with less than $5,000, compared to only 18 per cent of 
American firms. 
Consequently, the progress of Polish firnls is constrained by the lack of finance: 262 of the 300 finns 
surveyed in 1995 identified finance as a barrier in their development and 80 per cent of the surveyed firms 
showed an interest in raising additional finance with 40 per cent even showing a strong interest. The RWl 
confirms this by noting that 51 per cent of surveyed firms had financial problems during sturt up and about 
60 per cent did not have sufficient internal capital to finance the omning of the business or investments 
(RWI1994). 
3.4.2 External sources 
The efficient and effective provision of external finance to small firms has long been recognised in the UK 
and elsewhere as a key factor in ensuring that those firms can grow and compete (Binks et al. 1992). In 
some cases the availability of external funds might even be vital for the survival of the firms, for example in 
cases where internal sources are insufficient to provide the working capital needed to keep the firm running. 
External finance is available in the form of debt finance or external equity. 
3.4.2.1 Debt finance 
In the UK, the vast majority of small businesses use debt provided by the banking sector and trade credit as 
main source of external finance. An analysis of the published accounts of 110 UK small firms in the UK 
over the period 1986 to 1990 notes that bank finance provided about 31 per cent of the overall funding of 
small firms in 1990, consisting of 17 per cent short-term (overdrafts) and 14 per cent longer-teon loans. 
Trade credit ranked second in proving 17 per cent of the overall funding (Keasey & Watson 1995). A sun'ey 
of 5589 members of the Forum of Private Business (FPB) in 1994 showed that 72 per cent of firms had a 
overdraft facility with 47 per cent being lIsed and that 40 per cent of firms had a bank loan. However these 
particular high figures are not wholly representative for small businesses in general as the sample had a bias 
towards larger businesses and those making more active lise of their banks (Binks & Ennew 1996). The 
high reliance on short teon finance provided by banks (short teon loans and overdrafts) and relative 
importance of trade credit (in comparison to larger firms) are two of the persisting characteristics of the 
financing structure of small firms (Hughes 1992). Hughes (1992) also identified a lower ratio of fixed to 
total assets in smaller companies than in larger companies, which, lllay reflect the smaller firms desire 
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towards flexible production or service methods. However, this could also be the result of difficulties 
experienced by small finns in accessing long termed debt finance or equity. 
In Poland, bank loans have been available since the reform of the banking sector in 1989, however SMEs 
are still reported to have only limited access to them (Welter 1994). In the 1995 survey only 37 per cent of 
the 300 surveyed firms had actually obtained bank finance since start up and according to the R WI survey 
only about 13 per cent of start ups use bank loans as part of their initial capital (RWI 1994a). Domestic 
banks are hesitant about lending to SMEs and foreign banks tend not to be interested in lending to SMEs 
(Suzuki 1996). In other words, credit terms are much less common in Poland than in more mature market 
economies. Although trade credit is not mentioned in the literature as a source of finance for SMEs in 
Poland, it does exists. In one of the case studies (Case 2) the owner had an opportunity to buy two machines 
by paying 50 per cent of the price in cash and receiving a credit from the supplier for the remaining half of 
the costs. In another company (Case 7) trade credit played a significant role. The credit is mainly offered by 
large foreign companies who allow about 30 days for the payment. 
An alternative to banks are public support programs offering loan finance or even grants, which are funded 
by the Polish government as well as foreign national and international organisations (Appendix I). 
However, many of the schemes proved to be unsuitable for SMEs, as they are either overly bureaucratic or 
are more interested in larger projects. For example, the long-term World Bank loan for the development of 
the private sector, which is administered by the Polish Development Bank, is only given following 
agreement with the World Bank, which means it is overly bureaucratic. The PfIARE Loan programme, 
despite a guarantee option, has been of limited efficiency because of problems with the managing bank and 
regional restrictions and the European Investment Fund Loan is irrelevant for SMEs as it is considered 
mainly for large investment projects (RWI 1994b). 
Nevertheless, there are programmes which are more suitable for SMEs, such as the BGK loan guarantee 
programme and the Programme for Structural Development in Selected Regions in Poland (.STRUDER). 
The BGK loan guarantee programme, which has been designed for SMEs, is administered by Bank 
Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) in co-operation with 12 large commercial banks. The program had been 
funded by the Polish Ministry of Finance and aims to support SMEs to increase e>.1JOrt sales, to introduce 
new technology and for certain other purposes (see chapter 6.4 for more details). The STRUDD? 
programme was implemented by the Polish Agency for Regional Development (PARD) in April 1994 and 
provides support for regional institutions, training and advisory services, regional financial support for 
SMEs and undertakes small infrastructure projects. The financial support for SME is given in the form of a 
grant scheme as well as a loan guarantee scheme in six selected provinces of Poland. The voivodships 
selected were: Walbrzych, Lodz, Rzeszow, Olsztyn, Suwalki and Katowice. The main source of funding is 
the PHARE programme of the European Union. SMEs can apply for the grant in Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) in each of the six regions. The grant is a non-repayable grant of up to 25 per cent of the 
cost of investment in mainly fixed assets. A minimum of 20 per cent has to be contributed from the 
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entrepreneur's own resources (a minimum of 15 per cent for projects over 200 000 ECU) with the balance 
coming either from more of the entrepreneur's own resources or from bank credit. The maximum level of 
grant for anyone project is 100,000 ECU. 
To be eligible for the STRUDER grant, firms have to: 
• be privately owned 
• employee not more than one hundred employees. 
• be active in the manufacturing or service sector, including transportation, tourism and agribusiness. 
• locate the investment (fixed assets only) in the region only 
• demonstrate sound management and evidence of project viability 
• have no tax or social security indebtedness. 
(Kozak 1996, EURO INFO Correspondence Centre 1995) 
The guarantee fund within STRUDER was designed to partially compensate banks for the risk involved in 
lending to SMEs which are participating in the grant scheme (EURO INFO Correspondence Centre 1995). 
At the end of April 1995 grants for over 200 projects had been approved, totalling nearly 7 million ECU. 
The total investment by the SMEs involved (all of which employ less than 100 people) amounted to almost 
30 million ECU in some of the most disadvantaged regions in Poland (Kozak 1996). In fact, two of the case 
study firms applied for a STRUDER loan, Firms 7 and 4, which gives some insight into the working of the 
scheme. Firm 7 received the loan in 1994, Finn 4 could have received the loan had they internally agreed 
on how much and in what to invest. However one of the criticisms of the programme (mentioned by Marek 
Kozak, the Director of the Polish Agency for Regional Development) is that the scheme appears to be overly 
bureaucratic for the smaller investment projects. He also suggests that it might be preferable if the upper 
limit for employees was higher than the 100 persons which it is at present. In general he points out quite 
rightly that any regulatory system should be kept as flexible as possible so that the scheme can be adapted to 
meet the actual needs of SMEs, rather than rigidly trying to meet the needs anticipated at the outset (Kozak 
1996). 
However, the awareness among small firms about the availability of public support programmes appears to 
be rather low. This problem is also known in more mature market economies as pointed out by Keasey & 
Watson (1993): "The typical small firm operates in a low information and highly uncertain environment. It 
is clear that the problems faced by small firms in obtaining external finance is in part a reflection of low 
information availability and the high fixed cost of obtaining information" (Keasey & Watson 1993). This is 
supported by two of the case study firms (Case 3 and 7) who received loans from western credit lines which 
were made available via the Powszwchny Bank Gospodarczy (PBG - one of the nine regional state owned 
banks) in 1991. Both had heard about that option through informal connection, e.g. friends. Another case 
study firm (Case 6) mentioned that 'soft' loans, e.g. with lower then normal interest rates, exist but that 
there is not enough information about these credits available. For example, one month before the interview 
the entrepreneur read in the newspaper that it would be possible to receive a loan from the city council and 
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that information about this would be available at the city council. According to the newspaper it was an 
attractive loan with lower than nornlal interest rates. It included the possibility to repay part of the loan after 
a few months, which then would be free of charge. However when he sent someone to the city council, 
nobody could tell him anything about this loan. 
3.4.2.2 External equity 
External equity, or venture capital, means that an outside investor becomes a partner of the business, 
therefore owning part of the business by investing in the equity of the firms. Venture capital provision exists 
in two fOffils, as formal and as infoffilal venture capital. Formal venture capital is provided by institutions 
such as equity funds, banks, insurance companies etc. Informal venture capital on the other hand is defined 
by Gaston (1989) as equity and near-equity risk finance invested by private individuals directly in unquoted 
businesses without the use of formal intermediaries (Harrison & Mason 1995). These informal investors, 
often ternled as 'business angels', are specific individuals who wish to become involved in the financing of 
higher-risk projects in smaller, often entrepreneurial firms (Binks & Ennew 1996). In the following section 
the development, characteristics and investment criteria of both fonnal and informal venture capital will be 
explained. 
Formal venture cal)ital 
The American Research and Development (ARD), introduced by General Georges Doriot, a professor at 
Harvard Business School in 1945, is commonly accepted as the first modern venture capital fund. By 1987 
about 600 independent private venture capital funds existed in the USA, providing US$4.2 billion of equity 
finance (NVCA 1992 in Murray 1995). In the UK, the formal venture capital market began to develop 
rapidly during the early 1980s. The British Venture Capital Association (BVCA), founded in 1983 by 36 
founder members, had 124 member in 1989 and invested a record £1.42 billion in 1,302 UK companies 
(BVCA 1992 in Murray 1995). In Poland the venture capital market has just begun to develop, hence the 
availability of formal external equity finance is still very limited. By 1997, 25 venture capital funds existed, 
nearly 99 per cent funded by foreign governments, institutions and companies. Moreover, the majority of 
investments (64 per cent) were made in larger firms with more than 250 employees (Piasecki et al. 1998). 
SMEs experience difficulties in accessing external equity, even in countries with a developed venture capital 
sector . This is because since the late 1980s, the venture capital industry shifted away from its traditional 
concern with financing early stage investments and concentrated more on larger investments in mature 
firms, particularly management buy-outs (MBOs) and management buy-ins (MBls - Mason & Harrison 
1994, Freear et al. 1995, Mason & Harrison 1993). Hughes (1992) estimates that less then 17 per ct:nt of 
venture capital funds are used for projects with a value up to £ 250,000. According to the Bank of England 
report (1998) only 5 per cent of the value of venture capital managed by the BVCA has been invested in 
early stage investments. The trend is also evidenced in statistics for continental European venture-capital 
industries. France, which has the biggest venture-capital industry in Europe after the UK, invested only 3. I 
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per cent of their total funds worth 6.9 billion FFR in seed and start-up funds in 1991, a decline of a quarter 
form the previous year (EVCA 1992 in Murray 1995). 
However this tendency is understandable as equity investment in SMEs is unattractive for many institutional 
investors for several reasons: 
• SMEs and especially new SMEs are more risky to invest in because of their high failure rate (Storey 
1994). 
• Due to the characteristics of new business start-ups, their growth potential is highly uncertain or at least 
extremely difficult for outsiders to judge. 
• The evaluation and monitoring costs involved in equity financing are more or less fixed which makes 
larger investments more profitable. Monitoring costs of investment in small and young finns are likely 
to be even greater than in larger firms due to the inherent personal way of managing the firm, as well as 
difficulties with clearly differentiating between the owner's personal finances and those of the business 
(Harrison & Mason 1995, Binks & Ennew 1996). 
• Exit routes for investments in smaller finns are more difficult to find as their shares are not traded. 
Therefore the investment is highly illiquid for the venture capitalist which makes it more problematic to 
realise any capital gain. It also further increases the risk as it might not be possible to exit quickly and 
costlessly from the investee firm in the event of its poor performance or failure (Murray 1995). 
In this context, it is not surprising that venture capitalist funds apply very strict criteria when judging 
investment proposals. Businesses that are likely to be funded have to be fast-growing and capable of 
providing an annual return of 30 to 60 per cent (Mason & Harrison 1994). As mentioned above, the 
evaluation and monitoring costs are quite high. For example, initial accountancy and legal fees range 
between £50,000 and £70,000, which makes investments under about £250,000 (US$ 400,000) uneconomic 
for the venture capitalist. In fact the average size of venture-capital investments amounted to £910,000 in 
1990, preferably in from of MBOs and MBIs (Mason et al 1994, Murray 1995, Harrison & Mason 1995). 
Realising the market imperfection in providing smaller amounts of equity finance to SMEs, public bodies in 
the UK decided to support the creation of venture capital funds directed towards small and medium sized 
businesses. The rationale for this intervention was based on the positive contribution of SMEs to the 
economy, in particular regarding job-creation and income generating effects. Between 1992 and 1993 a 
network of 11 regional enterprise funds were set up funded by Midland Bank, Lincolnshire TEC and a 
number of individuals. The funds aimed to invest smaller amounts of less then £125,000 in SMEs but still 
to produce level of returns high enough to attract institutional investors (Boocock et al. 1995). Another 
example is the Merseyside Special Investment Fund (MSIF) which is funded jointly by the European 
Regional Development Fund, the UK Government, the Merseyside local authorities' pension fund and the 
Pilingston's pension fund, with further support from the European Investment Banks in form of guarantees. 
The fund provides equity finance, unsecured mezzanine loans and loans to small businesses. Since August 
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1996 MSIF has made 130 investments, a total of £5nlll, which have attracted a further £19mn from private 
equity providers and banks (Bank of England 1998). Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) were created by the 
1995 Finance Act with the aim to invest in new shares and securities of unquoted companies. Between 
August 1995 and September 1997 eighteen VCTs invested £90.6 million, si,,1een per cent of which (£14.6 
mn) in early stage businesses (Bank of England 1998). 
In Poland, support programs offering equity finance have been established, which are supported by the 
Polish government as well as foreign national and international organisations. However, similar to the 
schemes for debt finance, the programmes are mainly designed for larger projects. For example, the PHARE 
Equi~v programme is only available to those firms that have received European Investment Bank loans, 
which are irrelevant for SMEs, as they are mainly considered for large investment projects. Moreover, the 
Export-Development Bank which is involved in the administration is mainly orientated to state companies 
(RWI 1994b). The Pioneer Investment Poland Equi~y Fund and the Polish Private Equi~V Fund both start 
investments from US$ 500,000 and arc therefore only suitable for medium sized and large companies. The 
East European Food Equiry Fund starts investments from 2 million US$ and the DBG Osteuropa Holding 
GmbH Equiry Fund even starts investments from 5 million US$. 
Nevertheless, the Renaissance Equiry Fund might consider investing in emerging private enterprises, 
including start-up and young growth companies, management buy-outs and spin-offs of small state-owned 
businesses. It makes initial investments in the range US$ 100,000 to US$ 500,000, and follow-on 
investments will be made as appropriate, with ultimate portions being in the range of US$ 1.5 million to 
US$ 2.5 million (EBRD 1998). This might therefore be suitable for SMEs, however more for medium sized 
businesses, as small firms typically are in the need of about US$ 40,000 (see section 4.3). 
However, as in the case of the other public support programmes, it appears that the finns are uninformed of 
existing venture capital funds, like for example the Renaissance Equiry Fund which could be used by 
medium-sized firms. This is supported by one of the key informant, a business adviser at the Chamber of 
Commerce in Nowy Saez (South Poland), who mentioned that SMEs in his region are poorly informed 
about the existence of venture capital funds in Poland (mainly in Warsaw). Worse, even some support 
organisations seem to be unaware of available equity programs. For example, a key informant of the Lodz 
Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation mentioned that venture capital funds for SMEs do not exist 
and that finns would have no possibility of getting e,,1ernal equity finance. It is therefore not surprising that 
one of the case study owner-managers (Case 1), who showed an interest in external equity cited that he 
would not know how to obtain external equity. 
In contrast, the situation for SMEs in the UK has further improved, as recently banks have begun to show 
more interest in offering equity finance to small firms. All major banks in the UK have venture capital 
subsidiaries, for example Barclays Development Capital Limited and Basonsmead Fund. Midland provides 
equity through the above mentioned Regional Enterprise Funds and through its SME venture capital 
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subsidiary, Midland Growth Capital. Some of the banks have even launched equity option loans, as for 
example Lloyds in 1997 (Bank of England 1998). The underlying motivation in providing equity to small 
firms is, as argued by the Bank of England (1996), the provision of it as part of a financial package, rather 
then any profits that may result from the equity deal itself. The market for money transitions and other 
financial products has become increasingly competitive with building societies and other organisations such 
as supermarkets entering the market (Bank of England 1998). Therefore the bank might offer equity finance 
to small firms not in order to make a profit out of the equity deal but to gain the firms as a customer for 
other financial products. 
Moreover in recognising the importance of a suitable exit route for venture capitalists investing in smaller 
finns as well as the lack of a market for shares of smaller firms in general, the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) was established by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1995. Listing on the AIM is 
cheaper and easier then at the LSE. By the end of September 1997 294 companies were listed, including 20 
from overseas, with a total market capitalisation of £5.5bn (Bank of England 1998). Another market, 
OFEX, which is independent of the LSE, was established in 1995 as an unregulated market. The costs 
involved in listing at OFEX are comparable with those of AIM, however the listings conditions are more 
relaxed. At the end of November 1997, 117 companies were trading on OFEX with a total market 
capitalisation of £ 2.1bn (Bank of England 1998). In 1996 a European market had been launched, the 
European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (EASDAQ), aiming at small, fast-
growing companies. However as small companies preferred listing on domestic markets, EASDAQ now 
targets medium sized enterprises (Bank of England 1998). In Poland, a capital market has existed since the 
opening of the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) in 1991, which is divided into three markets: the Main 
market, the Parallel market and the Free market. Whereas the first two markets are unsuitable for SMEs, 
the Free market could become an important source of financing for SMEs. Yet until the end of October 
1995 not one company was listed on the Free market. It has not been attractive for issuers as listing on this 
market carried with it the stigma of being viewed as a high-risk company (Suzuki 1996). 
Informal venture capital 
As the provision of small amounts of equity from venture capital funds virtually disappeared during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, business angels become more significant as equity source for small businesses in the 
USA as well as in the UK (Freear et al. 1995, Binks & Ennew 1996). The MAS 'Business Line' survey for 
Barclays Bank in 1988, which consisted of 2,000 interviews of businesses with less then 50 fulI-time 
employee, notes that 2 per cent of finns raised equity from private investors; only family and friends (4 per 
cent) and banks, including their venture-capital subsidiaries (9 per cent) were more significant as a source 
of equity finance (Harrison & Mason 1995). Only three years later a survey undertaken by the Small 
Business Research Trust in the UK showed that 3 per cent of respondent used 'other private individuals' as 
a source of equity finance compared to only 0.8 per cent that cited 'venture capital' (Harrison & Mason 
1995). According to the Bank of England (1998) business angels make approximately 10 times as many 
Martina Freiberg Page 31 
Chapter 3 Sources of finance for SMEs 
investments as formal venture capital funds in early stage businesses and invest nearly four times as much 
in total. 
A study by Freear et a1. (1995) of 284 new, technology-based firms founded in New England between 1975 
and 1986 notes that of the 177 (62 per cent) firms which raised outside equity 70 per cent received funds 
form private individuals and 51 per cent from venture capital funds. These high figures may be explained by 
the fact that these firms were founded in a time of rapid growth of venture capital and that most of these 
funds were invested in new, technology based firms. Nevertheless the study made the distinctive role of 
angels in smaller deals evident by showing that out of the 110 investments below US$ 250,000 93 per cent 
were provided by informal venture capitalists (Freear et a1. 1995). Gaston (1989) identified the average 
investment size by a US angel at just under US$ 60,000 (Mason & Harrison 1994). Surveys in the UK have 
suggested that UK angels invest even smaller amounts. A study of 86 actual and potential informal investors 
in the UK by Mason and Harrison in 1994 concluded that just over half of all investments involved amounts 
of under £10,000 (US$ 16,000) where as only 12 per cent of investments involved amounts larger then 
£50,000 (US$ 80,000 - Mason & Harrison 1994). 
The fact that informal investors generally operate at the lower end of the investment size range is certainly 
one of the reasons why they proved to be a suitable source of equity finance for SMEs. Other reasons are 
explained by the characteristics of business angels, which are fairly well analysed although it is difficult to 
gather information about them as they have a preference for anonymity, hence operate in an invisible 
market (Mason & Harrison 1994). Business angels typically are high net worth individuals who have 
personal entrepreneurship experience, normally with backgrounds in industry and commerce. Generally, 
they learn of funding opportunities through their business associates and friends and keep a close working 
relationship with the firm they invest in (Harrison & Mason 1995, Freear et a1. 1995, Mason & Harrison 
1993). These characteristics in combination with the fact that most angels already have or develop prior 
knowledge of the sector and the business they are investing in reduce the evaluation and monitoring costs 
significantly. The lower evaluation cost, in comparison to formal venture capital, stem from the more 
personal approach which makes the preparation of detailed market analysis unnecessary and reduces the 
accountancy and legal fees (Harrison et al 1995). Moreover the majority of informal venture capitalists do 
play an active role in the firm they invest in, either by joining the board of directors, providing infOIDlal 
consulting help or working full or part-time in the business (Freear et al. 1995). In other words, the 
informal investor becomes more of an insider to the fiml, thus reducing the information asymmetric 
problem which leads to lower costs in monitoring. 
In addition the investment criteria applied by business angels are less strict than those applied by venture 
capital funds. Expected annual rates of return on investment are normally within the 15 per cent and 30 per 
cent range (Harrison et al 1995). Bearing in mind that business angels are reported to be more active in new 
firms or finns in the early stage of their development than venture capital funds, thus investing in high risk 
deals, the lower expectations regarding returns on investment seem even more counterintuitive. One 
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explanation might be that many individual venture capitalists are also motivated by non-financial attributes 
of the investment. Research undertaken by Wetzel (1983) noted that half of the angels accept lower returns 
or higher risks when they expect the firm they investing in to create jobs in their communities, 
commercia lise socially useful technology, assist women entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs from ethnic minority 
groups. Thereby the most important non-financial factor for angels is to play an active role in the firms thus 
assisting the entrepreneur to build a successful business, an observation which has been confinned by other 
surveys (Freear et a1. 1995, Mason & Harrison 1994, Harrison & Mason 1995). 
As one of the most often mentioned reasons for not willing to consider external equity stated by SME 
owner-managers is the fear of losing their independence and the control over the business activities, it is 
interesting that research in the USA and the UK has shown that in the majority of cases the business angel 
only held a minority stake of the business, thus only minority voting power in the finn (Harrison & Mason 
1995, Mason & Harrison 1994). However, the informal investor may of course still expect a significant say 
in the strategy of the business which can be positive as well as negative. According to Freear et a1. (1995) 
about 75 per cent of SMEs owner-manager who had a working relationship with their angel thought it to be 
productive, where as Mason & Harrison (1994) argues that '... the clash of two strong egos may create 
conflict between entrepreneur and angel.' However even if the business angel does not interfere significantly 
in the business activities, there is still the question of what will happen once he decides to exit from the 
investment. Interestingly a study in the USA by Gaston (1989) noted that most business angels expect to 
exit by selling their shares to company insiders (ref. to Mason & Harrison 1994). In the UK however, 
surveys concluded that investors tended more to sell to outsiders, namely other companies or by flotation on 
the stock market (Mason & Harrison 1994). 
Another problem linked with finance from business angels is the highly invisible market, hence the 
difficulties in finding a potential business angel in the first place. To overcome these problems 43 business 
angel networks (BANs) have been established in the UK, aiming to bring potential investors and finns 
seeking equity finance together. Some of them are supported by banks and Nat West even runs its own 
matching service, the Nat West Angels Service. Indeed, according to the British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA) which provides lists of national and regional business angel networks, in 1996/97 over 
£ 19mn was invested by 373 business angels in 192 UK companies of which 44 per cent were part of a larger 
financial package provided by banks (Bank of England 1996 and 1998). This is an interesting model, as a 
business angel who might not have the knowledge necessary to distinguish between a prospective and non-
prospective investment opportunity, can draw on the experience of other investors such as banks or venture 
capital funds. However, it is questionable whether this might be a successful solution for Poland, as data 
about business angels are not available and banks are not interested in providing equity to small firms. 
Nevertheless, the model might have some potential in a modified version. Small business support agencies 
in Poland, which are familiar with the SMEs in their local area, could operate business angel networks, 
aiming at finding Polish (for example Polish emigrants who have been in the USA during Communism and 
who are now coming back to Poland, as mentioned by one of the key informant from the Chamber of 
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Commerce in Nowy Sacz) as well as foreign investors via modern communication systems such as the 
Internet. It might even be possible to include business angels in public and foreign support programmes, 
instead of relying on financial packages provided by banks. Considering the tendency of business angels to 
keep a close working relationship with the firm, potential German business might be especially interested in 
investing in Polish finns because of their relatively short travel distance to Poland. 
3.4.2.3 Other sources of external finance 
Financial instruments like hire purchase and leasing are also available in Poland, however they are hardly 
used as a source of finance by small firms. Two of the banks interviewed (Bank 1 and Bank 3) are offering 
leasing service for SMEs, but according to the 1995 survey only about six per cent of firms that did invest in 
1993 -94 mentioned hire purchase or leasing as a source of finance for investments, typically accounting for 
2.7 per cent (mean) of the amount invested. Two of the case studies also referred to leasing as part of their 
current financial structure. In one company (Case 5) the leasing of one car and few machines accounted for 
about 10 per cent of the current resources and another business (Case 6) used leasing even to a lower degree 
for few machines. 
3.5 Key points in chapter 3 
• Under conmmnism, hardly any sources of external finance for SMEs existed in Poland. 
• Dept finance provided by banks is available in Poland since 1989, however SMEs have only limited 
access to it. 
• Up to now, SMEs in Poland, both for start up and investment, have to rely to a greater extend on 
internal funds that their counterparts in more mature market economies. 
• Banks are the main provider of debt finance, in the UK as well as in Poland. 
• Public support programmes offering debt finance or/and external equity are often unsuitable for SMEs. 
• Polish SMEs are uninformed about existing public support programmes. 
• Polish banks do not offer equity finance for SMEs, whereas all major banks in the UK have venture 
capital subsidiaries. 
• In Poland, a stock market for SMEs does not exist, whereas two markets aiming at small finns are 
operating in the UK since 1995. 
• In the UK and the USA, informal venture capital (Business Angels) became more important as a source 
of external equity for SMEs than formal venture capitalists. 
• In the UK, 43 business angel networks are operating, aiming to bring potential investors and firms 
seeking equity finance together. 
• Infonllation about Polish business angels are not available. 
• In Poland, small business support agencies could operate business angel networks, aiming at finding 
Polish as well as foreign investors via modern communication systems such as the Internet. 
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4. FINANCE AND SMEs: PREFERENCES, NEEDS AND PROBLEMS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter four deals with the demand side of finance, the preferences of SMEs for certain types and amoWlts 
of finance and strategies of firms in accessing finance or dealing with a shortage of finance. 
4.2 Preferences of SMEs with regard to their source of finance 
4.2.1 Reasons why SMEs prefer certain sources of finance 
When discussing the factors which influence decisions made by SMEs with regard to their sources of 
finance, it is important to understand the characteristics of SMEs. In the majority of cases SMEs usually are 
managed and owned by the same person(s), which means that owner-managers of SMEs are not accountable 
for their actions towards any third parties. Therefore in SMEs, the owner~manager's personal approach 
towards issues such as debt financing directly influences the company's behaviour. Bearing in mind the 
relatively undiversified assets portfolio of the owner-manager, as the investment in the business often 
constitutes a major portion of the owner's personal assets, this means that any business risks are in fact 
personal risks for the owner (Keasey & Watsonl993, Ang 1991). This is certainly also valid for SMEs in 
Poland. The vast majority (80 per cent) of surveyed firms in 1995 were owned by one or two persons and the 
financial structure of SMEs in Poland as outlined in section 3.4.1. confirms that the assets of the business 
consists mainly of personal assets of the owner(s). Therefore it is fair to argue that the personal 
characteristics and circumstances of the business owner play an important role in the financial decision of 
the firm. For example, the reason why the owner-manager initially started the business, e.g. to seek 
independence or to increase the personal income, is likely to influence the business aim, e.g. whether or not 
growth is an objective for the firm, as too much business growth might mean that the owner-manager can 
not stay in total control of the company which might jeopardise the initial reason for starting the firm. Once 
again the business objective will influence the financial choice of the firm as internal funds might not be 
sufficient to fund the investment needed by those firms that are interested in growth. However, owner-
mangers of small firms are unlikely to have a single overriding aim in establishing and nmning their 
business. Their aims are inclined to be numerous and complex (McMahon & Stanger 1995). 
Polish SMEs are not an exception to this. The main reasons why Polish SME owners started the business 
are to seek independence (70 per cent), to increase income (60 per cent) and to gain self-fulfilment (over 50 
per cent) (Smallbone et al 1996). However 41 per cent of firms that mentioned 'to seek 
independence/autonomy' as their main reason for starting the business mentioned 'to improve living 
standards/increase income' as second main reason and 44 per cent of firms that mentioned 'to improve 
living standardslincrease income' as their main reason for starting the business mentioned 'to seek 
independence/autonomy' as second main reason. In comparison, research in the UK has revealed that 
between 30 and 50 per cent of business owners started their firms mainly to seek independence, where as 
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only about 20 per cent of firms reported income related motives to be most important (Gray 1992). This 
suggests that starting up a business in Poland is done not only to be independent and in control of the finn 
but as a possibility of increasing the standard of living especially against the background of declining large 
state companies. It could also mean that the managers do not trust the large companies to provide 
employment with prosperous futures as they failed to do so in the past. 
On the basis of the Polish owner-managers being keen to increase their income, one would expect them to 
be quite growth orientated, especially considering the fact that this form of income generation was not 
available for the Polish people for about 40 years. It is therefore not surprising that in the 1995 study 88% of 
surveyed businesses (261 finns) had been seeking growth in 1993/94: moreover, for the majority of finns 
(62 per cent) growth had been an important objective. These figures are, as expected, higher than those in 
the UK. For example a survey of 139 manufacturing firms in South London notes that 55 per cent of 
surveyed firms had been aiming to grow during the 1991-94 period whereby only 37% reported a strong 
growth objective (CEEDR 1994). 
At the same time seeking independence is even more frequently mentioned by Polish owner-managers as a 
reason for starting up a business. That could influence the growth aim of the owner-manager as soon as the 
business growth has to be financed with external funds. In other words as soon as internal funds are 
insufficient to finance the growth of the firm the owner-manager has to decide whether he/she wants to slow 
down growth in order to stay independent or whether to seek external finance, hence gives away part of the 
independence, in order to grow and to increase income. This conflict is well documented in the literature. 
Rader (1987) for example mentions that " increasing value while maintaining control of the firm is the 
main task facing business owners" and Brigham (1992) points out that "" there is value to being in control, 
and that value is not easily measured. As a result, we often observe small businesses taking actions, such as 
refusing to bring in new stockholders even when they badly need new capital, that do not make sense when 
judged on the basis of value maximisation but that do make sense when seen in the light of the personal 
objectives of the owner. " (McMahon et al 1995). In this context, Scase (1997) suggests that, as a result of 
the experiences under communism, small finns in Poland were mainly set up to conduct "spheres of 
personal autonomy". He argues that Polish owner-manager were more proprietors, aiming to trade in order 
to generate surplus to increase living conditions (hence to consume) than entrepreneurs, committed to 
capital accumulation and business growth (hence to investment). Following this argument, one would 
expect the growth orientation of Polish SMEs to decrease as soon as finns of proprietors reached a size 
sufficient to generate enough income to realise the standard of living desired by the owner-manager. 
Because of this fear of losing independence, control and freedom of managerial actions, SMEs are often 
reported to be rather reluctant to use external equity. However, the agency cost involved, such as initial 
accountancy and legal fees as well as cost resulting from the need of outside investors to monitor the 
movements of the firm to ensure proper use of their assets, may be also of importance (Mason & Harrison 
1994, Harrison & Mason 1995). Although agency costs exist in every form of external finance due to the 
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problem of asymmetric information, the cost of external equity is likely to be greater than for debt finance. 
First, for the investor the profit potential of the firms is harder to monitor than its debt-paying potential. 
Providers of equity finance need to observe all aspects of a business operation on a continuous basis whereas 
debt providers just need to monitor the ability of firms to service their loans. Banks are probably in the best 
position to do so cheaply through the bank account which the firm is likely to hold with the bank. Second, 
equity investment necessitates long-term commitment of funds with little scope for renegotiating where as 
debt finance is more likely to be agreed on a more short-term and frequently reviewed basis, secured on 
business andlor personal assets which enables the debt finance provider to prevent the firm from 
undertaking excessively risky projects (Keasey & Watson 1993, Harrison et aI1995). 
However venture capital still has certain advantages compared to debt finance. Because of the long-term 
nature of equity finance it is ideal for the funding of long-term investments, especially as the primary 
reward for the providers of venture capital is based on eventual capital gain rather then on interest rates, 
which makes the cost calculation for the firm much simpler. Even though the initial fees when accessing 
venture capital might be higher than those involved in debt finance, no running costs arise apart from those 
created by the monitoring process. This makes the firm less vulnerable especially in times when bank-rates 
are increasing and economic activity starts to slow down as experienced in the UK after 1989 (Murray 
1995). Scope for venture capital also arises in firms that are credit-worthy but can't attract debt finance for 
other reason, e.g. the lack of a track record or insufficient collateral to secure the loan. In times of economic 
recession it might also be that the main provider of debt finance, the banks, apply more conservative 
lending practices to improve their capital/asset ratios which happened in the USA as well in the UK in 
response to significant loan losses during the 1980s (Mason & Harrison 1993). 
The Wilson Committee in 1979 suggested that as many as 75 per cent of small businesses in the UK would 
resist any external participation in the equity of the company. More recently Binks et al. (l990a) suggested 
that as many as 85 per cent of small business owners may resist external equity participation because of 
concern about a loss of control, while Cowling et al. (1991) quote a figure of 61 per cent (Billks & Ennew 
1996). Nevertheless, as emphasised by reports of the Bank of England, equity finance could be a potential 
source of finance for growth orientated firms, especially when they are facing problems with bank finance 
for reasons which are not connected with the viability of the finn or the project for which finance is thought. 
It is therefore quite promising that Polish firms seem to be less reluctant towards external equity. In the 
1995 survey 53 per cent of surveyed firms stated that they would be willing to consider external equity with 
16 per cent showing a definitive interest. The figure become even more significant when looking at firms 
that were interested in raising additional finance as two thirds of these firnls (66%) showed an interest in 
external equity. Because of the potential high expectancy of external equity by Polish small business owners, 
which might be a result of their difficulties in accessing debt finance from banks, venture capital could 
become quite an important source in the financing of Polish SMEs. However not all finns interested in 
external equity are necessarily potential receiver of external equity as they might not meet the investment 
criteria set by venture capitalists. 
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4.2.2 Analysis of firms that tried to obtain debt finance 
The importance of the personal characteristics of the business owner in the financial decision of the firms in 
combination with the fact that that independence is one of the main objectives of most entrepreneurs might 
explain why SME owner-managers, if they need external finance, mainly try to get it from of debt finance. 
Debt finance leaves the owner-manager in control of the business, is potentially available from banks in the 
region and even more important, it is generally known that banks provide debt finance. The downside are 
the costs involved in form of interest rates and the collateral demanded by banks (see chapter 5.5). In the 
1995 survey in Poland 177 finns indicated that they had at least once tried to get access debt finance since 
start-up, which represented 59 percent of the 300 firms surveyed. 168 firms applied for a loan to a domestic 
bank, 11 firms applied for a loan to a foreign bank (of which 4 had also applied for a loan at a domestic 
bank) and four firms contacted other sources of debt finance. 
As the wish of the owner-manager to expand or not to ex-pand the business influences the financial decision 
of the firm, the growth orientation of the 300 firms surveyed in 1995 will be examined regarding their 
attempts to access debt finance. 
Apart from personal preferences, other factors might force the firnl towards or away from debt finance, 
which might not be under the control of the owner-manager. For example firms that experience cash-flow 
problems might have no other choice but to seek external finance in order to avoid insolvency. This is even 
more relevant as cash flow shortages are one of the major constraints on SME development in Poland 
(Smallbone et al. 1996) and the above noted percentage of firms seeking bank loans includes requests for 
overdraft facilities. Furthermore, firms might also have to invest funds that are beyond available internal 
financial means in order to survive in the new market environment with increasing competition form within 
Poland as well as abroad. Even though questions about the situation of firms at the time when they applied 
for debt finance were not covered in the 1995 survey, evidence from the case studies suggests that these 
push factors indeed exist. Three of the firms (Case 1, 3 and 7) mentioned increasing competition as one of 
the main factors for the firm's need to invest. On the other hand, even though interested in debt finance 
provided by banks, not all small businesses have access to the collateral demanded. Therefore, some firms 
are excluded from this source of external finance. As smaller firms typically have a lower ratio of fixed 
asses to total assets when compared to larger finns (Hughes 1992), smaller firms might have more 
difficulties in providing sufficient collateral than larger firms. Therefore, it seems fair to argue that smaller 
firms are less likely to apply for bank loans than larger finns. 
Moreover, it appears that bank loans as wells as foreign credit lines were more available in the begilUung of 
the reform, especially in the years 1990 and 1991, than in the following years (see chapter five for more 
details). Therefore it could be argued, that whether or not a small firm tries to apply for debt finance might 
be influenced by the ex-pectations of the owner manager to be successful. In other words, even though the 
finn is in need of external finance, the owner might not even try to apply for a loan in times when debt 
Martina Freiberg Page 38 
Chapter 4 Finance and SMEs: preferences, needs and problems 
finance is not or only to a limited extent available. Unfortunately, the question in which year the firms 
applied for the loan has not been asked in the 1995 survey, which is why this factor could only be discusses 
with data provided by the case study interviews. 
Following the above, the analysis will examine the following factors with regard to the attempts of the 
owner-managers to access debt finance: 
l. The growth orientation of the owner-manager(s). 
2. The size of the firm. 
3. The year in which the loan application took place. 
4.2.2.1 Growth orientation of owner-managers 
Analysis of the 1995 survey reveals a significant (chi-square sign. = 0.00156) relation between the growth 
aim of finns and their wish to raise debt finance. Nearly 63 per cent of firms that aimed for growth in 
1993/94 had tried to get a loan since start up compared to only 35 per cent of firms without growth (Figure 
4.1). The case study firms confirm these findings, as five of the seven owner-manager interviewed had plans 
to develop their business. This emphases the potential role banks could play in small business finance in 
Poland. 
065% 
Figure 4.1: Growth orientation of owner-manages during 1993/94 
by attempt to obtain debt finance 
Not growth orientated Growth orientated 
35% 039% 
o Did not try to obtain debtfinance III Tried to obtain debt finance 
Chi-square Pearson: value 10.00118, OF 1, significance 0.00156 
Note: For two firms the data could not be obtained. 
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4.2.2.2 Size of firms 
The assumption that smaller firms are less likely to apply for bank loans than larger firms has been 
confirmed, as microbusinesses (under 5 employees) in the 1995 survey were least likely to apply for a bank 
loan. This supports the hypothesis that there may be some self-selection among this group of firms (Figure 
4.2). Due to the high level of collateral demanded and high interest rates charged, some of the 
micro enterprises may have recognised that they either would not have a chance to obtain a loan or would 
not be able to meet the loan repayments. Another explanation may be that microfinns, due to the small 
amounts of total capital required by them, have the possibility of obtaining enough funds through personal 
loans, which are easier to access than business loans. However, those microenterprises that applied for a 
bank loan were indeed quite successful: 62 per cent of microfirms obtained bank finance, which was a 
higher proportion than those in the 6-20 employment size group, only 48 per cent of which were successful. 
It might be that in the case of microenterprises the private assets of the owner (e.g. his house) are sufficient 
as collateral, whereas such securities might not be enough to cover the amoIDlt sought by slightly larger 
firms. Case study firms 1 and 4 for example, employing eight and fifteen persons in 1995 (including two 
owners) were unsuccessful in attracting a loan from a bank because of insufficient collateral. In the first 
case, hand based production methods are used within the firm, therefore no machines are available that 
could be used as collateral. The private car provided not enough value to serve as collateral and the private 
house could not be used due to government plans to build a highway straight through the house (which 
existed for the last 30 years without anything ever happening). Case 4 used machines for production. 
However these were tailor-made and would not be sellable on the market, hence not acceptable as collateral. 
By comparison, case 3 (employing 15 persons in 1995) provided the private house as well as western 
machinery (which they intended to buy with the loan) as collateral and did received a loan in 1991. 
Nevertheless, as expected, the most successful finns in the 1995 study were the largest firms; 75% of those 
who applied for bank finance actually obtained it. 
Figure 4.2: Size of firms in number of employees by attempt to obtain debt finance 
Martina Freiberg 
1-5 employees 6-20 employees 
21-50 employees 51-100 employees 
D Did not try to obtain debt finance III Tried to obtain debt finance 
Chi-square Pearson: value 21 .57238, DF 3, significance 0.00008 
Source: 1995 study 
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4.2.2.3 Year of the loan application 
Evidence from the case study firms does not indicate any support for the hypothesis that debt finance was 
more easily obtained in the early years of transfonnation (1990/91) than in the following years (Bearing in 
mind that the data from the case study interviews is not representative.). Data about the year in which the 
fimls applied reveals that the number of loan applications did stay more or less the same between 1991 and 
1995, with a slight increase in 1996 and 1997. None of the firms tried to access debt finance in 1990 (Table 
4.1). 
On the other hand, the result has to be analysed with caution, as the criteria for the case study finns to be 
selected was that they had applied for external finance. Moreover, the nWllber of loan applications per year 
does not necessarily indicate the difficulties of Polish fimls in accessing loan finance, as finns applying for 
the second loan are likely to find it easier to obtain it than those applying for the first time (see section 4.5.2 
for more details). Furthennore, finns that were successful in raising debt finance, might have had the 
opportunity to grow, to accumulate assets, hence be able to provide more collateral for future loans. Case 
study finn 7 for example, secured a loan in 1991 which is " .. the reason that this firm is in such a good 
state." (Owner-manager of case 7). 
Additionally, unsuccessful loan applications are more often reported from case study firms that applied 
between 1994 and 1997 than those that applied before. One explanation might be, that because of the more 
stabilised economy with decreasing inflation rates firms were more interested in long term investments, 
hence in the need of higher amounts and longer termed finance. The problem firms experienced in 
attracting long term finance appeared to be connected with collateral and the reluctance of banks to grant 
larger loans. Both case 2 and case 5, for example, intended to build production premises in 1997, but could 
not provide sufficient collateral to secure the loan. In the case of firm 5 the loan would have been accounted 
for about 80 per cent of the current value of the assets of the business. Finn 5 also mentioned that banks are 
not interested to grant loans for longer periods of time. In this case, the firm had asked for a loan for five 
years. According to case 7 (who had three bank loans in 1997 and a fourth under negotiation) banks usually 
give loans for up to two years. 
Another reason why more loan applications were rejected in more recent years might be that bank became 
more careful with loan applications form very young firms, as these typically are considered as being more 
risky businesses than more mature firms. Case 5, for example, managed to access debt finance for the start 
up of the business in 1992, whereas case 4 was unsuccessful in obtaining during their first year of trading in 
1994. The reason for the rejection of the application was insufficient collateral. In conclusion, the evidence 
given does not indicate whether or not access to debt finance has become more difficult for firms (may be 
with the exemption of very young finns, for which it does appear to have become more difficult). However, 
with more years in a market economy firms seem to show an increasing interest in larger and longer term 
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investment, but for which they might not be able to provide sufficient collateral and which banks are 
reluctant to grant. 
Table 4.1: Year in which firms applied for loan finance - evidence from the case study firms 
(year of start-up) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Case 1 Nol ) 
(1982) (short) 
Case 2 Yesl ) Yesl ) Yesl ) No 
(1990) (all short) (long) 
Case 3 Yes 
(1945) (long) 
Case 4 No Yes Yes 
(1994) (short) (short) (overdraft) 
Case 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
(1992) (start up) (short) (short) (short) (short) (long) 
Case 6 Yes No 
(1990) (short) 
Case 7 Yes Yes Yesl ) Yesl ) 





Total number of 0 2 2.5 2.5 3 2 3.5 5.5 
applications 
Number of 0 2 2.5 2.5 2 2 2.5 4.5 
successful 
applications 
Note: 1) The firm did not mention the exact year they applied for debt finance. 
2) In cases where a two year period was given for the loan application, both years were given half of the 
application for the calculation of the total number of loan applications. 
3) In cases where more than two years were given a period in which the loan application took place, the 
application has been excluded from the calculation for the total number of loan applications. 
4) This loan application has been counted as "successful" in the calculation of the number of successful 
applications, because the bank appeared willing to give the loan. 
4.2.2.4 Key pOints in section 4.2.2 
• The majority of Polish firms applying for debt finance are growth orientated, hence are in need of 
ex1ernal finance to develop their business. 
• Some firms are also pushed towards external finance, as they need to invest in order to keep up with 
raising competition. 
• The small and medium sized firms are more likely to apply for debt finance than microbusinesses (firms 
with 5 or less employees). However, those microenterprises that did apply were more successful in 
obtaining debt finance then slightly larger firms. The reason might be that the private assets of smaller 
firms present sufficient collateral, whereas such security might not be enough to cover the amowlt 
sought by slightly larger firms. 
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• With more years in a market economy finns show an increasing interest in larger and longer termed 
investments, but then find they can not provide sufficient collateral. Moreover, banks are reluctant to 
grant longer termed loans. 
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Table 4.2: Evidence from the case study firms with regard to their attempt to access debt finance 
Case study firms General situation of the firm (1997) Attempts to access debt finance 
Case 1 Declining business because of Applied for bank loan before 1995 
Started trading: 1982 increasing competition, decreasing • short term loan 
Size 1995: 8 employees demand and lack of financial means • unsuccessful due to insufficient collateral to invest in machines to change the 
Business objective production. • production is hand based, therefore no machines available that could be 
1993/94: some growth used as collateral 
Education of main Specialist • private house can not be used as collateral due to governments plans to 
owner: secondary school build a highway though it 
• car is insufficient as collateral for the loan 
Case 2 Growth orientated firm with many Received three bank loans between 1992-93 
Started trading: 1990 ideas to develop the company, • provided machines as collateral 
Size 1995: 26 employees 
however not the funds to put them 
• short term loans (up to one year) used as working capital into practise. 
Business objective Current situation(1997) 
1993/94: some growth • interested in loan finance for investments (to build production premises) 
Education of main Specialist • interested in raising 300,000 ZLP 
owner: secondary school • has not enough collateral to get a loan from the bank 
Case 3 Firms that developed from using Received loan from western credit line via PBG bank in 1991 
Started trading: 1945 traditional production methods • provided private house and machines they intended to buy with the loan as 
Size 1995: 11 employees 
(mainly hand based and simple collateral 
machinery) towards modern 
• the loan was used to buy machines from Denmark Business objective survival, making machinery. However, the firm is 
1993/94 acceptable living operating in a market with increasing • the loan was taken over by PBG bank in 1991 
Education of main competition which puts it in a diffi,cult • the loan was originally for four years and was later extended to 10 years 
owner:: Secondary school financial situation. 
Table 4.2: Evidence from the case study firms with regard to their attempt to access debt finance (cont.) 
Case study firms General situation of the firm (1997) Attempts to access debt finance 
Case 4 Firm consisting of seven partners Applied for a bank loan in 1994 
Started trading: 1994 (one of which is a company) with • unsuccessful due to lack of collateral 
Size 1995: 15 employees growing sales turnover. However, • the machined used for the production are tailor made and therefore not 
Business objective 
different views among the suitable as collateral 
shareholders regarding the future 
1993/94: definitely growth development of the firms leads to Received bank loan in 1995 
Education of main University of other inconstancy within the management. • even though they had not enough collateral to secure the loan 
owner: higher education • received loan because the main customer, who is one of the partners and 
owned by the bank to 60 per cent, guaranteed for the loan 
• short term loan 
Current situation (1997) 
• have an overdraft limit on their account 
• could have received a loan from STRUDER if the management of the firms 
would have agreed how much and in what to invest 
Case 5 Growth orientated firm that seems to Received a bank loan at start up (1992) 
Started trading: 1992 be in a favourable market position, as • provided private house as collateral 
Size 1995: 35 employees they can afford to demand cash Received a loan every years since start up payment from their customers. Trade 
Business objective credit is only granted to very well • short term loan 
1993/94: definitely growth known customers. • to receive these loan was not problematic because the firm could provide 
Education of main University of other enough collateral 
owner: higher education Current situation (1997): 
• have one credit which was used to buy car : 
• the firm is interested in a five year loan to buy production premises 
• the loan would account for about 80 per cent of the current value of the 
business 
• the banks are unwilling to give a loan for such a long time 
• in addition, the firm has problems to provide enough collateral 
Table 4.2: Evidence from the case study firms with regard to their attempt to access debt finance (cont.) 
Case study firms General situation of the firm (1997) Attempts to access debt finance 
Case 6 Prosperous and growth orientated Received a bank loan before 1995 
Started trading: 1990 firm. Sough external finance because • provided cash as collateral 
Size 1995: 70 employees the owner-manager had planned a • credit for 3 months large investment and expected the 
Business objective tax office to be surprise about the Applied for a EU loan via a Polish banks in 1996 
1993/94: definitely growth financial resources of the firm. In • attractive as interest rates are 10 per cent lower than loans from banks 
Education of main Specialist other words, in this case external • unsuccessful, mainly due to the business plan required (too expensive) 
owner: secondary school finance was sought to cover • the firm also wanted to use the loan for another investment than outlined in 
unreported profits. the plan 
Case 7 Firm producing high quality products Received a loan from western credit line via PBG bank in 1991 
Started trading: 1986 for a small market with strong • had to provide everything they had as collateral 
Size 1995: 51 employees competition from foreign companies. Received loan from STRUDER in 1994: Because of this and constant 
Business objective changes in the market, the firm • part of the funds were given as a grant 
1993/94: definitely growth needs to invest on a regular basis to Current situation (1997): 
Education of main University of other stay competitive. • 12-13% of overall turnover per years are credits 
owner: higher education • have loans from 3 banks 
• the loans are for up to 2 years 
• collateral accepted by the banks are machines, houses, cars and sometimes 
raw materials 
• under negotiations for a further bank loan (Banks appears willing to give 
the loan) 
Note: Some of the data IS from the 1995 study. 
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4.2.3 Analysis of firms that are willing to consider external equity 
In order to find out whether firms in Poland might be attracted to venture capitalists if such supply were 
available, the characteristics of firms surveyed in 1995 that showed an interest in e:\1emal equity were 
analysed. Only those 240 firms that expressed an interest in raising additional finance were included in the 
analysis. Venture capitalists, both informal and formal, are attracted by firms with rapid growth prospects 
and that are able to produce a high rate of return on investment. They therefore need to be convinced that 
the owner-manager is be able to realise this expectations. In fact, the ability to manage the business is 
reported to be one of the key factors in the investment decision of venture capitalists (Harrison & Mason 
1995, Boocock et al. 1995). Mason & Harrison (1994) note the lack of confidence in the entrepreneur to be 
the most significant reason for rejecting investments opportunities by business angels. The judgement 
whether or not an owner-manager is capable of managing the firms certainly depends on the personal 
impression he or she makes on the venture capitalist. However, the background of the owner, the level of 
education and former work e:\1JCrience, might influence that judgement. 
The motivation of the owner manager to start the business is likely to be of relevance for the acceptance of 
venture capital, as for example owners prioritising independence are unlikely to be willing to share the 
ownership of the firm. However, firms might also be pushed towards the acceptance of venture capital 
because of difficulties to tap bank finance. In western countries venture capital typically is viewed by many 
SMEs as source of the last resort which will only be considered should other sources of debt finance not be 
accessible (Binks et al. 1990, Harrison & Mason 1995). Therefore, one could expect that finns which 
received a loan from a bank or another provider of debt finance would reject the idea of external equity. 
However, it might even be of more importance whether or not the development of the firm is constrained or 
held back by a shortage of finance, as this indicates more precisely the actual need of the firm to raise funds. 
Moreover, the amount of finance sought by firms might also contribute towards their interest in equity 
finance since it appears that firnls e:\1JCrience more difficulties in raising larger amounts of finance, mainly 
because of difficulties in providing sufficient collateral. 
Consequently, the analysis will examine the following characteristics of the owner-managers as well as finn 
related factors with regard to the interest of finns in ell.1ernal equity: 
Characteristics of the owner-manager: 
1. The growth orientation of owner-manager. 
2. The background of the owner-manager (level of education and work experience). 
3. The motivation of the owner-manager to start the business. 
Firm level characteristics: 
1. The profitability of the firm. 
2. The possibility of the firm to access debt finance. 
3. The extent to which the shortage of finance influences the development of the firm. 
4. The amount of finance sought by the firm. 
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4.2.3.1 Growth orientation of owner-managers 
Interestingly there is no significant difference between growth and non-growth oriented firms with respect 
to their willingness to consider external equity as a source of additional finance. 65 per cent of firms that 
aimed to grow in the next 12 month claimed to be interested in external equity compared with 70 per cent of 
firms that did not aim to grow. This might indicate that firms generally find it rather difficult to obtain debt 
finance, so that even firms that are not interested in growth but in defining their goals as making an 
acceptable living would consider external equity. This also includes firms that are struggling to survive, 
which are unlikely to be of interest for potential venture capitalists. Case study firm 1 for example, showed 
no interest in external equity when questioned in 1995 (1995 study), even though they had been 
unsuccessful in raising loan finance from their bank. In 1997, however, the owner-manager indicated an 
interest in venture capital, probably because the business is declining and an equity partner was seen as a 
potential saviour of the firm. 
Nevertheless, growth oriented firms in the 1995 study showed a stronger interest in external equity than 
those with other business objectives (21 per cent of growth firms were definitively willing to consider 
external equity compare to only 9 per cent of firms without growth ambitions). Moreover, the majority of 
firms (90 per cent) were growth oriented in the first place and half of the 16 firms that did not aim to grow 
in the next 12 months claimed to be aiming for long-term growth. Looking at the growth actually achieved 
by firms in terms of sales turnover at the end of 1994 compared with 1993, it is encouraging to see that the 
majority of firms (74 per cent) increased their sales turnover in 1994. It seems that Polish firnls are not only 
willing to grow but in fact arc able to do so, and quite considerably. Therefore, Polish SMEs could be of 
interest for venture capitalists. 
On the other hand, evidence from the case study interviews suggest that finns, even though growth is an 
important business objective, will be less interested in external equity as soon as they are able to access 
sufficient finance through other sources. Out of the four of the case study firms which indicated a definite 
interest in growth for 1993/94 in the 1995 study and which were still growth orientated when interviewed in 
1997, only one finn (case 7) showed an interest in external equity in 1997. Two of the other firms expressed 
no need for external equity. One of them could generate enough internal funds, the other enjoyed an 
overdraft limit on their bank account and could have received a loan from STRUDER, if the management 
could have decided on how to invest the funds. In other words, the relatively high level of interest in 
external equity in this Polish sample of manufacturing firms appears to reflect the greater difficulties they 
experience in raising loans and other fonns of finance compared with UK firms rather than a higher level of 
interest in venture capital per se. 
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4.2.3.2 Background of main owner (level of education and work experience) 
Analysis of the 1995 survey shows no difference between the level of education of owner-manager nor their 
professional background with regard to their interest in external equity. However, it is encouraging that the 
level of education of Polish entrepreneurs is high in general, with 50 per cent of entrepreneurs having a 
University or other higher education. These findings are supported by a study by Erutku & Vallee (1997) 
who notes that 65 per cent of Polish owner-managers in his sample of 48 firms had completed their college 
education and that Polish entrepreneurs in general tend to be more educated then their American 
counterparts. 
Regarding fonner work experience owner-managers come mainly form a technical background (50 per 
cent), e.g. have been an engineer before starting the own firnl, or used to be a craft or skilled tradesman (23 
per cent), for example a printer or carpenter. Therefore it might be, that whilst very capable of 
manufacturing the product, the owner-manager could be lacking marketing skills, an allegation which has 
been supported by further analysis. Information about the domestic market are mainly gathered through 
existing customers and/or informally from other businesses or colleagues in the same industry (64 per cent 
and 50 per cent respectively, where managers could cite up to three sources of information). To promote 
their products only 48 per cent of firms interested in external equity make use of advertisement and even 
fewer finns (20 per cent) produce any kind of sales brochures. These finding fit with those of Erutku & 
Vallee (1997) who notes that most Polish owner-manager' ... do not know what marketing is, nor are they 
aware of the role that it could play in a business development strategy.' The lack of marketing know-how is 
not surprising considering the fact that none of that was needed in the fonner centrally planned economy, 
where the shortage of productive resources was the main problem, not a lack of demand or strong 
competition. Policy measures undertaken to overcome this deficit were 110t sufficient, partly because of the 
lack of suitable training arrangements as well as for technical and financial reasons (OECD 1996a). Other 
forms of marketing assistance, e.g. from business support organisations or from local/national authorities, 
was also lacking as 90 per cent of firtns interested in external equity stated that they never received any 
external assistance for marketing. This certainly is a weak point from the perspective of any potential 
provider of external equity. However it also could be the base for a good working relationship should the 
venture capitalist be in the position to contribute marketing knowledge to the finn. 
4.2.3.3 Motivation of owner-managers to start the business 
The main reasons for starting businesses by surveyed managers were to seek self-fulfilment or independence 
(84 per cent of respondents) as well as to improve living standards or to increase income (62 per cent of 
respondents). However no difference could be found between founders with different motivations for 
starting the business with regard to their interest in external equity (Table 4.3). The reason is probably that 
over half of the respondents (53 per cent) mentioned both reasons as motivation for setting up their own 
business. This could indicate that while wanting to own the business the wish to increase the current living 
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standard is strong enough to accept sharing the ownership of the business, especially considering the lack of 
alternative sources of finance. 
Evidence from the case study interviews confirms this suggestion. Out of the five firms that quoted "to 
improve living standards / to increase income" as their main aim for starting up the company, three did not 
expressed any interest in external equity. All of these firms had been able to access debt finance. The most 
often quoted reasons for being reluctant were the fear of the owner(s) to lose total control over the business 
operations. Out of the two firms that were interested in venture capital, one is declining and could not 
access any bank loan, therefore is desperate for funding (Case I). The other one could access debt finance, 
however has to invest on a constant basis as the company operates in a changing market to invest in order to 
keep up with the competition (Case 7). In other words, this firms is more or less being pushed into the 
acceptance of ex1ernal equity. Following this art:,'Ument one would expect the interest of Polish firms in 
venture capital to decrease should bank finance or any other kind of debt finance become more easily 
obtainable in the future. Therefore, this factor has to be taken into account in the setting up of systems or 
policies aiming to improve the supply of venture capital to Polish SMEs. 
Table 4.3: Reason for starting the business by willingness to consider external equity 
Would not Would possibly Would definitely Total 
consider consider consider number of 
external equity external equity external equity firms 
Reasons given No % No % No % No % 
Seek independence or 67 34 94 47 38 19 199 100 
gain self-fulfilment 
Improve living standard or 53 36 69 47 25 17 147 100 
increase income 
Alternative to 27 33 40 49 14 18 81 100 
unemployment or 
family tradition or 
imitation of other 
entrepreneurs 
• 
Seek independence or go 43 34 61 48 22 18 126 100 . 
self-fulfilment 
and 




Source: 1995 study 
Note: Manager could give up to three reasons for starting a business 
4.2.3.4 Profitability of firms 
As it appears from the above that difficulties in accessing debt finance constitute a push factor towards 
venture capital for Polish SMEs, it is not surprising that firms that made a loss in the financial year ending 
1994 showed a higher acceptance of external equity as a possible source of finance then those ending up 
with a profit (80 per cent and 61 per cent repetitively - Figure 4.3). This is understandable, as loss making 
firms are more likely be dependent on external finance to keep the business going than those which are 
profitable, hence have more internal funds at their disposal. However this does not limit the scope for 
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Figure 4.3: Loss/Profit after tax of firms at the end of 1994 by 
willingness of the owner to consider external equity 
Loss Break even 
. 80% 
Profit 
OWould notconsiderexternal equity 
11 61% 
. Would consider external equity 
Chi-square Pearson: value8.64924 DF 2, significance 0.01324 
Note: For two firms the data could not be obtained. 
Source: 1995 study 
e~1ernal equity provider, considering the fact that the majority of the finus that were interested in raising 
additional finance (82 per cent) did end the year 1994 with a profit 
4.2.3.5 Possibilities for firms to access debt finance 
Interestingly, whether or not a finn had been successful in raising a loan or not doesn 't influence their 
interest in e~1ernal equity. This might indicate that firms that received finance did not obtain enough 
finance. Indeed 56 per cent of these finns were still trying to raise additional finance of ZLP 100,000 and 
more. Case study firm 7 for example, even though very successful in raising debt finance (12-13 per cent of 
the overall turnover per year are financed with credits) had thOUgllt about accessing external finance, as 
they needed to invest on a constant basis to keep up with the competition in the market. 
Another explanation for the interest in external finance of firms that accessed debt finance might be that the 
loan they did obtain since start up was short-term and that they are now in the need of another round of 
financing. It is also possible that they are now looking for long-term finance which they might find difficult 
to receive from banks, as experienced by two of the case study finns (Case 2 and case 5). On the other hand, 
both firms were not interested in venture capital. Case firm 5 generates enough internal funds and firm 2, 
even though in need of long term external finance, does not want to share the ownership of the firm with 
another partner. One reason is that members of the owners family are working within the company and that 
he feared that a new partner might disagree with tIils. Following these arguments, it appears that not the 
fact whether or not the firms could access debt finance is important towards the acceptance, but more 
whether or not the firms could raise sufficient funds internally. 
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In the case of the finns that tried to access debt finance but have not been successful (of which there were 57 
in the survey), it is important to investigate the reason. For example, finns that have been denied funding 
for reasons that are connected with the viability of the firm or the project in question would certainly not be 
able to attract any source of equity. However, the survey showed that finns were mainly denied finance 
because of insufficient security or collateral (46 per cent) or could 110t accept the loan due to excessive 
interest rates (39 per cent). Further analysis even showed that the majority of these firms (77 per cent and 
91 per cent respectively) did indeed realise a profit at the end of 1994 (Table 4.4), so were not failing to 
raise debt finance because of this factor. 
Table 4.4: Firms that not been successful in obtaining a loan by profit/loss after tax at the 
end of 1994 
Loss 
No % 
Collateral 5 19 
Interest 1 4.5 
Other - -
Total number of firms 6 10 
Note: For seven firms the data could not be obtained. 







4.2.3.6 Shortage of finance for the development of firms 
Profit Total number 
of firms 
No % No % 
20 77 26 100 
20 91 22 100 
9 100 9 100 
49 86 57 100 
As expected, firms that are definitely constrained by a lack of finance expressed a stronger interest in 
external equity than those that were not at all or only to some extent constrained (Table 4.5). Nearly 30 per 
cent of firms that describe the development of their firms as clearly constrained by lack of finance would 
definitely consider venture capital compared to only 12 per cent of firms that were not at all or only to some 
extent constrained by a lack of finance. In other words, in an environment of limited access to debt 
financing, the lack of finance of Polish firms constitutes a negative push factor towards external equity. 
Table 4.5: Firm's development constrained by lack of finance by willingness to consider 
external equity 
Would not Would possibly 
consider consider 
external equity external equity 
Constrained by lack of No % No % 
finance 
not at all / to some extent 46 35 69 53 
definitely 36 33 41 38 
Total number of firms 82 100 110 100 
Chi-square Pearson: value 11.02271, OF 2, significance 0.00404 
Note: For one firms the data could not be obtained. 
Source: 1995 study 
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Would definitely Total number 
consider of firms 
external eqUity 
No % No % 
! 
16 12 131 100 ! 
31 29 108 100 
47 100 239 100 
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4.2.3.7 Interest in additional finance 
Finns interested in raising larger amounts are significantly more willing to share the ownership of the 
company, in other words to consider exiernal equity (Figure 4.4).77 per cent of firms seeking to raise more 
than 100,000 ZLP showed a positive attitude towards external equity with 27 per cent being definitively 
interested. In comparison, firms seeking up to 100,000 ZLP were less willing to consider exiernal equity, yet 
still showed a high level of interest. More than half of these firms (58 per cent) would consider venture 
capital with 16 per cent mentioning a definitive interest. An explanation might be that firms seeking larger 
amounts can't deliver the collateral necessary to obtain such amounts of debt finance from banks, whereas 
securities such as cars, the private house etc. might be sufficient to raise smaller amOlUlts of finance. It 
could also be that firms seeking larger amounts of finance need these for long ternl investment and that 
external equity is considered due to the lack of available long term bank finance. 
Figure 4.4: Interest of firms in raising additional finance by 
willingness of the owner to consider external equity 
Interested in rais ing up to 100,000 ZLP Interested in raising more than 100,000 ZLP 
o 
1:.:142% 
o Would not cons ider external equity 
o Would pos s ibly cons ider external equity 
Would definitely consider external equity 
. 27% 
Chi-square Pearson: value 9.88340, DF 2, significance 0.00714 
Note: For 16 firms the data could not be obtained. 
Source: 1995 study 
4.2.3.8 Key points in section 4.2.3 
• The majority of firms interested in venture capital ended 1994 with a profit and increased their turnover 
in 1994 compared to 1993, on average by 25 per cent (median). 
• Polish owner-managers in general are well educated. 
• Owner-manager come mainly from a technical background or used to be a craft or skilled tradesman. 
They show a lack of marketing know-how, which can be a weak point from the perspective of potential 
equity provider. 
It is therefore fair to argue that Polish firms, in terms of their growth ambitions, their growth potential and 
their personal ability could well be of interest to informal venture capitalists, especially to those that could 
provide marketing knowledge to the finn . 
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• Even though owner-managers seek independence, the wish to increase the current standard of living or 
the need to invest because of increasing competition is strong enough to accept sharing the ownership of 
the business in a large proportion of firms. 
• Former success in raising debt finance does not necessarily influence the interest of owner-managers in 
external equity, probably because finns had only obtain short term finance and became more interested 
in longer term loans which banks do not provide. However, as soon as the firms receive sufficient debt 
finance, their interest in venture capital decrease. 
• Firms were denied debt finance mainly because of insufficient collateral or excessive interest rates 
required by banks. The majority of these firms did however realise a profit a the end of 1994. Banks are 
not financing profitable firms due to conservative lending and high interest rates. 
• Firms interested in raising larger amounts are more interested in venture capital than firms interested in 
raising smaller amounts. 
• Two thirds of finns interested in external equity are actually constrained in their development by a 
shortage of finance. 
It would appear that from the small business owner point of view, a better venture capital market in Poland 
can help overcome financial constraints which hinder the development of the firms, without them having to 
provide extensive securities. However, the majority of firnls started their business in order to stay 
independent and the majority of firms willing to consider external equity were definitely constrained by 
external finance, which constitutes a negative push factor. Therefore, one would expect the interest in 
venture capital to decrease as soon as the collateral requirements for debt finance are lowered and longer 
termed debt finance become more easily available from banks. 
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Table: Table 4.6.: Evidence from the case study firms with regard to their interest in external equity 
Case study firms Motivation for General situation ofthe firm (1997) Success in accessing Interest in external 
starting the debt finance equity 
business 
Case 1 to improve living Declining business because of Did not receive any debt YES 
Business objective some growth standards I to increasing competition, decreasing finance. They would like to access 
1993/94: increase income demand and lack of financial means external equity, however 
Education of main Specialist to invest in machines to change do not know how they 
owner: secondary production. could do this. 
school 
Background of craft/skilled 
main owner: tradesman 
Case 2 1) to improve living Growth orientated firm with many Received three short NO 
Business objective some growth standards / to ideas to develop the company, term bank loans The owner does not want 
1993/94: Specialist increase income however not the funds to put them between 1992-93 to share the firm with 
Education of main secondary 2) family tradition into practise. another partner. One 
owner: school 3) to seek reason for this is that 
Background of craft/skilled independence / 
members of the owners 
family are working within 
main owner: tradesman autonomy the business, and he would 
be afraid that a new 
partner would want to 
change the situation. 
Case 3 1) family tradition Firms that developed from using Received long term loan NO 
Business objective survival, making 2) to seek traditional production methods in 1991. The owner has no interest 
1993/94 acceptable independence / (mainly hand based and simple in external equity. 
Education of main living autonomy machinery) towards modern machinery. However, the firm is 
owner: operating in a market with increasing 
Background of Secondary competition which puts it in a difficult 
main owner: school financial situation. 
craft/skilled 
tradesman 
Table: Table 4.10.: Evidence from the case study firms with regard to their interest in external equity (cont.) 
Case study firms Motivation for General situation of the firm (1997) Success in accessing Interest in external 
starting the debt finance equity 
business 
Case 4 1) to improve living Firm consisting of seven partners Received short termed NO 
Business objective definitely growth standards / to (one of which is a company) with bank loan in 1995. The firms does not need 
1993/94: increase income growing sales turnover. However, Currently have an any external equity. 
Education of main University of 2) to seek different views among the overdraft limit on their Moreover, the current 
owner: other higher independence / shareholders regarding the future account partners would be afraid 
education autonomy development of the firms leads to Could have received a that an increase in Background of 3) to gain self- inconsistency within the loan from STRUDER if external equity might lower main owner: management. Technical fulfilment the management of the their significance in the 
firms would have agreed firm. 
how much and in what 
to invest 
Case 5 to improve living Growth orientated firm that seems to Received a bank loan at NO 
Business objective definitely growth standards / to be in a favourable market position, start up (1992) The owner had bad 
1993/94: Technical increase income as they can afford to demand cash Received a loan every experiences with a partner 
Education of main University of 
payment from their customers. Trade years since start up in the past, as the partner 
owner: other higher credit is only granted to very well The firm is now looking had a different view about known customers. I how to run the company. 
Background of education for a larger and longer 
main owner: term loan which the 
banks are unwilling to 
give. 
Table: Table 4.10.: Evidence from the case study firms with regard to their interest in external equity (cont.) 
Case study firms Motivation for General situation of the firm (1997) Success in accessing Interest in external 
starting the debt finance equity 
business 
Case 6 1) to gain self- Prosperous and growth orientated Received a short termed NO 
Business objective definitely growth fulfilment firm that appeared to have sough bank loan before 1995 There is no need for 
1993/94: 2) to seek external finance only to cover illegal external equity in the firm. 
Education of main Specialist independence / activities. The owner-manager had planned a large investment and 
owner: secondary autonomy expected the tax office to be surprise 
Background of school 3) to improve living about the financial resources of the 
main owner: Technical standards / to firm. increase income 
Case 7 1) to improve living Firm producing high quality products Received a loan in 1991 YES 
Business objective standards / to for a small market with strong Received loan from They had thought about 
1993/94: definitely growth increase income competition from foreign companies. STRUDER in 1994: external equity, even 
Education of main University of 2) to seek Because of this and constant Currently, enjoy two about listing at the stock 
owner: other higher independence / changes in the market, the firm short term and one market. However, their 
education autonomy needs to invest on a regular basis to medium term bank loan. turnover is too low at Background of 
3) family tradition stay competitive. present to be able to list on main owner: Academic the stock market. To 
achieve sufficient 
turnover, they would need 
external support. 
Note: Some of the data is form the 1995 study. 
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4.3 Need for further finance 
In order to improve the financial market for SMEs effectively, it is important to understand both the 
financial needs and the characteristics of small firms. Moreover, the expectations of SMEs with regard to 
external finance have to be taken into account, as difficulties in accessing external finance reported by small 
business owner might partly exist because of unrealistic expectations of the owner-manager. Therefore, this 
section will analyse the characteristics (such as age, sector, size and growth orientation) of firms interested 
in additional finance, as well as the terms and conditions (e.g. amount, repayment period and interest rates) 
under which those firms would be willing to accept external finance. 
The basis for this section are the 240 finns of the 1995 survey (80 per cent) that showed an interest in 
raising additional finance, of which 50 per cent eAl'ressed a strong interest. However, no difference could be 
found between finns that were possibly interested in raising additional finance and those that were 
definitely interested with regards to the amount of finance required. Over half of the firms (57 per cent) 
were interested in raising amounts up to 100.000 ZLP where as about a quarter of firms would have 
preferred to borrow more than 300.000 ZLP (Table 4.7). The typical amount sought was 100.000 (median), 
the lowest amowlt required was 5.000 ZLP and the highest amount was 11.000.000 ZLP. 7 
Table 4.7 Interest in additional finance in ZLP 
Number of firms Percentage of firms 
up to 50,000 ZLp8 65 28.9 % 
over 50,000 ZLP up to 100,000 ZLP 63 28.0% 
over 100,000 ZLP up to 300,000 ZLP 42 18.7 % 
over 300,000 ZLP 55 24.4 % 
Total number of firms 225 100 % 
Source: 1995 study 
7) 15 finns out of tllat group had to be excluded from the analysis as no data about the amount of finance they would 
have liked to raise is available. 
8) ZLP 50,000, ZLP 100,000 and ZLP 300,000 are the quartiles of the frequency distribution of additional finance 
sought by Polish SMEs. 
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4.3.1 Characteristics of firms that are interested in additional finance 
4.3.1.1 Age of firms 
Analysis of the 1995 survey showed no difference between finns that had started trading before the political 
changes in summer 1989 and those that had started trading after summer 1989 with respect to their demand 
for additional finance per employee9 . 
This would be somewhat surprising in the case of more mature market economies, where one would expect 
the older firnlS to have less demand for additional finance per employee since they have had the opportunity 
to accumulate capital over an extended period of time. However, in Poland the situation is somewhat 
different. The growth of small firms was limited under communism and external finance for SMEs only 
became more accessible in the 1980s in the form of foreign start up capital (Grabowski et al. 1992). 
Therefore, Polish firms that started trading before 1989 had no more chance to accumulate assets than those 
that started later. Moreover, firms that stated trading under communism had to adapt to the new economic 
environment after 1989 in terms of their approach in running the business (from production orientation 
towards consumer orientation). Therefore, it might indicate that the resources of the older firms had already 
been used for adjustments necessary to adapt to the new market environment. 
4.3.1.2 Sector 
Smallbone et al 1996 already stated that there were sectoral variations regarding the financial needs of 
firms. The median capital sum sought by firms in the food processing sector (ZLP 200.(00) was twice the 
level of the median of the sample as a whole. In fact, the minimum and maximum capital sum required by 
SMEs in the food sector were on a higher level that those of the firms in the other sectors (Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8: Interest in additional finance in ZLP by sector 
Median Mean Minimum Maximum 
Food processing 200,000 791,455 20,000 11,000,000 
Engineering 100,000 252,158 5,000 2,000,000 
Clothing 100,000 292,624 7,200 3,000,000 
Furniture 100,000 226,364 10,000 2,000,000 
All sectors 100,000 388,112 5,000 11,000,000 
Source: 1995 study 
I 
To eliminate possible effects the firm size might have on the capital sum required, the amount of additional 
finance per employee required was calculated for each sector (Table 4.9). There still appeared to be a very 
significant difference between the sectors. 65 per cent of the SMEs in the food processing sector would have 
liked to raise more then 8.333 ZLP per employee, compared to 60 per cent of firms in the furniture sector, 
9) The amOlmt of additional finance per employee required was used to eliminate possible effects the fiml size might 
have on the capital sum required 
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50 per cent in the engineering sector and only 30 per cent in the clothing sector ( x2-test = 0.00084). This 
reflects the high investment costs that are typical of the food processing sector due to the expensive 
machinery needed, whereas the clothing sector is typically more labour intensive, particularly given the cut 
make and trim (CMT) nature of much of the activities in the case of surveyed firms (Smallbone et al 1996). 
Table 4.9: Interest in additional finance per employee by sector 
up to 8,333 ZLp10 over 8,333 ZLP Total number of firms 
No % 
Food processing 19 35 
Engineering 29 50 
Clothing 40 70 
Furniture 22 40 
Total number of firms 110 49 
Chi-square pearson: value 16.673235, OF 3, significance 0.00084 
Source: 1995 study 
4.3.1.3 Size offirms 
No % No % 
36 65 55 100 
29 50 57 100 
17 30 57 100 
33 60 55 100 
115 51 225 100 
Looking at the amount per employee required by the firms, it appeared that it was mainly the 
microenterprises that needed the highest amounts. 76 per cent of the firms with 1-5 employees would have 
liked to raise more then 8.333 ZLplO per employee compared with between 37 to 48 per cent of the other 
size groups (Figure 4.5) . 
Figure 4.5: Interest in additional finance per employee in ZLP by firm size 
1-5 employees 6-20 employees 
1324% 11 76% 052% 




Interest in raising finance (in ZLP) 
o up to 8,333 ZLP • over 8,333 ZLP 
Chi-square pearson: value 18.01130, OF 3, significance 0.00044 
Source: 1995 study 
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One explanation might be that, as mentioned earlier on, microenterprises were least likely to apply for a 
bank loan in the first place, hence were among those firms that received the lowest level of external finance 
both for the start up of the business as well as for investments in 1993 and 1994 (Table 4.10 and Figure 
4.6). In addition, microenterprises were less successful in growing in terms of sales turnover than the larger 
firms. More than half of the firms with 1-5 employees (56 per cent) reported that the value of sales 
decreased in 1994 compared with 1993, whereas 70 to 90 per cent of firms with 6 and more employee said it 
had increased. Therefore it was even more difficult for microenterprises to generate funds for investment, 
which may help to explain why they invested significantly smaller amounts in the years 1993 to 1994 than 
larger firms, even when standardised by the number of employee. The majority of firtns with 1-5 employee 
(64 per cent) invested less then 2,500 ZLpll per employee compared to 36 per cent of finus with 51-100 
employee (x2-test = 0,03263). TIllS suggests that the demand for lllgller amounts of additional finance 
among microenterprises exists due to the low level of internal sources available for investments. TIllS is also 
supported by the high percentage of nlicroenterprises (32 per cent) clainling that their technical standard is 
lower than that of their competitors, compared with 9 to 19 percent of firtns with 6 and more employee (X2-
test = 0.02934). 
Table 4.10: Main sources of capital at start up by firms size 
Number of employees Internal sources External sources All responses 
No % No % 
1-5 73 89 9 11 
6-20 91 89 11 11 
21-50 72 75 24 25 
51-100 66 71 27 29 
All responses 302 81 71 19 
Note: Each manager was able to identify up to 3 main sources of capital at start up 







Figure 4.6: Level of external finance for investment 1993/94 in percent by firm size 
Firm size 
1-20 em ployees 
21-100 employees 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Percentage of external finance for investment in 1993/94 
Chi-square pearson: value 15.39068, OF 2 , significance 0.00045 
Note: For 17 firms the level of external finance for investment was not obtainable 
Source: 1995 study 
10) 8.333 ZLP per employee is the median amount of additional frnance per employee required 
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As mentioned by Smallbone et al. (1996), the development of new products is important for firms to survive 
and grow in the face of increasingly competitive market conditions. Since financial resources are required to 
implement a strategy for innovation it is not surprising that firms that were more interested in developing 
new products required significantly higher amounts of additional finance then those that were less interested r· · 
(X2 -test = 0,02277). However when standardised by finn size no differences could be identified between the 
level of interest in product development with regard to the amowlt of additional finance required. The same 
phenomena appeared when the aim to grow in the ne"i 12 months was compared with the need for 
additional finance. In other word finns that were less interested in product development and growth still 
needed as much funds as those finns that showed more interest. This suggests that the fonner had other 
reasons for the need of additional finance. As it was mainly the larger firms in the survey that showed a 
higher interest in the development of new products as well as in growth (Figure 4.7 and Table 4.11) the 
overall conclusion is that the larger firms in the study seem to need additional finance mainly for product 
development and growth whereas the microenterprises need part of the funds to raise their technical 
standard to that of their competitors, in other words simply to survive. 




















1 - 5 6 -100 
employees employees 
Firm size 
Chi-square pearson: value 11.23589, OF 2, significance 0.00363 
Source: 1995 study 
Table 4.11: Growth an aim for the next 12 months by firms size 
Number of employee Growth is not an aim 
No % 
1-20 16 14% 
21-100 6 6% 
Total number of firms 22 % 
Chi-square pearson: value 4.28501, OF 1 , significance 0.03845 
Note: In one case the data was not obtainable 
Source: 1995 study 










11) ZLP 2,500 is the median sum invested per employee of the firms that were interested in raising additional finance. 
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4.3.2 Terms and Conditions 
As mentioned above opportunities for SMEs to access debt finance from banks are still limited, especially 
for long-term credits. However no evidence could be found from the 1995 survey that a demand for long-
term credit exists among SMEs. Indeed only 44 firms out of the 225 that were interested in additional 
finance answered the question about the maturity period they would want provided a bank loan would be 
available. 23 of these 44 firms were interested in a period of between one and three years. 13 firms would 
have preferred a short-term loan with a maturity period of up to one year and the remaining 8 firms seek to 
borrow funds for more then three years. 
On the other hand, as the economic situation in Poland became significantly more stable between 1995 and 
1997, with inflation lowering from 27.8 per cent to 13.2 per cent (Gronkiewicz 1998, National Bank of 
Poland 1998), firms might have become more interested in longer term loans. This suggestion is supported 
by two of the case study finns that tried (unsuccessfully) to access long termed finance in 1997 in order to 
build production premises. One of these firms (case 5) required a maturity period of five years. 
The majority offirms (77 per cent) were willing to accept nominal interest (i.e. not acljusted by the inflation 
rate) rates up to 23 per cent. The average rate managers approved was 12 per cent (median). Compared with 
the interest rates offered by commercial banks in 1995 these appear relatively low as the lending rates of the 
banks only started at 24 to 44 per cent, depending on the individual bank (National Bank of Poland -
Annual Report 1995). However, these rates were for lowest-risk loans and referred to the interest rates 
charged to borrowers in good financial standing. In particular cases, depending on the level of risk 
involved, banks applied higher rates (National Bank of Poland - Annual Report 1995). Considering the high 
risks involved in lending to small and medium sized businesses, it is very likely that these higher rates 
would have been applied for the firms surveyed enterprises (Keasey 1993, Wyczanski 1993). Nevertheless, 
an inflation rate of 27.8 per cent in 1995 emphasises that smail business owners have rather unrealistic 
expectations regarding the interest rate, as they seem not to realise that banks simply can not survive on 
negative real interest rates, as they are commercial businesses and, like every business, depend on profits in 
order to survive (For more information on interest rates see section 5.5.3). 
4.3.3 Key pOints in section 4.3 
• The typical am0ll11t sought by Polish manufacturing SMEs in 1995 was 100,000 ZLP (median). 
• It appears that the resources of the older firms had been already used of adjustment necessary to adapt to 
the new market economy, as analysis of the 1995 survey showed no difference between firms that had 
started trading before the political changes in summer 1989 and those that had started trading after 
summer 1989 with respect to their demand for additional finance per employee. 
• Finn seeking larger amounts of finance than the median amount were typically those of the food sector, 
probably because of the expensive machinery needed in this sector. 
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• Micoenterprises were typically more interested in raising higher amounts of finance per employee than 
larger firms. 
• The larger firms in the study seem to need additional finance mainly for product development and 
growth, whereas the micoenterprises are in the need of additional external finance partly to raise their 
technical standard in order to survive in a market economy with an increasing level of competition and 
to compensate their lack of own resources. 
• In 1995, no evidence could be found that a demand for long term debt finance exist among Polish SMEs. 
However, this might have change between 1995 and 1997, due to a increasingly stable market 
environment. 
• Polish owner-managers seem to have unrealistic expectations with regard to the interest rates they would 
be willing to pay. 
4.4 Consequences of not obtaining external finance and alternatives to external 
finance: Evidence from the case studies 
A shortage of finance is reported to be the single most important source of failure of SMEs in the UK, an 
opinion which is shared by small business owners as well as the Official Receiver (Storey 1994). In Poland, 
due to the fact that the main sources of finance are internal resources, combined with a low average level of 
assets, the structure of SMEs is dominated by very small and financial weak enterprises (Slifirczyk 1992). It 
may be that businesses which can not access any external source of finance will become insolvent. However 
this does not mean that the shortage of external finance inevitably leads to business failure. Research 
undertaken by Leigh et at.. (1991) and North et al. (1991) also points to the importance of a range of non 
financial adjustments undertaken by the small finn (regarding the market, the production process, labour 
issues and the organisation of the business) for the survival of SMEs. These imply the reemployment of 
human resources (human capital) as much as (or more) financial capital. 
A survey of 900 SMEs in Sweden by Winborg & Landstrthn (1997) analysed the measures undertaken by 
small business managers to meet the need for resources without using long-term external capital from 
institutional financiers. Winborg & Landstrom refer to these measures as "financial bootstrapping". In the 
researchers opinion financial capital as such is not important for the small business manager but rather the 
resources needed by the finn. As a consequence "entrepreneurship and small business management are very 
much about the 'creation' of resources." Thereby it is argued that different resources are more or less 
integrated in small firms, for example the social network is used to secure tangible and intangible resources 
from external parties (Winborg & Landstrolll 1997). During the cOlllmunist period in Poland, informal 
relationships were of particular importance for starting a business, as ex1ernal sources of finance were 
hardly available. In fact, a significant number of firms starting trading in the 1980s without real capital. 
The critical factor in operating the finns successfully was more to establish business relationships with large 
state owned enterprises or local authorities, to receive orders or arrange contracts (Grabowski & Kulawczuk 
1991a). In some case, the state even delivered the raw materials necessary for the production (Kanvowska & 
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Mrozinska 1993). Other sources were, and still are, based on the price differences in Eastern and Western 
market, which are made used of by networks of small enterprises on both sides of the border of Poland 
(Karwowska & Mrozinska 1993). Considering the reluctance offormal providers of e)"1ernal finance to deal 
with Polish SMEs, informal networks are likely to be still of more importance for small finns in Poland 
when compared with their cOlllterparts in more mature market economies. This is supported by the fact that 
Polish finus have to rely more on internal sources of finance and other personal (informal) networks, such 
as friends, to finance their businesses than SMEs in the UK (see section 3.4 for more details). 
4.4.1 Bootstrapping measures applied by SMEs 
The analysis of the data collected by Winborg & Landstrom (1997) revealed two main groups of 
"bootstrapping measures" used by surveyed firms, those with the aim of reducing the need for capital 
requirements and others with the aim to meet the need for capital. The ten bootstrapping measures most 
often used in both groups are listed below. 
Ten bootstrapping measures most often used to minimise Cal)ital need: 
1. buy used equipment instead of new 
2. use routines in order to speed up invoicing 
3. borrow equipment from other businesses for shorter period 
4. use interest on overdue payment from customers 
5. hire personnel for shorter period instead of employing permanently 
6. Use routines in order to minimise capital invested in stock 
7. Co-ordinate purchases with other businesses 
8. Lease equipment instead of buying 
9. Cease business relations with customers frequently paying late 
10. Offer same conditions to all customers 
78 per cent of respondents 
44 per cent of respondents 
42 per cent of respondents 
41 per cent of respondents 
40 per cent of respondents 
39 per cent of respondents 
36 per cent of respondents 
33 per cent of respondents 
32 per cent of respondents 
30 per cent of respondents 
Ten bootstral)ping measures most often used for meeting need for callital requirements: 
1. seek out best terms of payment possible with supplier/s 
2. withhold owner/manager's payment for shorter/longer periods 
3. deliberately delay payment to supplier/s 
4. obtain payment in advance from customers 
5. use owner/manager's private credit card for business expenses 
6. Obtain capital via manager's assignment in other businesses 
7. Obtain loan from relatives/friends 
8. Deliberately delay payment of value-added tax 
9. Obtain subsidy from Country Administrative Board 
10. Obtain subsidy form Country Labour Board 
(Source: Winborg & Landstrom 1997) 
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74 per cent of respondents 
45 per cent of respondents 
44 per cent of respondents 
33 per cent of respondents 
30 per cent of respondents 
28 per cent of respondents 
24 per cent of respondents 
14 per cent of respondents 
9 per cent of respondents 
8 per cent of respondents 
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Applying this framework to the Polish case studies might give examples and an initial insight into strategies 
applied by Polish small business manager to survive without externallinance. (Bear in mind that only firms 
that still exist had been interviewed.) The bootstrapping measures mentioned in the interviews are listed 
below, followed by a more in detail analysis of each case. 
BootstralJping measures used by Polish case study firms: 
• dismissing of employees and using members of the family instead 
• decrease in the profit margin 
• tight cost management (what to buy and when) 
• reinvestment of all firm profits 
• looking for support from a foundation or institution (plan for the future - has not happened yet) 
• flexibility with respect to investment opportunities 
While these measures are used not only by Polish but also by SMEs in more mature market economies, 
some firms reported other steps undertaken in order to adjust to the special condition of an economy under 
transition: 
• illegal activities to cope with rapidly changing regulations 
• use of credits to cover unreported activities 
Bootstrapping measures are certainly useful when external finance provided by fonnal providers is not 
available, as they help the firms to overcome resource based constrains. However, it is a diversion of 
management time and resources and might hinder the development of the business in the long term, for 
example in cases where the profit margin had to be decreased. Moreover, those measures that are of illegal 
character might put the existence of the firms on risk, especially if the finn is depended on not reporting 
some of the business activities. Some of the key informant interviews revealed that it is quite usual for small 
firms in Poland to hide part of their profits, in order to lower the amount of tax payable. In fact, the level of 
taxation is reported to be the main constrain in the development of Polish SMEs (Welter 1994, Smallbone et 
al. 1996). This might offer some scope for Polish policy makers to improve the financial situation of SMEs 
without actually offering financial support, e.g. by reviewing the current tax system. It is therefore 
encouraging that according to Piasecki et al (1998) the Polish system of taxation, and taxation rates, appear 
to move towards those adopted in the ED. 
4.4.2 Bootstrapping: some case study scenarios 
Case I: 
This firm was founded in 1982 by two partners and manufactures chairs. They specified a decrease in 
demand as their main problem, followed by delayed payments from customers. Being unsuccessful in 
raising bank finance combined with a cash-flow problem makes it impossible to invest in new equipment in 
order to change their range of production or to increase any marketing effort. The bootstrapping measures 
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the partners decided to take were to dismiss seven of his staff between 1995 and 1997, keeping only one 
full-time employee and relying on the partners wives to help out. However it is questionable whether this 
will help the finn to survive in the future as the firm is declining. In the 1995 survey the firm reported an 
after tax profit of more then five per cent of sale turnover whereas in autumn 1997 they described their 
profit margin as "quite low". 
Case 2: 
This partnership consists of two persons and started trading in August 1991, manufacturing kitchen 
furniture. They have been successful in obtaining three loans between 1992 and 1993 which have been used 
as working capital. However in 1997 when they planned to invest in land and to build premises for 
manufacturing (the current premises are rented), they could not access any bank finance due to the lack of 
collateral. They managed to buy the land from retained profits and are now searching for other sources of 
finance to construct the plant, e.g. a support foundation or institution (the owner did not mention a 
particular foundation or institution) who will support him to build the premises in 1998. In this case the 
lack of external finance did not put the existence of the firm at risk, which might be because the owners 
proved to be flexible as they took another investment opportunity that consisted of the purchase of two 
machines. The agreement included a supplier credit for 50 per cent of the price, whereas the other 50 per 
cent had to be paid in cash. Therefore, in this case, the bootstrapping measures consisted of searching for 
help from a support foundation as well as of flexibility with regard to investment opportunities. 
Case 3: 
The owner of this firm manufactures cookies and ice-cream and sells them to wholesale companies as well 
as to the public via a small retail shop. Although being successful in accessing western credit lines in July 
1991, he had problems with importing the machines he bought with the loan from Denmark. By the time 
the machines arrived in Poland the Polish government, without any warning, had introduced a new custom 
law. According to the new law the small business owner had to pay 30.000 ZLP in custom tax, an amount 
which he could not provide. Therefore the custom officer 'arrested' the machines, meaning that the machine 
were located in the premises of the small firm, but not connected. The owner was not allowed to used them 
until custom tax had been paid. Having to pay interest without being able to increase profits by using the 
machines put the firms under tremendous financial stress. The owner tried to clarifY that, as he had bought 
the machines before the new law had been introduced, it should not be applicable. He contacted several 
institutions, including the government, the custom office and the main custom office president. Even though 
he received letters saying that he would be right in principle, he was told that nothing could be done about 
it. Therefore he had to pay the tax. In March 1992 the owner informed the custom office that, as he was 
unable to pay the tax, he would send the machines back to Denmark. He transported the machines back to 
the harbour, but instead of sending them back to Denmark he hid them in the custom free zone. Two days 
later, on the 8 of March, was 'Woman Day', an event that is celebrated in Eastern European countries. 
Because of this event the customs officers were drunk and therefore less careful. The owner used this 
opportunity to transport the machines out of the custom free zone and back home without them noticing. 
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Being now able to use the machine made the firm profitable. In this case the owner was lucky that this 
illegal bootstrapping method was not discovered by the authorities. However valuable time was lost, as in 
1992 large foreign companies entered the ice-cream market, significantly increased the competition. Even 
more seriously, one of the partners died during that period, probably because the episode was too stressful 
for him. 
Case 4: 
Seven partners established this firm in 1994, 6 natural persons and one firm. The main activity is the 
production of parts for hydraulic machines. Their loan application had been rejected but being lucky enough 
to have the shareholder finn as main customer (at start up as the only customer), the firm did not encounter 
any demand problems. Thus they were profitable and could invest all their profits in equipment and 
machinery. However, in their first year of existence they had to apply a strong financial discipline, in other 
words they had to control the purchases of the firm. This bootstrapping measure meant that every purchase 
had to be discussed with the financial director, whether it was necessary to obtain that item, whether it was 
possible and what would be the best time of the purchase. In 1995 they applied for a loan again, this time 
successfully. 
Case 6: 
Finn 6, a food producing company founded in 1990, is a somewhat a different case, as they are doing well 
and are not in the need for external finance. However, the owner applied for a 3 month bank loan to 
purchase an expensive machine and was successful, as he offered cash blocked in an bank account as 
collateral. Obviously, the loan was not needed to provide the capital for the purchase but to legalise the 
existence of the capital available for investment, as he was worried that the tax office might be surprised to 
found him having such a large amount of cash. This indicates that this firm did not report the total amount 
of sales turnover to the tax office (which might be a bootstrapping measure to be able to operate profitable), 
a strategy often used by Polish SMEs to reduce the tax burden, which is considered too high by the vast 
majority of entrepreneurs (Smallbone & Piasecki 1995, Ministry of Economy 1997). 
4.4.3 Key points in section 4.4 
• Bootstrapping measures are applied by small finns to overcome shortages in resources, which might be 
caused by the unavailability of external finance. 
• They might be useful in the short tenn, however hinder the development of the firm in the long term. 
• It appears that bootstrapping measures used by Polish SMEs include illegal measures, which might put 
the existence of the finn on risk. 
• Polish policy makers intending to improve the financial situation for SMEs should eliminate regulations 
that lead small businesses towards bootstrapping measures. 
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5. THE BANKING SYSTEM IN POLAND, BANKING POLICY AND BEHAVIOUR 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter five deals with the supply of finance, describing the characteristics of the banking system during 
the communist period as well as changes of the system under transition. The development of the bank 
lending stnlcture is also described, with particular reference to lending to the private sector including 
problems banks faced with regard to lending after 1989. This is followed by policies of banks regarding 
lending to SMEs, which will be explained on the basis of the relationship typically existing between small 
firms and banks and the specific situation of Polish banks. The criteria that banks apply in their lending 
decision are also analysed. Finally, interest rate and collateral requirements by banks are described, since 
these have been cited by entrepreneurs as the main barriers in obtaining bank finance. 
5.2 The banking system in the communist period 
Despite the fact that according to socialist philosophy economies should function without the use of money 
and the existence of any financial systems, socialist economies in practice made use of both. However 
aiming at such principles meant that the role money and financial institutions played in the economy was 
certainly very different from that in developed market economies (Polanski 1995). 
Under cOlllmunism, the activities of commercial and central banking were not separated in Poland but 
combined in one institutional unit, the monopolistic National Bank of Poland (NBP). Furthermore there 
were three specialised banks, which were intended to be autonomous, although in practice they acted as 
agents of the NBP. These banks were: 
1. Bank Handlowa SA - providing service to e":porting enterprises. 
2. Bank Powszecbna Kasa Oszczednosci SA (Bank PKO SA) - handling foreign currency operations 
involving private persons, money transfers from abroad, sight and time accounts in foreign currencies. 
3. Banl{ Goslwdarld Zywnosciowej (BGZ) - catering for agricultural producers. 
(Wyczanski 1993, Buch 1996) 
The BGZ represented a special case as it included about 1,500 small and very small co-operative banks. The 
explanation for this was that the Polish agriculture proved impossible to collectivise with the result that it 
remained to consist of hundreds of thousands small family fanns. This again made is impracticable to 
operate a centralised financial system. However these co-operative banks still depended on the central 
authorities, they were in fact "". as most other Polish 'co-operatives', state-owned enterprises" (Wyczanski 
1993). 
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Following the pass of the Banking Law of 1982, two other specialised banks were founded in the 1980's,: 
1. Banli Rozwoju Elisportu SA - Export Development Bank 
2. Bank Inicjatyw Gosllodarcycg SA - Economic Initiative Bank 
The Bank Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci BP (Bank PKO BP), a savings bank which handled the 
deposits of households and the financing of housing constructions was integrated in the structure of the 
NBP in the 1970s, however had been isolated again in the 1980s (Wyczanski 1993). 
The National Bank of Poland was created by the Polish Provisional Government in 1945 and depended from 
the beginning on the Ministry of Finance, the Government and the Communist Party Leadership. The 
President of the NBP was nominated by the central government and with the introduction of a centrally 
planned economy developed on the Soviet model in 1948, the Bank became the administrator of the 
financial system on the basis of a central plan (Narodowy Bank Polski 1995). In reality this meant that the 
banks were not allowed to allocate credits to enterprises according to profit oriented decisions but that they 
had to follow central directives. The flow of capital was decided by the physical flow of means of production 
whose volume, pattern and direction again was determined by the plan (Buch 1993, Wyczanski 1993). 
Furthermore due to the specialisation of the banks the monetary circuits of the private households and the 
enterprises were separated. The deposits of the households held at the savings bank were transferred to the 
NBP which allocated credits according to plan to state-owned enterprises via their investment banks (Buch 
1993, 1996). This system had different consequences regarding the function of money in the economy and 
the efficiency of the lending procedure. 
Money in Poland under communism served more as a means of measuring than as legal tender, in other 
words money was used as a unit to express quantities within the plan rather than as a tool to distribute 
merchandise. Access to goods depended more on the target of the central plan and the actual availability of 
supplies. Having regulated prices meant that a shortage of goods was not indicated by rising prices, and 
fixed interest rates (often below the rate of inflation) made money not very attractive as a store of value. 
Furthermore due to the transfer of all assets from the savings bank to the NBP, book money could be 
swapped into cash only to the extent allowed by the central plan (Buch 1993, 1996). 
As the banks had no say in the lending decision nor in the setting of interest rates, there was no reason for 
them to check the creditworthiness of a potential customer or the risk of a prospective investment. They 
were not in the position to reject funding applications or to force enterprises into liquidation. Furthermore, 
considering the monopoly structure of the economy which made the enterprises quite powerful and the fact 
that the companies as well as the banks were state-owned, the govenullent usually guaranteed any loan risks 
to the banks (Buch 1993, 1996, Wyczanski 1993). As a consequence, efficiency of the use of funds was not 
often used as criteria in the lending decision (Wyczanski 1993). In conclusion, at the starting point of 
transformation, the banks not only had no experience in profit oriented approval of credit applications or 
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risk appraisals, but they were also inexperienced in dealing with small firms, as they, nearly exclusively, 
were used to serving large state-owned enterprises. 
5.3 Structure of the banking system since 1989 
Two important laws were passed in January 1989 in order to create a financial system suitable for a market 
economy. These laws aimed to transform the banks from passive agents of the central authorities into active 
financial intenl1ediates: 
1. The Banking Law 
2. The Act of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) 
The Banking Law contained rules for establishing commercial banks and hence created the basis for a 
universal banking system in which financial institutions were not only allowed to accept deposits and 
allocate credits but also to be active in investment banking (Polandski 1995, Buch 1996). The Act of the 
National Bank of Poland created a two-tier banking system by the separation of central and commercial 
banking. Nine universal commercial banks were created out of regionally based branches of the NBP, which 
started trading as independent organisations from the first of February 1989, taking over deposits and 
credits from the central bank. Consequently the NBP took on the role of a central bank, being responsible 
for the national currency, the financial system and monetary policy by using indirect economic tools, such 
as the alllount and interest level of refinancing credit, the level of obligatory reserves, open market 
operations and discretionary methods such as the determining of the level of commission charged by the 
banks or limiting of banks' credit operations (Buch 1996, Polandski 1995, Narodowy Bank Polski 1995, 
Wyczanski 1993). 
In the beginning of the banking reforms the NBP conducted very liberal bank licensing and required 
commercial banks to hold a relatively low level of obligatory reserves. Because of this the number of banks 
increased quickly, so that by the end of 1990, 75 banks operated in Poland, 30 of which operated with a 
majority share of private capital. By 1992 the number of banks had reached 120 (Wyczanski 1993, Buch 
1993). In some cases banks were even established by enterprises in order to gain access to cheap refinancing 
credits (Buch 1996). In 1990, an act was passed allowing the co-operative banks to leave the BGZ structure. 
104 co-operative banks took that opportunity to become independent, although the majority of banks 
decided to remain affiliated with the BGZ on a voluntary basis (Polanski 1995, Wyczanski 1993). 
Despite the increase in the number of bank operation in Poland, the competition in the banking sector 
remained at a rather low level. One of the reasons was the size of the new banks, as the majority of newly 
established banks started banking with the minimum required capital. In fact, at the end of 1990 the 
combined balance of all private banks was smaller than that of the smallest state-owned bank (Konopielko 
1997). Furthermore, they faced several problems, such as a lack of office space, a lack of experienced 
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banking staff, an inadequate infrastructure (especially with respect to the poor telecommunication 
network12) and a low capital base. Despite this, many offered the full range of retail and commercial 
sen'ices included in the universal bank business instead of concentrating on a niche which would have been 
more appropriate considering the small size and the lacking knowledge of these banks (Wenzeler 1997). By 
1997, the banking supervision department of the NBP aimed at a reduction of the number of small private 
banks as the were regarded as non-sustainable in the long ternl because of solvency problems and the 
competitive environment (Wenzeler 1997). 
On the other side, the fonner banks of the NBP had the advantage of a deposit insurance by the government, 
a developed network of branches and an established clientele. Especially PKO BP, the state owned saving 
bank, benefited from the loyalty of their customers, as they could not only use the banks branches to deposit 
and withdraw savings but also any Post Office in the country (Buch 1993,1996, Wyczanski 1993). The 
privatisation of the banks started in summer 1992 with the selling of Bank Rozwoju Eksportu SA, the 
Export Development Bank. 47,5 per cent of the shares were sold in public offering, 52,5 per cent were 
obtained by foreign trade firms and banks (Buch 1993). Two of the nine large regional state banks were 
privatised in 1993, although 30 per cent of shares remained in state ownership (Buch 1996). In 1995 
privatisation continued with the selling of Bank przemyslowo-Handlowy of Cracow and Bank Gdanski 
(OECD 1996b). As the Polish government was concerned with the small size of Polish banks (in 
comparison with foreign batlks)13, a major initiative was announced in 1995, involving the consolidation of 
the remaining state owned banks prior to their privatisation. The aim was to create a strong Polish banking 
system which could compete with large foreign banks once they enjoyed freer entry to the market (OECD 
1996b). Therefore, the PeKaO S.A. Group was created in November 1996 by consolidating the state owned 
bank PeKaO SA with three regional state bank, Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy S.A. in Lublin (BDK), 
Powszwchny Bank Gospodarczy S.A. in Lodz (PBG) and Pomorski Bank Kredytowy S.A. in Szczechin 
(PBKS). The group forms the largest bank in Poland, holding 21.8 per cent of assets and 24.8 per cent of 
deposits of the total banking system. (Bratkowski & Kawalec 1996, EIU 1997). Another consolidation 
emerged in 1997 between Bank Inicjatyw Gospodarczych (BIG) and Bank Gdanski, forming BIG Bank 
Gdanski S.A. (EIU 1997, National Bank of Poland 1998). 
However state-owned banks or banks with a major state participation still hold the biggest share in the 
market. In 1996 overall state capital participation in the banking system amounted to 49.3%. Yet taking 
into account high concentration of assets in this group, the share of state-owned banks in the total volume of 
assets amount to 70.9% (Konopielko 1997). More specifically, with a share of about 70 per cent in both total 
credits granted and total deposits held in 1997, the state banks clearly dominate in the non-financial 
12) In fact, the low level of telecommunication appears to have been the main reason for organising the fonner NPB 
banks on a regional level, thus adding to the problem of insufficient competition in the banking sector (Wyczanski 
1993). 
13) The Polish banking sector is weak and dispersed by intemational standards. Banking sector capitalisation, the total 
sum of banks' own capital given as a percentage share ofG!)P, is nearly three times lower then the respective West 
European average. No Polish bank ranks among the worlds' largest 500 banks (PNB 1997). 
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banking sector, e.g. in trading with persons and businesses (WellZeler 1997). This might indicate that in 
practice the majority of banks continue to be less concemed about their profitability, for example by lending 
to large uneconomical enterprises as they use to do under communism, expecting the govemment to take 
care of any losses the bank might cause. 
Table 5.1: Top Polish banks according to the volume of assets (USD bin) and type of 
ownership at the end of 1996: 
Bank Volume of assets in bin USD Type of ownership 
PeKaO SA Group 13.63 State 
PKOBP 12.79 State 
BGZ 4.70 State + Co-operative 
Bank Handlowy (BH) 4.55 State 
Powszechny Bank Kredytowy (PBK) 3.44 State 
BIG SA 3.25 Private + Public 
Bank Slaski 3.11 Foreign + Public 
Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy (BPH) 2.66 State + Foreign + Public 
Polski Bank Inwestycyjny (PBI) 1.58 State (NBP) 
Bank Rozwoju Eksporty 1.29 Foreign + Public 
Source: Polish Ministry of Finance in Konopielko 1997 
Table 5.2: Ownership structure of banks (capital) in Poland at the end of 1996 
Per cent of total capital in the commercial banking sector 
State Treasury 31.5 % 
National Bank of Poland 9.5% 
State-owned enterprises 8.5% 
Polish private 9% 
Communal 0.3% 
Other Polish (including co-operative) 13.7% 
Foreign Majority 24.5% 
Foreign Minority 3.1% 
-
Source: National Bank of Poland in Konopielko 1997 
Another problem is the low density of the branch network of the banks. In 1997 the Polish banking system 
provided 8,7 branches per 100.000 citizens compared with 64 branches per 100.000 citizens in Germany. 
This reflects the mentality of the Polish population to rely mainly on cash-based transactions instead of 
using facilities provided by banks. Indeed, while about 53 per cent of households maintain savings, only 20 
per cent use banks (OECD 1996b, Konopielko 1997). 
Foreign banks, which could have increased the competition in the banking market, showed only an limited 
interest in the Polish market in the beginning of the reform period. This was not only due to an uncertain 
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market environment and unfavourable conditions as mentioned above, but also because of regulations by the 
NBP after 1994 which made the equity investment in a domestic bank compulsory for the granting of a 
license to a foreign bank. Moreover between June 1993 and up to the end of 1994 not a single licence was 
issued for a foreign bank. In 1994 foreign banks contributed to only 3 per cent of total bank assets in Poland 
(Buch 1996, Wetzler 1997). According to an agreement with the European Union market entry barriers for 
EU-banks have to be lifted only from 1997 onwards and have to be totally removed by the year 2001 (Buch 
1996). In other words foreign banks will then be allowed to open branches throughout Poland without the 
need to receive permission from the NBP. It is likely that foreign banks will account for increasing 
competition in the banking sector in Poland, since the foreign banks already operating in Poland are judged 
to be among the most successful in the country (with regard to their profitability), especially Citibank 
Poland (Wenzeler 1997). 
5.4 Development of bank lending since 1989 
Having been used only as agents of central planning under communism, banks lacked the ability to check 
the creditworthiness of loan applicants, to evaluate the level of risk involved in a potential project and to 
understand the use of collateral at the beginning of transformation (Polandski 1995, Wyczanski 1993). 
Because of this the banks extended overdue loans from state-owned enterprises and converted unpaid 
interest into principal (therefore reporting a higll, if fictitious rate of return) instead of forcing the firm into 
insolvency. Another explanation is the fact that the local authorities had an interest in aiding the persisting 
of the large state-owned enterprises to minimise the growth in unemployment. Furthermore, there was also 
a lack of experience and experts in the liquidation of state-owned enterprises, at least during the initial 
stages of the transition period (Wyczanski 1993). This suggests that to change the institutional stmcture of 
the banking system was more easily done than to change the lending attitude of banks, in other words their 
behaviour. 
This in combination with more and more enterprises experiencing payment problems after the freeing of 
prices, the reduction of subsidies and the collapse of the RGW market, resulted in an increasing number of 
bad loans (Buch 1996, Gomu1ka 1992). Even the newly developed private banks granted credits to unsound 
borrowers thus adding to the bad debt problem in the banking system. The reason for this is, similar as in 
the state banks, lack of information and knowledge. Moreover due to the regional monopolistic stmcture of 
the large state banks14, the small private banks were forced towards the private business sector, which 
typically involved higher risk lending as it mainly consisted of newly developed small private enterprises. 
In 1991 about 16 per cent of credits in the banking system were doubtful or lost and the share of bad debts 
in the largest state banks ranked from 18 to as much as 68 per cent of all loans (Wyczanski 1993). By the 
end of 1992 the share of non-performing loans amounted to about 27 per cent of all loans, and topped 32 
14) The nine tonner NBP banks were based in different regions thus not competing against each other. 
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per cent in 1993 (Buch 1994, 1996). In February 1993 a law on the financial restructuring of enterprises 
and banks was passed by Parliament, intended to solve the problems of bad loans connected with credits 
before 1992. The scheme was based on the development and implementation of a restructuring programme 
and the creation departments specialising in dealing with bad debts, meant to improve the capability of 
bankers and to stress the importance of risk assessment and market techniques to bankers. Participating 
banks (seven of the group of nine which were formerly part of the NBP as well as PKO SA, PKO BP and 
BGZ) were endowed with ZLP 21 billion worth of government bonds in 1993. However, the recapitalisation 
of the saving banks and the agricultural bank was not combined with necessary changes in the control 
structure and business policy of these banks. Therefore a further 19 billion ZLP had to be spend on the 
financial restructuring of these banks in 1994. By 1995 the ratio of non-performing loans had lowered to 
21.7% (Buch 1996, OECD 1 996b). 
The share of private sector credits in total domestic credit was rather low in 1989 at about 5 per cent, which 
is not surprising considering the dominance of large state-owned enterprises in the economy (Buch 1995). 
In 1990 the NBP urged the commercial banks to increase the share of new credits to private enterprises to 
50 per cent which as a result grew to about 15 per cent by the end of the year, reflecting the rapid 
development of the private business sector during that period (Wyczanski 1993). At the end of 1991 credits 
to the private sector as a proportion of all credits to non-financial businesses (i.e. businesses not involved in 
any financial services), increased to about 23 per cent (Wyczanski 1993), although Buch (1994) reports a 
even higher share of 34 per cent. However she stresses that compared with the share of the private sector in 
production and employment (42 per cent and 51 per cent respectively in 1991) the share in credit 
underrated this sectors contribution to the Polish economy. Interestingly, while the share of credits to 
enterprises in general rose to 40.3 per cent of total assets of lh~ commercial banks until the end of 1991, it 
decreased to just over 36 per cent by the end of the 1992. This indicated a trend towards credit rationing to 
non-financial businesses and a growth of credits to the Polish government, which coincided with the 
Ministry of Finance taking control over the nine former NBP banks at the end of 1991 (R WI 1994a, Buch 
1995, 1996, Polanski 1995). 
Lending to enterprises became increasingly risky since the majority of firms are said to have been making 
losses although low market value of accepted collateral and the slowness of court proceedings in collecting 
assets certainly contributed to this trend (Wyczanski 1993). Additionally, Treasury bills were issued in 1992 
and sold below their face value, thus raising the effective yield above the coupon rate and therefore 
exceeding the refinancing rate set by the NBP. Hence commercial banks could make arbitrage profits (i.e. 
by taking advantage of different price levels) by borrowing from the central bank and investing these funds 
into treasury bills, without any risks involved (Buch 1995). Consequently the share of Treasury bills of total 
assets of commercial banks rose from 0.4 per cent in 1991 to 7.8 per cent in 1992. By the end of 1996 their 
share accounted for 8.4 per cent with securities in total amounting to 28.2 per cent of total assets (National 
Bank of Poland 1996 - Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3: Structure of the Asset Portfolio of Commercial Banks in Poland 1994 - 1996 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Claims on non-financial sector 31.6 % 31.6% 32.9% 33.4% 
(corporate) 
Securities 23.9% 27.0% 28.2% 24.8% 
Claims on financial institutions 11.9% 13.7% 12.3% 12.7 
Foreign assets 15.6% 11.0% 8.5% 9.7% 
Claims on non-financial sector 2.7% 3.5% 5.6% 7.0% 
(persons) 
Claims on general government 0.7% 0.98% 1.0% 2.0% 
Other assets 13.6% 12.2% 11.5% 10.4% 
Total assets 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total assets in million Zloty 120,952.9 160,064.3 207,638.9 263,320.9 
_ .. _-_._--L.....--.. 
Source: National Bank of Poland, Annual Report 1995, Information Bulletin 1211996 and 1-3, 1998 
By 1995, the share of credits to the private sector of total lending to the non-financial sector had risen to 51 
per cent. Nevertheless, this still underrating the private sectors share in total employment (over 60 per cent) 
and contribution to the GDP (58 per cent) in 1995. Moreover, in the Polish statistics co-operatives are 
included in the private sector (National Bank of Poland 1995, U.S. Agency for Intemational Development 
1997). Information to what extent credit to small and medium sized enterprises has been increased with the 
overall growth in lending to the private sector by the banking sector is hardly available. None of the 
interviewed banks could divide their lending structure by the size of the companies. Statistics of the 
National Bank of Poland do differentiate between two groups of private entries, private companies, 
partnerships and co-operatives on the one hand and sole proprietorships on the other hand, however 110 
infonnation is given about the actual size of firms (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Structure of the Lending Portfolio to the non-financial sector of Commercial 
Banks in Poland 1995 
Outstanding loans (by value) 1995 Growth 1994-1995 
of which due from: 
Public sector 37.1% 123.9% 
Private sector 50.8% 143.0% 
private companies &partnerships, co- 36.5% 145.7% 
operatives 
sole proprietorships 14.2% 137.7% 
farming 3.5% 139.3% 
other 10.7% 137.2% 
Other organisations 0.1% 49.4% 
Private persons 10.8% 122.7% 
Total outstanding loans in bn Zloty 51.23 137.6% 
-------_ .. _--- -- ----
Source: National Bank of Poland, Annual Report 1995 
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5.5 Banking policy and behaviour towards SMEs financing since 1989 
5.5.1 Lending policy 
When discussing the criteria banks use in their lending decision the relationship between banks and small 
firms and the problems following this relationship have to be understood. The banks provide finance to 
firms and in return expect the firnls to generate an income for the bank. Thus, the firm has to be able to 
generate this income to repay the loan . It is therefore vital for the bank to be able to distinguish between 
sound and unsound propositions, which includes the assessment of whether or not the firm will be capable 
of successfully undertaking the project for which finance has been sought. While it can be assumed that 
most of the information regarding the above are available to the owner-manager of the firnl, they are not 
necessarily at hand for the bank. Therefore the bank relies on data that the owner-manager supplies. This 
phenomena of infonnation asymmetry leads to two types of errors the bank can make in their lending 
decision, which are the financing of a bad project and the non-financing of a good project. While the banks 
are less concerned about the latter error, as long as it does not seriously effect their profitability, the 
possibility of accumulating bad loans is a serious threat for banks (Stanworth & Gray 1991, Binks et a1. 
1992, 1996, Keasey & Watson 1993). 
According to Storey (1994) banks have three different ways to cope with this lending risk: firstly they may 
seek to reduce the risk by making loans available only to firms which have a low probability of failure, 
secondly they may seek to ensure that, even in the event of failure, they obtain some return by calling in the 
collateral used to secure the loan, or thirdly they could increase the returns from the investment through the 
raising of interest rates. However the first solution of lending only to prospectively successful projects 
presuppose the ability to asses credit applications, hence to understand the small business sector. As this 
would require special training of bank staff, thus resulting in additional costs for the banks, it seams fair to 
ague that in an environment of low competition in the banking sector the banks would rather increase the 
interest rates in order to compensate the risk or rely on securities offered by the firnls. 
Nevertheless, to increase the interest rates might not necessarily be the right strategy, as this would probably 
discourage those firms that plan to undertake lower profit but therefore safer investments. Following this 
argument only firms undertaking projects with lower probability of success but higher rates of return when 
successful would require bank finance. This might increase the bank's share of bad loans, hence could lower 
their profits (Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). As an alternative, banks can require collateral to reduce the risk, 
which works in three ways. First, it is likely to result in a kind of self-selection of viable projects, as it can 
be assumed that only those who judge the probability of failure to be on a low level will apply, especially 
when the loan is secured by personal assets (Keasey & Watson 1993). Second, it ensures that the finn is 
truly committed towards the success of the project for which the loan is granted, the moral hazard problem 
(Binks & Ennew 1995, Hughes 1992). Third and most important, the collateral guarantees the recovering of 
the bank's investment even in the event of business failure or more precisely, its inability to repay the loan. 
However this method still does not prevent the banks from the risk of adverse selection, the possibility to 
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fund non viable projects if sufficient assets are provided as collateral and a complete analysis could not be 
done because of unacceptable high evaluation costs (Binks & Ennew 1995). 
Furthermore, as profit margins in lending to larger firms are more attractive, and lending to larger firms 
usually proves to be less risky than lending to small finns, it is not surprising that banks, under the 
circumstances of low competition, tend not to show a particular interest in small businesses. This was the 
experience in the UK until the late 1960s (Stanworth & Gray 1991) and seems currently to be the case in 
Poland, as the banks do not differentiate between the needs of small and large firms and therefore do not 
have a lending policy designed for SMEs. In the UK, banks became more interested in the small business 
sector towards the end of the I 970s due to increasing competition and following decreasing profit margin in 
dealing with larger companies (Stanworth & Gray 1991). Nowadays all major banks in England have small 
business departments (hence banks staff specialised in dealing with SMEs), many of which have 
decentralised units (Fletcher 1996). As a good working relationship between the small business owner-
manager and the bank-manager proved to be important to at least partly overcoming the information 
asymmetryl5, the majority of lending decisions to SMEs (over 90 per cent) are taken by local branch 
managers (Bank of England 1998). 
With respect to the low level of competition and the non-differentiation between small and large firms by 
the banks, the current situation in Poland is similar to that in the UK until the late 1960s. However coming 
from a socialist background banks in Poland facing additional problem, arising from not being used to 
deciding upon the credit allocation, not being used to undertake any risk assessment and furthermore not 
being used to dealing with small firms. In an attempt to define the mles of lending in the Polish banking 
system (hence to introduce modern prudential principles), the NBP released recommendations regarding the 
bank's proceedings involving credit applications (Recommendation No.1) and regarding the review and 
classification of assets due from clients and from banks (Recommendation No.2) in August 1990 
(Wyczanski 1993). 
The NBP President's Recommendation NO.1 for Polish banks included the following requirements: 
• to write down the lending principles of the bank 
• to define the loan size to be allowed to be decided upon at the various management levels 
• to specifY the documents needed to be provided by the customers 
• to adopt suitable mles of procedure 
• to make an appraisal of the borrower's financial situation at least on an annual basis 
(Source: Wyczanski 1993) 
15) For further details see Cowling & Westhead 1996 
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The President's Recommendation No. 2 advised the rating of credits on the bases of the financial 
performance and the track record of debt servicing of the borrower. Therefore the following objective 
factors, subjective factors as well as some further assessment factors were suggested to be applied. 
Objective factors: • ratio of sales to the average level of assets 
• ratio of sales to inventories 
• analysis of liquidity coefficients 
• composition of funds financing the operation 
Su~jective factors: • quality of management 
• dependence on the fonner Comecon 
• dependence on government subsidies 
• performance in debt repayment so far 
Further assessment factor: • The involvement in the production of goods and services that were overpriced 
or obsolete in comparison to goods coming from highly developed countries. 
(Source: Wyczanski 1993) 
Even though the recommended procedure of awarding credits did not differentiate to a great extent from 
those applied by banks in more mature market economies, the fundamental difference in Poland consisted of 
a lack of practical experience in handling such procedures. Moreover the system of competence in the banks 
was underdeveloped. Hence the mandates or limits depending on the position of the decision maker with 
regard to credit allocation was not clearly defined (Wyczanski 1993). Consequently the recommendations 
were unsystematic and too infrequently conducted which caused an increasing number of bad debts (See 
chapter 4.4). In the process of dealing with that problem bartles were allowed to swap bad debts to equity 
shares, hence strengthened the already tight relation between banks and large firms (Buch 1993). The Lodz 
Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation for example noted that PBG banks on average own about 20 
per cent of the biggest finns, e.g. 51 per cent of a large carpet company in Lodz. 
However, evidence from the key informant interviews shows a slightly different picture. In Bank 3 for 
example, which is mainly state owned and has 54 branches in Poland, the loan manager deals with the 
firms, gives the application with his comments to the branch director for him to review. The final decision 
is then made by a credit committee in the branch, which consists of at least four people. In the case of very 
large amounts the decision is made by the credit committee at the headquarters. The procedure applied in 
Bank 2, which is one of the specialised state banks that were active during the communist period and which 
is still entirely state owned, varies slightly. After evaluation of the documents delivered by the finn a bank 
employee visits the firms site and reports to a loan manager who then proposes whether or not to give a loan 
and if so under what conditions. The proposal then is evaluated by a credit-committee in the branch who 
make comments on it and pass it on to the branch director for the final decision. Below 50.000 ZLP the loan 
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application goes directly from the loan manager to the branch director. It is the policy of the bank, that the 
decision is made by one person only, which is the branch director. In Bank I, which has five branches and 
is mainly owned by a capital group from the Czech Republic, the credit decision is made either by the 
branch-director, the loan committee of the branch or the loan committee of the headquarters, depending on 
the size of the loan required. Once the final judgement is made the application is passed on to a loan 
manager whose task is to deal with the firm. This suggests that by now decision procedures applied by the 
banks have been improved, as the responsibilities and decision limits of the bank staff are more clearly 
defined. In most cases the loan decision is made within the branch, which is beneficial for dealing with 
SMEs as a working relationship can be build up. However this is neglected to some degree as the bank 
manager dealing with the finns does not necessarily have the competence to decide about the loan approval. 
Indeed, it appears that the final decision about whether or not a loan is granted, is made at least by the 
branch director, although in some banks only by the credit committee of the branch or the credit committee 
of the headquarters, depending on the size of the loan required. (By comparison, Lloyds Bank claims that 90 
per cent of their lending decisions in the UK are "... taken on the spot." - Spence 1995) Therefore, the 
person deciding about the loan application does not necessarily know the owner-manager of the business, 
which suggest that for smaller as well as larger loan applications more formal lending criteria are applied. 
5.5.2 Lending criteria 
The criteria used in the lending decisions to small firms vary between the banks, although studies by 
Deakins and Hussain (1991) in England (ref. To in Fletcher 1995) and Fletcher (1995) in Scotland note that 
trading eA'perience, existing profitability and equity stake are among the four most important criteria. The 
projected income is also of importance for English banks whereas Scottish banks put more emphasis on the 
gearing of the proposed project. However, the bank manager also stressed that the importance of the lending 
criteria might depend on the individual case. For start-up firms, for example, as they can't provide any track 
record of trading results, a high gearing of a proposed project would not be acceptable, whereas the same 
proposal made by a more mature company might obtain funding. In other words, in the case of start-ups, 
which are typically perceived as more risky than mature businesses, bank managers prefer the finn to 
provide more internal equity, since this adds to the value of the collateral for the debt finance sought. 
Fletcher (1996) argues that the importance of trading experience in the lending decision of banks suggests 
that the people involved and their track record are critical. In other words, it is most important for the bank 
to be convinced that the owner-matlager of the small firm has the ability to do what he says he will do. The 
emphasis on the personality of the owner-manager emerges from the fact that in small businesses the 
personal approach of the owner-manager directly influences the company's behaviour. Existing profitability 
is a further measurement with respect to the abilities of the owner-manager to undertake business, whereas 
the equity stake is of relevance regarding the gearing, illdicating the degree of commitment by the owner-
manager. The expected income on the other hand gives an idea of the maximum amount the firms could 
afford to borrow, hence the probability of the owner-manager's ability to service future loan instalments. 
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Furthermore, according to the Bank of England (1998), the banks have tried to improve the efficiency of 
their lending decisions by increasingly using credit scoring system in their risk assessment, which aims to 
reduce the costs for small business customers. 
In Poland, evidence from the key informant interviews suggests that small businesses are not recognised as 
being different from larger enterprises as far as banks are concerned. Therefore banks can't divide their 
customers according to their size, nor do they apply different principles in the approval of credit 
applications by different sized firnls. However, all four banks interviewed divide their customers by their 
type of book-keeping. Firms with simple book-keeping only have to keep a record of their sales, as they pay 
taxes as a percentage of tumover. Finns with a higher tumover have to apply a more complicated type of 
book-keeping, an accounting book, which the costs are also taken into consideration (Bank 3). Because of 
this, all four key informant banks indicated that loan applications are more complex for firms that have an 
accounting book than for those with simple book-keeping. However, only one of the managers (Bank 4) 
remarked that this would affect the process of the evaluation of loan application. (Unfortunately, it was not 
mentioned in what way the evaluation would be influenced.) Moreover, none of the banks interviewed 
indicated any differences in the lending criteria with regard to the size of the loan. However, two of the 
banks (Bank 2 and bank 3) mentioned that the requirements for personal loans are less strict than those for 
business loans. According to Bank 3, persons with a fixed monthly income receive a credit (up to 50,000 
ZLP) almost automatically. The maximum size for personal loans in bank 2 are 10,000 ZLP. 
The actual criteria applied in the lending decision by the banks differ, although all responding banks 
mentioned the importance of financial ratios, such as cash flow and profitability, in order to evaluate the 
ability of the firm to generate income. Bank 2 uses the national ratio of the sector the finns is active in as a 
basis to evaluate the financial ratio given by the firm. Bank 4 employs a credit scoring consisting of nine 
chosen financial ratios. Another important parameter is the analysis of the market, in other words the 
capacity and the competition in the market. This is vital to ensure that the product or the service will have a 
future in the market. For example, a finn producing electrical equipment without any quality assurance 
certifications or standards (which will be compulsory in the fhture), would most likely have no future in the 
market and therefore not be granted a credit. In this context two of the banks investigate the age of the 
machinery and/or the equipment used by the finn and one bank also considers the way the finn is organised 
into accOlUlt, e.g. the extent to which the finn has organised production, services and/or distribution 
according to market rules. (A procedure which is unlikely to be economical in the case of smaller loans.) 
The existence of" positive history in dealing with banks, preferably a credit history, is also frequently noted 
by the Polish banks. In this regard Bank 1 and Bank 3 make use of the experience other banks might have 
had with a particular firm which is possible as the banks co-operate with each other in exchanging 
information about customers. According to Bank 3 banks have access to a 'Register of Unreliable Bank 
Clients '. However, it appears that not all banks have access to these information. Dickinson (1994) notes 
that the large commercial banks in Poland, whilst sharing data with each other, do not let small private 
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banks join their information network. The reason might be that the larger banks, which are either privati sed 
or still state owned, are operating in different regions. As a consequence, they do not directly compete 
against each other, and regard the small private banks as their main competitors. Another criterion looked 
at by the banks is the existence of documents stating that the firm has no liabilities outstanding to the tax 
office and the national insurance institutes. One bank mentioned the age of the firms as one factor of their 
risk evaluation, probably referring to the fact that lending to more established firms is less risky than to 
younger companies. 
Even though all the criteria cited by the banks are certainly of value ill the approval of loan applications, 
they are clearly targeted at the approval of larger finns. The trading experiences and the characteristics of 
the owner-manager, which is of major importance in lending to smaller firms, are conspicuously missing in 
the criteria list of the Polish banks. Moreover, loan applications from small start-up businesses are unlikely 
to be assessed by banks at all, as they cannot meet any of the above criteria apart from the market analysis, 
which would be to costly to undertake for small loans. Only one bank interviewed indicated steps in a more 
appropriate direction for small firms by taking the qualifications of the owner-manager into consideration in 
their credit assessment. It is therefore not surprising that the analysis of our 1995 survey data did not show 
any statistically significant differences between successful and unsuccessful loan applications in terms of 
personal characteristics such as the level of the owner-manager's education, age, his/her background and 
previous experience of working in the industry. Moreover it appeared that loans were not approved in 
conjunction with financial ratios as credits were equally distributed between profitable and loss making 
firms and neither existing cash flow problems not falling profitability between 1992 and 1994 had any 
impact of the success rate of firms in obtaining bank finance. Unfortunately information about the year in 
which credits have been granted were not included in the survey. However, when looking at the year the 
firtns started trading it appeared that firms that started trading before 1992 were significantly more likely to 
secure bank finance then firms that started trading in 1992 or later (Figure 5.1). Therefore it might be the 
case that majority of firms obtained bank finance in the early years of transformation when the assessment 
procedure applied by the bartlc in their lending decision were less developed and less criteria based. 
Moreover, there were more western funded credit lines available at this time compared with more recent 
years. This assumption is supported by a firm-level survey carried out by the World Bank in 1991, which 
shows that 65 per cent of the sample of 93 entrepreneurs had received short -term loans since 1988 (Webster 
1991). 
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Figure 5.1: Year the firm started trading by success in raising debt finance 
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Chi-square pearson:4.42004, OF 1, significance 0.03552 
Note: Only firms that did apply for bank finance are included in this table 
Source: 1995 study 
5.5.2.1 Role of the business plan 
Analysis of the 1995 survey results indicates that the existence of a business plan has not necessarily been 
vital for a firm to receive bank finance, although it increased the chances of the applicant being successful. 
Indeed, 60 per cent of firms had been asked by their lender to prepare a business plan. Moreover, it can be 
seen that, when a business plan was required, it's professional preparation proved helpful in achieving 
success in raising bank finance. More than 80% of the firms which used external, professional help in this 
manner obtained credit compared to only 55% offirms which prepared their business plan without any such 
support (Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2: Success in raising a bank loan by 
use of external assistance in preparing loan application 
Business plan preparation without any 
external professional advice 
Business plan preparation with advice 
from or entirely by external profess ional 
o Unsuccessful in obtaining bank finance 
• Successful in obtaining bank finance 
Chi-square pearson: value 8.06100, OF 1 , significance 0.00452 
Note: Only firms that did apply for a bank loan and have a business plan are included in this table 
Source: 1995 study 
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Evidence from the key informant bank interviews suggests that a business plan is only required in the case 
of finns applying for a tenn loan (Bank 1, Bank 3 and Bank 4), which Bank 2 defines as a loan with a 
period of between one and three years. Bank 3 and Bank 2 required a simpler business plan for smaller 
amount (less then 300,000 ZLP or less then 150,000 ZLP respectively), which does not have to be prepared 
by an external professional. However for larger credits the business plan is required to be prepared by a 
consulting finn or even a "well known" consulting finn. Barile 2 co-operate with a few consulting firms. 
Nonetheless, they do not suggest the entrepreneur to only use these firms. In the case of an overdraft loan or 
a short tenn loan Bank 4 requires information about the level of the current turnover as well as the expected 
turnover in the bank account of the firm. 
Analysis of the 1995 study data concluded that Polish SMEs tend to require rather smaller amount of 
finance. Over half of finns (57 per cent) were interested in raising additional finance up to 107,000 ZLP, 
which is the equivalent to 150,000 ZLP in 1997 in consideration of an inflation of about 20 per cent in 1996 
and about 17 per cent in 1997. The median amount of additional finance sought was 100,000 ZLP, or about 
140,000 ZLP in 1997 prices. Moreover the majority of the 47 finns that raised bank finance to fund their 
investments in 1993-1994 (70 per cent) obtained up to 107,000 ZLP. Combined with the fact that credits to 
small finns are reported to be rather short-term (up to one year - RWI 1994a) one could expect that the 
existence of a business plan is not essential for the small finn to be successful in raising bank finance. 
However, tills contradicts the above findings, that the existence of a professionally prepared business plan 
did indeed increase the chances of finns to access bank finance. 
This might be e;\:plained by the time factor between the 1995 study and the key informant interview, in other 
words it might indicate that the banks developed their own assessment methods over time and therefore are 
now less concerned about the professional preparation of business plans. This suggestion is supported by the 
fact that the banks have started to improved the efficiency of their lending procedures by using credit 
scoring systems. Bank 2 for example employs a system that consists of two parts, the analysis of financial 
ratios and the subjective impression (i.e. the situation in the market, the qualifications of the owner-
manager and the machines and equipment used by the firm). In order to qualify for a credit the applying 
finn has to reach a minimum amount of points in each part of the analysis. Bank 4 uses a similar scoring 
system, consisting of the assessment of the risk-profile and non-financial factors of the firm. The former 
include nine chosen financial ratios and the age of the firm, as younger firms are believed to be more risky, 
whereas the latter contains the econonllc activity of the finn and the proposed effects of the loan. 
Moreover, one of the key infonl1ant interviewees from the Chamber of Commerce in Nowy Sacz (South 
Poland) confirmed that with more years in a market economy professionally prepared business plans of 
SMEs became less important for banks. Whereas a few years ago banks distinguished between whether or 
not the business plan was prepared by (or with the help of) a professional adviser, banks now (1997) 
emphasise more the quality of the plan, i.e. whether it is a realistic plan and not just one made to receive a 
bank loan. Further analysis of the 1995 study provides further proof. For those firms that started trading in 
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1992 or later, it made hardly any difference whether or not the business plan was prepared with the help or 
completely by professionals with regard to their success in accessing bank finance. However, this made a 








































Figure 5.3: Success in raising a bank loan by 
use of external assistance in preparing loan application 
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Chi-square pearson: value 10.20205, OF 1 , significance 0.00140 
Note: Only firms that did apply for a bank loan, have a business plan and started trading in 1991 







Source: 1995 study 
Figure 5.4: Success in raising a bank loan by 
use of external assistance in preparing loan application 





o Not successful in obtaining bank finance 
Business plan 
preparation with 
advice from or entirely 
by external 
II Successful in obtaining bank finance 
Chi-square pearson: value 0.05099, OF 1 , significance 0.82135 
Note: Only firms that did apply for a bank loan, have a business plan and started trading in 1992 
or later are included in this table 
Source: 1995 study 
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5.5.2.2 Situation of microbusinesses 
Whereas banks might have improved their lending procedures as well as their credit assessment system, 
small finns were and still are discriminated against with regard to their accessibility to bank finance. 
Analysis of the 1995 study confirmed that the size of the firms (number of employees) significantly 
influenced the probability of obtaining loan from the bank (x2-test = 0.041 - Figure 5.5). Most successful 
were the larger firms in the sample employing between 51 and 100 persons as 75% of applicants obtained a 
bank loan , whereas firms which employed 6-20 employees were least successful (47.9%). Somewhat 
surprisingly, 62.1% of microfirms that applied for bank finance actually obtained it, hence stood a higller 
chance of success then firms with 6-20 employees. 
However, it should also be highligllted that microbusinesses were least likely to apply for a loan in the first 
place (about 38 per cent of firms with up to 5 employees applied for a credit compared with about 64 per 
cent of the other firms in the sample) which suggests that there may be some self-selection among this 
group of firms (see section 4.2.2.2 for more details). 
This suggestion has been supported by Bank 2 which reported that firms have used personal loans for their 
firms. As credits in general have to be secured by business or personal assets (see section 1.5.3) and as most 
of the business assets are financed with internal sources, the owner-manager personally guarantees for the 
loan in any case, regardless of whether it is a business or personal loan. It therefore makes sense for the 
owner-manager to apply for a personal loan if possible, as the requirements of personal loans are less strict. 
However, the downside are the costs involved in form of interest rates, which are likely to be higher for 
personal loans than for business loans. 
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Figure 5.5: Success in raising a bank loan by firm size 
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5.5.2.3 External Factors 
The reasons why smaller finns tend to be less successful in obtaining bank finance than larger firms, are 
certainly connected with problems in dealing with SMEs in general, such as the high level of risk involved 
in lending to small firms and the relative high rate of business failure. However in the case of Poland, 
factors associated with transition conditions are likely to make lending to SMEs even more problematic than 
those experienced in more mature market economics. An unstable economic environment with an inllation 
rate of 13,2 per cent in 1997 (National Bank of Poland 1998), which, even though much lower than in the 
early 1990s, is still high by western standards, makes businesses activities more difficult and firms less able 
to predict their ability to service loan repayments due in any future time. 
Considering also the bad experiences that Polish banks had with loss making finns, the fact that banks can 
make attractive profits with treasury bonds and the low level of competition in the banking sector makes it 
understandable that Polish banks are rather risk adverse, demanding high levels of securities and interest 
rates. Nevertheless, as competition is likely to increase in the near future and with SMEs paying an 
increasing role in the economy, Polish banks should prepare themselves to enter the SME sector if they 
don't want to be left behind by foreign banks. 
5.5.3 Interest rates 
Part of the Balcerowicz Plan, the Government Economic Program which was introduced on o 1. January 
1990, was the liberalisation of prices and interest rates. As a result Poland experienced a hyperinflation of 
112,536 per cent in January 1990, which varied between 2-1- and over 100 per cent in the following months 
(Buch 1993, 1994, Wyczanski 1993). Being unused to undertaking own projections of the monetary 
situation the commercial banks set their interest rates on the basis of the refinancing rate applied by the 
NBP, which they regarded as the official projection of the inflation (Wyczanski 1993). However as the 
future inflation rates were typically underestimated by the NBP (Table 5.5), real refinancing rates were 
negative in almost the entire period between 1990 to 1994, when based on consumer price changes (Buch 
1995). The interest rates applied by commercial banks were close to the refinancing rate in cases of prime 
borrowers, hence negative in real terms in certain periods. Apparently, even rates charged to small firms 
were relatively low. A survey undertaken by Webster (1992) reports interest rates between 60 to 70 per cent 
for SMEs in May 1991, which, although high in absolute terms, are moderate considering an inflation rate 
of 60 per cent. 
Table 5.5: Rate of inflation, December on December growth in consumer prices 1990-1996 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Rate of projected n.a. n.a. 36.9% 32.2% 23.2% 19.0 % 17.0 % n.a. 
inflation 
Rate of actual 250 60 44.3% 35.3 % 29.7 % 27.8 % 18.5 % 13.2% 
inflation 
, 
Source: Wyczanski (1993), Gronkiewicz (1998), National Bank of Poland (1998) 
Note: n.a. = no data available 
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Nevertheless the maximum interest rate set by private banks often far exceeded the refinancing rate, leading 
to a range of more than 20 percentage points in interest rates charged by various banks (RWI 1994a). This 
again emphasises the low level of competition in the Polish banking sector. At the end of 1992 banks started 
to reflect more on the costs of obtaining funds on the inter-bank market, the Warsaw Interbank Offered Rate 
(WIBOR), as well as the profitability of Treasury bills in the calculation of their interest rates, which led 
them to start to apply a more profit-orientated, market economy behaviour (Wyczanski 1993, Buch 1996). 
In the following years the banks continuously lowered their interest rates to about 22 to 32 per cent for one 
year loans in March 1998, partly reflecting the stabilisation of the inflation (Table 5.6). The consumer price 
index in December 1997, measured as price raised since December 1996, accounted for 13 ,2 per cent 
(National Bank of Poland 1998). 
Table 5.6: Zloty Lending Rated of Principal Commercial Banks for loans up to one year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
31% - 49.4% 24% - 44,2% 20.5 % - 28.8% 22.5% - 29.4% 22% - 32% 
Source: National Bank of Poland (1995, 1996, 1998) 
Note: (i) rates quoted by 15 commercial banks in December of each year 
(ii) Till the end of 1997 figures present the lowest range of prime lending rates, which apply for lowest-risk 
loans, i.e. to borrowers in good financial standing 
(iii) For 1998, figures present the range of minimum and maximum lending rates 
Considering the high risks involved in lending to small and medium sized enterprises (Keasey & Watson 
1993, Wyczanski 1993), it is likely that rates at the higher end of the range have been applied for small 
finns seeking bank finance. More detailed information from banks about interest rates for different company 
types are hardly available in the literature. However the key informant interviews give an insight into the 
lending policy to SMEs with respect to interest rates. In fact, as the banks do not differentiate between small 
and large finns, they always apply the same criteria in calculating the interest rate for a proposed project. 
The rates depend on the risk of the project, the repayment period, the overall profit the bank expects from 
dealing with the finn and the kind of collateral provided. For example if a firm that applies for a credit also 
brings other business to the bank, e.g. in the forms of deposits, fund transfers etc., then the bank might 
lower the interest rate in order to win the firm as a customer. Bank 3 would even go so far in lowering the 
interest rate to the point that they would not make any profit with the actual credit, provided the overall 
business expected from the finn is worth it. This strategy is well known in more mature market economies. 
In the UK, most banks offer some kind of start up service, i.e. special loans and free banking for a year, in 
the hope to increase their number of long-term customers (Stanworth & Gray 1991). 
Although lending criteria appear to be equally applied to all firms, small firms in reality tend to be 
discriminated as they are usually seem as more risky and do not offer as much business opportunities as 
large firms. Hence they have to pay higher interest rates when compared with their larger counterparts. 
Bank 1 acknowledged this by mentioning that larger firms usually get better rates than smaller firms 
because of these reasons. However Bank 3 declare the size of the firm would not affect the interest rate they 
Martina Freiberg Page 88 
Chapter 5 The banking system in Poland, banking policy and behaviour 
demand yet stated that the interest rate depends on the overall profit the bank can gain from the co-
operation with the finns. Consequently, smaller finns are indeed more likely to face higher interest rates 
than larger firm. Another factor that might influence the interest rate is whether or not the firm has an 
account with the bank and particularly whether or not only with that bank. If that is the case it makes it 
easier for the bank to evaluate the financial situation of the firm and this represents a "comfort factor" 
helping to reduce the bank's perceived risk. However, this would work both ways, as finns that are in a 
financially good position might receive a lower interest rate, whereas firms that are in a more problematic 
situation would be clearly identified as more risky and therefore might have to pay higher interest rates. 
The same principle applies for firms that have a credit history with the bank. On the assumption that the 
firm proved to co-operate well with the bank they might get a lower interest rate the second or third time 
they apply for a credit. According to Bank I good co-operation means paying interest and repayment in 
time, acting according to any agreements set out in the contract (e.g. not to pay less than a fixed amount of 
money per month into the account) and a solid financial situation of the fiml. It therefore seems fair to 
argue that new start up firms, as they do not have a business nor a credit history, are likely to face higher 
interest rates then more established companies. Bank 4 even includes the age of the finn in the evaluation or 
the risk-profile of business. Creditworthy firms are classified by their risk into four groups, A. B, C and D, 
with A being the lowest risk group. Finns that operate longer than three years might be ranked as A, 
although companies trading for two to three years will qualify for a B at most. Firms operating for one to 
two years will not be grouped better then C and those businesses trading for less then a year can only qualify 
for a D. Thus ceteris paribus new start ups will always be charged higher interest rates then more mature 
enterprises. 
The banks were rather vague when asked about the level of interest rates that apply for credits to SMEs. The 
average level of interest demanded by Bank 1 is 28% pa., although the rate is higher for firms that apply for 
the first time. Furthermore, the customer base of the bank contains mainly medium sized firms with a 
turnover of 400.000 - 500.000 ZLP per month. Finally, as the bank does not divide its customer structure by 
firm size, the average rate might be distorted by lower rates given to larger firms. Bank 3 use the London 
Interbank Offered Rate16 (LIBOR), and the Lombard rate as base rate, although they did not reveal any 
infonnation about the margins they apply. At the time of the interview the Lombard rate accounted for 27 
per cent. Bank 2 give a margin of 3.5% to 9% on the interest base rate, depending of the evaluation of the 
creditworthiness of the firm. This represents the basis of the interest rate calculation which then can be 
negotiated. Infonnation about the interest base rate were not given during the interview. However, 
according to the Infonnation Bulletin of the National Bank of Poland (1996, 1998), the base rate for prime 
rates of Bank 2 has been 19.5 per cent. The general base lending rate by commercial banks to businesses 
was 23.64 per cent on March 31, 1997 (EIU 1997). 
16) The LIBOR represents the base lending rate bctween banks in thc London Eurocurrency market. It is used as an 
index for plicing a bank loan or line of credit (United Nations 1996). 
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The firm level case studies also provide a rather insufficient picture about lending rates for SMEs applied by 
Polish banks. Firms that had received loans in the early 1990s do not remember the rates they were charged 
(Case 2, 5, and 6) or received loans from foreign governments (Case 3 and 7). The first might indicate that 
firms were more concerned with the size of the repayment per time period due to serve the loan than the 
actual interest rate. In the case of firms 3, the US$loan was granted in 1991 by western credit lines at a rate 
of LIBOR plus 6 per cent. Even though this rate was low in comparison with loans provided within Poland, 
the firms still experienced problems to serve the loan because of rising exchange rates. However, PBG SA 
bank took over the loan in 1992 applying the same rates and by 1997 had lowered them to LIBOR plus 4 
per cent. At the time of the interview the owner was in negotiation with the bank for a even lower rate at 
LIBOR plus 2 per cent. Firms 7 received a loan from a western credit line, however can't remember the 
rates applied. 
Nevertheless some firms that received loans more recently, reported rates applied by banks in lending to 
SMEs, which appeared to be in the range between 25 and 30 per cent. Case firm 2 applied for credit at the 
bank they used to deal with and would have got credit at a rate of about 30 per cent. The owner then decided 
not to take this offer, but to change to PKO which is charged a lower rate, which unfortunately he did not 
reveal. Case 4 secured a loan from Bank Handlowy in 1995, paying a margin of 6%. The base rate 
accounted for 24 per cent (National Bank of Poland 1995). In 1997, they enjoyed a overdraft facility on their 
account at a margin of 3 per cent. (The base rate at Bank Handlowy accounted for 25.39 per cent in March 
1998 - National Bank of Poland 1998.) Case 5 received a two year loan for a car at a rate of about 25 per 
cent, which was arranged through the car dealer. 
A so far unpublished research project, about credits granted to SMEs by the PBG Bank undertaken by the 
Department for Entrepreneurship and Industrial Policy in Lodz, Poland at the end of 1997 supports these 
figures. The researcher, who had access to the banks credit documents regarding four small finns, reports 
interest rates in the range between 26.5 and 28.6 per cent. The lowest rate referred to a 3 month loan 
granted to a firm dealing with scrap-iron that had several loans in the past and claimed to have a good 
working relation with the bank. The highest rate of 28,6 per cent was charged for a five year loan given to a 
business in the food industry, which is subsidised by the Polish Agency of Agriculture Restructuring and 
Modernisation. At the same time the firms had a one year loan form the bank, charged at 27.5 per cent. 
By comparison, in the UK average bank lending margins to small business customers were about 3-4 per 
cent above base rate (6.25 - 7.25 per cent) during 1997 (Bank of England 1998, MoneyWorld UK Limited 
1998). 
The reasons for such high interest rates in Poland are not only the level of inflation, as real interest rates 
Polish small firms have to pay are significantly higher than those charged from their counterparts in the 
UK. In 1997, real interest rates in Poland were in the range between 12 to 17 per cent compared with about 
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6.25 to 8.25 per cent in the UK. Buch (1996) attributes the high Polish rates to the low level of competition 
and high costs, although the latter are caused by the low quality of the loan portfolio, inefficient methods of 
operating as well as necessary modernisation of the banking system. However, Bratkowski & Kawalec 
(1996) disagree with the first argument, but agree with the second. According to them the competition 
regarding interest rates is much stronger in Poland than in more mature market economies, as banks, while 
the whole financial system undergoes major changes, are fighting to maintain or increase their market 
share. As possibilities to compete on the basis of services (e.g. by offering new or better services) are limited 
in Poland, banks compete in prices. Nevertheless, Bratkowski & Kawalec (1996) stress that the main factor 
for high interest rates lies in the fact that Polish banks have to pay corporate income tax out of nominal 
profits, whereas other countries such as the UK enjoy tax allowances for the inflation rate (Finance Act 
1998). Consequently, as shown in Table 5.7, Polish banks received a lower real interest rate after tax than 
banks in the UK, even though they originally required higher rates from their customer. Therefore, under 
the current circmnstances, Polish banks can't lower their interest rates for their customers. In other words, if 
Polish banks are to improve the flow of finance to the small business sector by reducing the level of interest 
rates demanded, the government has to provide a working environment in which the banks stay profitable 
by granting corporate tax allowances to compensate for the inflation rate. The government should also aim 
at the reduction of the inflation rate in the first place, however this seems to be happening already as table 
5.5 suggests. 
Table 5.7: Calculation on the real interest rates after banks received from SMEs 
in Poland and the UK in 1997 
Poland 
Nominal gross interest rate 25% - 30% 
- Corporate income tax 38%1) 
= Nominal interest rate after tax 15.5% -18.6% 
- Inflation rate 13.2% 
= Real interest rate after tax 2.3% - 5.4% 
Note: 1) Piasecki at al. 1998 




Nominal gross interest rate 9.25% - 11.25% 
- I nflation rate 3.1%2) 
= Real gross interest rate 6.25% -8.25% 
- Corporate income tax 33%3) 
= Real interest rate after tax 4.2% - 5.5% 
I 
Whereas interest rates decreased over the years since the start of the transition period, the criteria regarding 
the collateral demanded by banks seem to have become more strict. In the early years of transformation, 
banks appear to have been more liberal regarding the kind of collateral they are willing to accept, as for 
example declarations of surety from friends and family were widely accepted. On the other hand, real estate, 
because of often unclear ownership rights, has generally not been accepted as security (OECD 1996, 
Webster 1992, Slifirczyk 1992). In the following years, banks have become more cautious, preferring 
sellable assets like cars, machines, houses and cash blocked in an account as collateral, whereas guarantees 
were accepted only in certain circumstances. 
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In fact, the acceptance of securities other than assets as collateral was mentioned by only one key informant. 
This was Bank 2, which would accept guarantees from other persons for example to pay the credit in case 
the firm fails to do so. In one of the case studies (Case 4) a guarantee given by the main customer of the 
firms was accepted as collateral by Bank Handlowy in 1995. However it should be noted that this customer 
was an equity-shareholder of the finn, had an account at Bank Handlowy and furthermore is 60 per cent 
owned by Bank Handlowy. The fact that this firm could not get a loan in 1994 because of the lack of 
collateral, despite the above mentioned connection to Bank Handlowy is remarkable. Another firm (Case 7) 
was at the time of the interview under negotiation for a credit, for which they wanted to provide a contract 
with the customer as collateral. The firm considered the baltks attitude as positive, although the fact that the 
customer was the PBK-baltk certainly had a favourable influence on the banks decision. 
The level of collateral demanded by banks has been reported to be high in the early years of transition, 
sometimes up to 300 per cent of the loan value (OECD 1996a). Moreover, evidence from the key informant 
interviews suggests that the percentage of collateral is still high, ranging from 100% up to even 500%. The 
actual value of securities demanded depends on the liquidity of the collateral, the financial prospects of the 
firm or the risk involved in the project and the existence of good previous co-operation with the customer. 
For example, one of the firms interviewed (Case 1) was asked to deliver assets to the value of 200 per cent 
as security, whereas another firm (Case 6) that provided cash blocked in an account as collateral, and hence 
more liquid security, was required to cover only 110 per cent of the loan value. In comparison, another finn 
(Case 2) cited that they had to provide machines worth only 50 per cent of the loan value as collateral for 
three loans obtained in the period from 1992-1993 whereas in 1997 bank demanded collateral to the extent 
of 100 per cent of the value of the loan. The usual level is about 130% to ISO%. 
However, the ratio to which the collateral is accepted ranges from as little as 30% up to 80%. In other 
words, only a certain percentage of the market value of the collateral is counted as loan security. For 
example if new machinery is provided as security about 80% of the market value is accepted as collateral, 
whereas in the case of old machinery only 30-50% of the market value will be accepted (Baltk 3). Bank 2 
assumed that the market value of fixed assets is the sum they are insured for 50% of which is accepted as 
collateral. Private houses are accepted with 50% of their value whereas floating assets such as cars are 
accepted with 70% of their market value. Consequently, the actual value of security fimls typically have to 
provide as collateral is not in the range from l30 per cent to 150 per cent but in the range from 433% to 
500%17. These findings are supported by the 1995 survey. The 63 fimls that had sought bank finance but 
not received it cited insufficient collateral (45 per cent) as the most important reason whereas too high 
interest rates ranked only second (38 per cent). It therefore surprising that, according to Bank 3, most of 
firms thittk that the percentage of collateral demanded by the bank is acceptable. This might be explained by 
the fact that Bank 3 require more collateral then necessary in the first place only reducing the level 
11) Under the assumption of only 30 per cent of the market value of the collateral being accepted as loan security. 
Martina Freiberg Page 92 
Chapter 5 The banking system in Poland, banking policy and behaviour 
demanded if the customer complains about it. This way the firm is convinced it is getting a good deal while 
the bank receive the percentage of collateral they want. 
5.6 Key points in chapter 5 
• Under communism, Polish banks were not allowed to allocate credits to enterprises according to profit 
orientated decisions but had to follow directives from the central authorities. 
• At the starting point of transformation, Polish banks not only had no experiences in profit orientated 
approval of credit applications, but were also inexperienced in dealing with small firms. 
• Despite an increasing number of banks operating in Poland in the new market environment, the 
competition in the banking sector remained at a rather low level. 
• Market entry barriers for foreign banks will be removed at the latest by the year 2001. 
• As profit margins in lending to larger finns are more attractive, and lending to larger firms usually 
proves to be less risky than lending to small firms, it is not surprising that banks, under the 
circumstances of low competition, tend not to show a particular interest in small businesses. 
• In the UK, banks consider the trading experience of the owner-manager as critical in the lending 
decision to small businesses, which suggest that it is most important for the banks to be convinced that 
the owner-manager of the small firms has the ability to do what he says he will do. 
• In Poland, banks do not consider small businesses as being different from larger enterprises, nor do they 
apply different criteria in the lending decision to different sized firms. 
• The criteria mentioned by Polish banks in their lending decision (mainly financial ratios) are clearly 
targeted at the approval of larger firms. The capability of the SME owner-manager is not a key factor for 
Polish banks in lending to small firms. 
• Small finns in Poland have to pay higher interest rates when compared with their larger counterparts. 
• New start ups are likely to face higher interest rates than more established firms. 
• Polish banks charge between 25 per cent and 30 per cent interest from SMEs. By comparison, banks in 
the UK demand between 9.25 per cent and 11.25 per cent. 
• The fact that Polish banks have to pay corporate tax out of nominal profits might be one of the main 
reasons the high interest rates demanded by banks. Indeed, bank in the UK receive higher real interest 
rates after tax than Polish banks. 
• Whereas interest rates decreased over the years since the start of the reform process, the criteria 
regarding the collateral demanded by banks seem to have become more strict. 
• Polish banks typically ask for collateral between 130 per cent to 150 per cent of the loan value. However, 
considering that the ratio to which the collateral is accepted ranges between 30 per cent and 80 per cent, 
the actual value of security finns have to provide ranges between 433 per cent to 500 per cent. This acts 
as a real disincentive to SME borrowing. 
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6. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN SMEs AND BANKS IN POLAND 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter six looks at the experiences and problems small finns and banks have in dealing with each other, 
both from the viewpoint of firms and banks. This includes attempts to analyse the extent to which 
complaints made are justified. Finally, possible solutions aiming to overcome these problems are suggested, 
drawing on ex."periences made in more mature market economies. 
6.2 Experience and complaints of SMEs in dealing with banks 
In discussing the criticisms banks receive [TOm small businesses in Poland, the experience of SMEs in more 
mature market economies such as the UK might be useful, since UK research has shown that the complaints 
that some SME owners make about the banks can be attributed to their own deficiencies. For example, 
Storey (1994) argues that the so-called finance gap with respect to small firms revolt from both demand and 
supply side failure. The external financing of small businesses has been the topic of various debates at least 
since the MacMillan Committee in 1931, which argued that small firms had difficulties in raising long-tenn 
capital of less than £200,000 (Storey 1994). Further investigations were made by the Radcliff Committee in 
1959, the Bolton Committee in 1971 and the Wilson Committee in 1979. Whereas the Bolton Report 
concentrated mainly on the effects of tight credit for small finns, the Wilson Report, in response to the 
growing importance of the SME sector in the late 1970s, drew more attention to the quality of the credit 
provision, especially to the security levels required by banks. In conclusion the committee suggested that 
bank managers may be overly cautious in lending to small finns (Stanworth & Gray 1991, Binks & Ennew 
1996). 
However, not only because of growing criticism but also due to an increase in competition in the UK market 
as building societies and other institutions were allowed to enter the banking market, banks changed their 
approach to small finns in the 1980s (Binks & Ennew 1996, Stanworth & Gray 1991) According to a 
survey of 110 small firms based in Yorkshire 1985-1990 it can't be suggested that finns in general are 
being denied bank finance (Keasey & Watson 1995). Furthermore, some of the criticism banks received 
from small businesses or small firm sector representatives proved to be more a result of the type of 
financing, namely debt finance that small firm owners seem to prefer, rather than an attitude problem of the 
banks (Storey 1994, Keasey & Watson 1995). 
The criticisms were mainly about " ... the handling of small firm finances, overcharging in terms of interest 
payments and of not passing on interest rate reductions, of applying bank charges without informing the 
customer, being overly eager in calling in their loans and demanding too high a level of security." (Keasey 
& Watson 1993). These findings were more or less supported by Storey (1994), who co-ordinated a survey 
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of more then 10,000 small firms between 1989 and 1992. The main complaints made by small firm owners 
with respect to banks were about: 
I. Bank charges (too high, customer don't get itemised charges, frequently calculated incorrectly) 
2. Delay in passing base rate reductions on to customer 
3. Collateral (Banks lend only against collateral and high level of collateral required by banks) 
4. Unwillingness of banks to lend to high-risklhigh-return borrower 
5. Banks close down a business 'too early' if it gets into difficulties 
6. 'Attitude' problems of banks, batlks don't understand small firms. 
Story (1994) concluded that criticism I, 2 and 6 were not all justified. Most batlks introduced itemised 
charges in 1992/93 and private computer programs to check charges are available. Changes of the base rate 
are centrally inputted into the banking computer system, hence banks are not able to choose which of their 
customers should receive the new rate. Moreover, bank staff training and reorganisation within the banks 
have led to improvement with regard to the relations between ballks and the small business sector (Storey 
1994). 
Criticism 3, 4 and 5 are unavoidable to some extent, considering the fact that banks, due to the nature of the 
debt contract, do not share in any upside gains made by the firm. In other words, the beneficiary of an 
increased valuation of the finns is the owner-manager. The bank only benefits indirectly, as in the case of 
the firm doing well, interest and the principal are being repaid by the firm. However, as the batlks do not 
receive more income if firms become more profitable, it is understandable, that banks do not accept any 
uncompensated down-side risk, hence are primarily concerned to protect their investment (Storey 1994, 
Keasey & Watson 1993). Moreover, some criticisms directed to banks are not always addressed correctly. 
Arguably much of the criticism ballks received from small firms during 1991 and 1992 were in fact a result 
of an increase in business failure which was caused mainly by the govenunent's high interest rate monetary 
policy (Keasey & Watson 1993). 
Nevertheless, as argued by Bitlks & Ennew (1995), small firms can experience a loan gap as they typically 
have insufficient collateral to cover the loan. This is especially tme for rapidly growing businesses, as their 
demand for capital may grow faster than the value of the purchased plant and equipment due to carcass-
valuation procedures applied by banks. The Membership of the Forum of Private Business survey of 6,000 
SMEs in 1992 confirms that fast-growing firms are significantly more constrained with respect to collateral, 
availability of credit, and term of loan. Interestingly the survey provides evidence suggesting that the 
collateral ratios are not the reason for the constraint but the type of collateral demanded by banks, which in 
the case of growing finns consisted more of personal collateral (such as the private house of the owner-
manager - Binks & Ennew 1995). 
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A more recent survey by the Forum of Private Businesses (FPB) in 1994 ranked complaints about collateral 
demanded by banks fourth, after charges, interest rate and termination of overdraft (Billks & Ellnew 1996 -
Table 6.1), which suggest that collateral became less of an constraint for small businesses in the UK in 
accessing bank finance. 
Table 6.1: Ranking of main constraints cited by SMEs in the UK in 1994 
l. Transaction charges 
2. Interest rate 
3. Threat of termination of overdraft 
4. Collateral 
5. Credit availability 
6. Competence of manager 
7. Speed of delivery 
Source: Survey by the Forum of Private Businesses (FPB) in 1994 in Binks & Ennew 1996 
By comparison, in Poland collateral seems to have become more of a constraint for SMEs since the start of 
the transformation in 1989, whereas transaction charges appear not to be an issue at all. In other words, it is 
the lack of availability of finance, not the cost of it, that is the problem. The main complaint cited in surveys 
in the early years of transformation was the high level of interest rates, whereas more recently the level of 
collateral demanded by banks seems to be the main criticism. A study by Grabowski & Kulawczuk (l991b) 
of 1,326 small private enterprises from the Gdansk Region in November 1990 - April 1991 reported that the 
main barriers in taking out bank credits were the extremely high interest rate (93 per cent), high collateral 
(36 per cent) and the reluctance of bank officers to deal with small finns (21 per cent). One year later 
Grabowski et ai. (1992) conducted another study of 300 SMEs in Gdansk, Krakow and Lodz which 
although noting that interest rate levels were the most significant barrier to finns using external finance, 
this had been cited by fewer finns (84 per cent) than one year previously. 52 per cent considered the amount 
of collateral requested by banks as the most important barrier and 30 per cent mentioned the unwillingness 
of banks to service small firms. A study of 143 polish entrepreneurs by the RWI and the WSF Economic and 
Social Research Institute in June 1993 - May 1994 supplies a more detailed list of complaints made by small 
firm, with the level of interest still being the main problem (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: Ranking of main constraints cited by SMEs in Poland in 1994 
Complains Percentage of respondents 
1. Credit interest rates too high 78% 
2. Bank credit guarantees too high (collateral) 65% 
3. Banks unable to inform on government assistance 43% 
4. Government assistance applied for, but not approved 38% 
5. Application for assistance too complicated 23% 
6. Credit allotments not fulfilled 22% 
7. Credit application rejected 20% 
--_ .. __ .... _------
--------
Source: Welter 1994 
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In the 1995 study the order of complaints changed for the first time, as 48 per cent of the 63 firms that had 
sought bank finance but not received it, cited insufficient collateral as the most important reason and only 
38 per cent the level of interest rates, reflecting declining interest rates as macro economic conditions 
improved (Smallbone et al. 1996). These findings are supported by the case studies of which most defined 
the collateral demanded by banks as the main problem. 
However, in some cases e,,1ernal factors outside the banking sector are the reason for SMEs not being able 
to provide the level of collateral demanded by banks. For example Case 1, a manufacturer of leather chairs, 
could not provide the securities of 200 per cent demanded by the bank when applying for a loan even 
though he owned his private house. This is because for the last 30 years the government had been thinking 
of building a high-way directly through his house (a plan which has never been realised but that is 
mentioned in every relevant document) which is why the bank will not accept the house as collateral. Case 
2, a kitchen manufacturer, would like to grow and to develop his business but can't access bank finance 
because of insufficient collateral. In order to provide his machines as collateral, he would have to insure 
them and that again would be too expensive. 
Although other surveys report that Polish entrepreneurs often lack an understanding of why banks need 
security for loans (Welter 1994, OECD 1996a), the evidence given suggests that Polish banks indeed are too 
security oriented. Banks, as mentioned in section 5.5.2 , do not apply criteria designed for small firnls in 
their lending decisions, hence are likely to compensate the risk involved in lending to SMEs by asking for 
high levels of security. This has been confirmed by one of the case study finns, case 7, who mentioned that 
banks look only for the collateral available. This is even more credible, as this firm managed to secure 
several loans and claimed to have a good relationship with their banks. The Lodz Region Economic 
Redevelopment Foundation also pointed out that firms with up to 20-30 employees find it most difficult to 
access bank finance, mainly because they do not have enough assets to secure a loan. Moreover, small firms 
in general, as mentioned in this context by the Lodz Incubator, are not in a strong position to deal with the 
banks. Indeed, Polish banks typically demand between 400 and 500 per cent of the loan value as collateral 
(section 5.5.4), whereas banks in the UK demand about 300 per cent for fixed-term loan (which is already 
higher then the level demanded by banks in the United States - Storey 1994). According to the Lodz 
Incubator, banks are also very strict with regard to the kind of collateral accepted, as they normally don't 
agree to personal guarantees. This makes access to finance more difficult for small finns, especially start-
ups and businesses with insufficient assets. The inadequacy of the surety system, including sureties for 
SMEs, certainly contributes to the problem. The establishment of a surety and guarantee network, including 
those of a local character, " ... must be considered too slow in relation to the needs" (Polish Ministry of 
Economy 1997). 
Complaints about excessive interest rates are certainly understandable, considering the sharp rise of interest 
rates from 30 per cent in 1990 to more than 80 per cent in 1991, which came as a surprise for those who 
had received loans in 1990 but were inadequately informed about the method by which variable interest 
rates were set (Webster 1992). On the other hand, as mentioned in section 5.5.3, interest rates became even 
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negative in real terms in certain periods which might indicate that managers of small and medium sized 
enterprises tend to an overly strong orientation towards nominal interest rates, which can, at least in parL be 
the reason why they consider interest rate as too excessive (Webster 1992, OECD 1996a). 
This suggestion is also confirmed by the 1995 study. The annual rise in industrial output prices (which 
applies in this analysis since all the surveyed firnlS were manufacturers) add up to 19 per cent at the end of 
1995 (National Bank of Poland - Annual Report 1995). The majority of firms (77 per cent) surveyed in 
1995 would have accepted interest rates (nominal interest rates) up to 23 per cent and on average even only 
12 per cent (median). Therefore, the real interest rate (nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate) 
accepted by SMEs would not have exceed 4 per cent in most cases and would have been even negative on 
average. It could be argued that the annual rise in industrial output prices is an average figure and does not 
necessarily say much about the rise in sales prices individual finns could realise. Nevertheless the evidence 
given seems too strong to deny that the manager of the surveyed firms had unrealistic ideas with respect to 
interest rates. They do not seem to realise that banks are commercial enterprises which are in business to 
make profits and to give their shareholders a fair return on their capital. Moreover, the criticism of high 
interest rates might be addressed incorrectly to the banks. Because of the high inflation rate and the fact that 
Polish bank do not enjoy corporate tax allowances, bank have to apply a high level of interest rates in order 
to stay profitable (see section 5.5.3). For both the inflation rate and the tax system, however, the government 
is responsible, not the banks. Moreover, even so it might be difficult for SMEs to pay current interest rates, 
the answer to the problem is not as simple as given by the Lodz Incubator: "The banks should lower their 
rates". 
The criticism of banks made by SMEs that they are not interested in dealing with small firms seems to be 
correct and appears to result fTOm a low level of competition within the banking system as well as the 
existence of more profitable opportunities in the form of government bonds as outlined in chapter 4.5.1. 
Consequently banks do not have special strategies for dealing with SMEs and, even worse, bank staff 
dealing with lending decisions for small finns are reported to be poorly prepared and therefore orientated 
mainly on the collateral provided (Case 7). This statement is supported by the Lodz Incubator and the Lodz 
Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation. The latter also pointed out the old way of thinking of the 
banks which is still present from the communism period where banks were not used to lending to SMEs. 
Start up firms for example find it extremely difficult to open an account at Bank Handlowy. In every market 
economy banks would be expected to be interested in increasing the number of accounts. However, when 
they spoke to the chief of Bank Handlowy it turned out that the bank is more interested in mature firms who 
have a name in the market and who have more e}>.-perience that get an account with the bank. It is more or 
less considered an honour for the firm to have an account at Bank Handlowy. 
Welter (1994) also hints at the old connections between the manager of the large commercial banks and 
(fonner) state owned companies, i.e. normally larger finns, which might result in a certain reluctance of 
banks to follow legal bankruptcy procedures. One of the key informant interviewees addressed this problem 
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as a potential danger for the quality of the batIks lending portfolio. In the case of this bank all employees in 
the credit department were replaced in 1993 by new staff due to infornlal ties to clients which probably has 
been the reason for part of the batIks losses (Bank 4). Because of reasons like this as well an increase of 
competition which is likely to occur with more foreign banks entering the Polish market, one would expect 
the situation to improve for SMEs trying to access bank finance. Moreover, as cited by Bank 3, banks will 
increase their share of lending to SMEs due to the dynamics of their activity and will have to make their 
lending procedures more effective as they will have to enlarge their market. 
The rather hostile environment for small firms in need of external finance that is currently present in 
Poland highlights the need for government assistance, either in the form of equity or credit guarantee funds. 
Considering the fact that most entrepreneurs are not aware of present support programmes (see chapter 
3.3.1) the criticism of banks being unable to infornl firnls about government assistance is quite serious, as 
they, because of their networks, could play an important role in circulating such information. In fact only 
one bank, Bank 2, mentioned the existence of a government scheme, the loan guarantee scheme operated by 
the BGK bank, for which small business owner can apply at their branch. 
However the bank also noted a low demand for this scheme, as up to then only one firnl had inquired about 
the nmd but had not even tried to apply for it. This, on the other hand, could again indicate the lack of 
information among SME owners with respect to the existence of such schemes. Therefore, the aim should 
be to integrate the batIks into a well developed business support system, not only because of the banks 
potential in the circulation of infonnation, but also because of their position as gatekeeper to credits. 
6.3 Experience and complaints of bank in dealing with SMEs 
The banks' risk of lending to non viable businesses (adverse selection) exists in every market economy, 
although it is likely to be higher in the case of Poland, as not only cost factors prevent the banks from 
undertaking proper loan assessments but also a lack of evaluation eX1JCrience amongst their staff. Moreover, 
as mentioned in chapter 4.5.1, business prediction in Poland tends to be more difficult than in more mature 
market economies due to the unstable economic environment as well as because entrepreneurs themselves 
had to get used to financial discipline, which was neither practised nor needed under communism (Welter 
1994). It is therefore not surprising that the Polish banks accumulated a large share of bad debt, especially 
in the early years of transformation, when both banks as well as firms found themselves in an unfamiliar 
and unstable economic environment. Consequently, in order to improve their profitability, banks try to 
avoid high-risk projects. Moreover, they are hesitant about lending to SMEs in general and to those with 
insufficient collateral in particular (Slifirczyk 1992, Polanski 1995). Given the low level of competition 
within the banking sector and the existence of profitable but safe investments in government bonds, makes 
the indifference of the banks to the small business sector understandable. 
The problems the banks were citing in relation to lending to SMEs are similar to those surveyed in more 
mature market economies, namely the lack of assets which might be used as collateral, the high rate of 
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failure in the SME sector as well relative high evaluation and monitoring costs. However, the first might 
also steam from Polish banks demanding too high level of collateral as security in the first place. High 
evaluation and monitoring costs arise from the fact that it takes more effort to monitor 100 small finns than 
10 or 15 large firnls which would bring the same profit. However in Poland the high level of cost arc not 
only a result of the small scale businesses typical in dealing with SMEs, as information given by SMEs to 
banks arc often limited which makes any risk assessment for bank difficult. Smaller firms in particular, 
normally employ a very simple type of book-keeping which contains only receipts of sales, as they pay taxes 
as a percentage of their turnover. In such a case, it is rather difficult for the bank to asses the financial 
situation of the finn as no information about costs are given. 
It is therefore not surprising that the banks complained about the poor level of information in the financial 
statements of small firms, which are not suitable to give sufficient infonnation to the bank about the real 
financial situation of the firm. To obtain more data about the firm is difficult, requires a lot of work, thus 
increasing the evaluation and monitoring costs even more. Evidence from the key informant interviews 
highlights tIus problem as 60 per cent of the customers of Bank 2 and 50 per cent of clients from Bank 4 
were reported to use only a simple type of book-keeping. Moreover many market economy institutions 
assisting creditors in risk evaluation such as credit information agencies, do not exist in Poland, which 
contributed to the problems the banking sector still face in evaluating credit worthiness of firms (Polanski 
1995). Therefore, the complaint of Polish banks regarding the low level of information from small 
businesses and the high costs of loan evaluations appear to be justified, which certainly adds to the 
reluctance of banks to deal with the SME sector. In addition, one has to bear in mind, as mentioned by the 
banks themselves, that SMEs are a new sector and that the bank employees are still learning to deal with 
them. 
Another problem cited by the Polish banks is that small firms usually try to hide their profits in order to 
lower the amount of tax payable (which makes this problem an issue for the government). This statement is 
supported by the fact that so-called shadow activities are estimated to have accounted for between 10 and 30 
per cent of the GNP in 1993 (RWIa 1994), which might have a negative impact on the lending decision as 
banks can only consider official financial documents in the loan evaluation. Moreover the banks commented 
on unrealistic business ideas by the entrepreneurs. A small retailing finn for example applied for a loan in 
order to stock more similar articles to those they were offering already, even though they were not very 
successful in selling them. One bank also noted that many start up finns were not sufficiently specific about 
the exact use of the loan they wanted to apply for nor about the cost connected with setting up a firm, e.g. 
the price of machines, the conditions of payment for the machines etc. However, the relevance of this 
problem is difficult to prove with the available data, and requires further research. Another bank mentioned 
a problem that is related to the legal definition of a business partnership in Poland. A business partnership 
of two persons ceases automatically if one of the partners leaves the company. In such a case the only 
chance for the bank to recover their investment is by using the collateral. Again, this points to a weakness in 
the regulatory framework for conduction business, therefore is an issue for the government. 
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6.4 Possible solutions with regard to problems in the SMEs-bank relationship 
In assessing loan applications banks can follow two procedures, a capital-gearing or an income-gearing 
approach. Capital-gearing emphasises the value of the collateral provided by the firm which is compared 
with the size of the loan requested. Providing the bank is convinced that the collateral is sufficient to protect 
it from any losses in the case of business failure, the loan might be granted. The income-gearing approach 
concentrates more on the expectation whether or not the finn would be able to serve the loan, thus looking 
at the income the business is likely to generate, in other words, emphasising the future prospects of the 
company (Binks & Ennew 1995). The latter approach certainly should be more desirable for both banks and 
SMEs. For banks, the risk of adverse selection would be reduced whereas for the latter the access to bank 
finance would be easier, at least for those with viable projects, as the level of collateral demanded by the 
banks would be lower. 
However an income-gearing approach requires detailed information about the current and future financial 
situation of the finn. This information is most likely to be available for the owner-manager although not 
necessarily for the bank (infonllation asymmetry). Moreover, it appears that for reasons mentioned in 
section 6.3 it is quite difficult and costly for banks to access sufficient information to overcome the 
information asymmetry in the current situation in Poland. Binks et a1. (1992) even argues that" ... restricted 
access to finance is not attributable directly to size, but is instead a result of the problems associated with the 
availability of information from which projects are evaluated. Although such information problems are not 
unique to the small finn sector, they are considerably more prevalent there because of the anticipated higher 
costs of information collection." 
While information asymmetries can't be eliminated completely, they can be reduced and the relationship 
between the small fiml and the bank is the key factor in this respect (Ennew & Binks 1996, Binks & Ennew 
1995,1996, Williams 1996). Binks & Ennew (1996) stress the importance of the company contributing to 
the relationship by sharing information with the bank. Their analysis of regular surveys of the membership 
of the Fonull of Private Business (FPB) in 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994 of between 3,500 and 6, 100 small 
firms produced evidence to suggest that companies which participating more in building up a relationship to 
their bank were generally more satisfied with the service they received and perceived their business to be 
less constrained then the less participate fimls. Suggestions on how fimls can contribute to a good working 
relationship are given by Williams (1996). 
Businesses should: 
• work at the relationship by providing the management and financial information the bank has requested 
on time. 
• be very clear about the negotiated terms and conditions. 
• remember that banks arc in business to make a profit, just like every company. In other words, if banks 
provide a service they are entitled to charge for it. 
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• try and make the bank their ally. If the bank manager trusts the owner-manager, he will support the 
business 
• be clear that banks have enormous powers and can make or break businesses 
• above all, as far as possible avoid giving the bank any nasty shocks. Firms should tell the bank about any 
unexpected bad news, such as the sudden loss of a major contract or a bad debt as soon as you discover 
it. Banks claim they are often unable to help simply because they are asked too late 
Source: Williams 1996 
In the Polish context tIils means that, in order to be able to provide sufficient financial infoDllation, firms 
that have only used simple type of book-keeping hitherto, should start to keep records of all finances of the 
firms, even though this might not be required by law (for tax reasons). A positive history in dealing with the 
bank as well as a long teDll flow of information between the small business manager and the bank manager 
makes the behaviour of the firm more predictable for the bank, thus less risky. In such a situation ballk 
finance might become cheaper for the finn, as bank managers tend to grant finance or more favonrable 
condition to customers with which they have a close working relationship (Ennew & Binks 1996). 
In Poland, SME managers could not develop a personal relationship with financiers such as bank managers 
before 1989, because of the way the economy was organised under communism. However, with an more 
experience in a market economy small business owners have the possibility of building up a track record as 
well as a personal relationship with financiers. Not only has the importance of a positive history of SMEs in 
dealing with banks been mentioned in the key informant interviews (see relevant sections in chapter 5), but 
it has also been reported in some of the case studies. For example case firm 3 experienced improving co-
operation with one of the major banks in Poland in terms of extending the repayment period from 4 to 10 
years and in lowering the interest rate from originally LIBOR plus 6 per cent to LIBOR plus 2 per cent. The 
bank also proved to be flexible concerning the repayment term of the 235.000 US$ loan. (Originally the 
loan had been granted by western credit lines and had then been taken over by the Polish bank, which is 
why the loan is in US$.) Initially the firms had to pay US$ 20.000 every three months, although now they 
only have to pay US$ 15.000 every half year. When the company experienced turnover problems in 1996 
because of a very cold summer, the bank again proved to be co-operative in agreeing to charge only half of 
the interest rate during the summer months. The owner himself explains that because he is working together 
for six years with the same group of persons in the bank they trust him. Another business (Case 4) came to a 
similar conclusion that for the bank it would be most important to have a good opinion about the firm. 
However in this case the good opinion of the bank did not compensate for lack of collateral but certainly 
counted for the acceptance of a guarantee from another company as collateral. 
Equally the banks, providing they want to penetrate and develop the SME market, need to recognise the 
special requirements of SMEs, hence need to train their staff in understanding the small business sector, in 
order to contribute to a good working relationship. One of the case studies (finn 7) for example reported 
about a bank complaining about high fluctuations in the monthly turnover of the firm, a phenomenon 
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absolutely normal in their sector. Banks also should inform their customers about the constraints under 
which they are operating, e.g. the influence of the inflation rate, so that the finns know what they can 
expect in terms of financing (Binks & Ennew 1996). 
Nevertheless, more years of experience as a market economy does not guarantee the development of a close 
working relationship between bank managers and small business owners. In fact the failure to form such 
connections has been identified as one of the weaknesses of the banking system in the UK, which, in 
comparison with countries like Gennany and Japan, typically applies a more capital-geared loan evaluation 
(Binks & Ennew 1995, 1996). In the case of Germany it is argued that because of the existence of more 
banks, many of which are small and locally based, bank managers are able to develop closer working 
relationships with business owners than their British counterparts (Bittks & Ennew 1995). Even though 
banks in the UK claim to become more orientated on business plans and cash flow projections in their 
lending decision, small firms still cite lack of collateral as a major barrier to growth (Bmtk of England 
1998). Considering the low density of the Polish banking system (see section 5.3), the lack of staff trained to 
deal with SMEs and above all the current disinterest in dealing with small finns, it seems fair to argue that 
the banks are unlikely to improve their capital-geared approach significantly in the near future. But where 
viable projects are denied finance because of the lack of collateral potential economic growth might be 
foregone, which does justify the intervention of the government in the financial market. 
In the UK such intervention has been taking place in the form of the Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) 
launched in 1981 which aimed to support small finns with viable projects that are unable to secure 
conventional loans because of the lack of collateral or/and the lack of a track record (Stanworth & Gray 
1991, CEEDR 1995). In this respect the Loan Guarantee Scheme, according to Mason & Harrison (1992), 
appeared to playa small but significant role in assisting small firms to raise finance. Moreover, a survey of 
100 small finlls that borrowed under the LGS, undertaken by CEEDR (1995), reports that most of the finns 
took up the scheme because of a lack of collateral and that their projects would not have gone ahead without 
the LGS. Furthermore, the report notes that majority of firms were growth orientated and in fact did grow, 
both in terms of turnover and employment. However, the overall take up of the scheme was rather low with 
only an average five loans per 1000 eligible businesses. Several factors were suggested to be responsible for 
this, among them a lack of viable business proposals in general and a lack of firms that have viable projects 
but insufficient own capital or external finance opportunities in particular. Most of the businesses in the 
study area were very small, employing less then five people, and therefore had very modest capital 
requirements. Only a very small proportion of finns were reported to be growth orientated and in the need 
of external finance. This might also be e}",'plained by the fact that most who become self-employed have been 
long-term unemployed, achieved only a low level of education and are more or less being pushed into self-
employment. 
Another problem appeared to be the low awareness of the scheme among the small businesses. Banks seem 
not to playa significant role in raising awareness, as the majority of firms that had borrowed under the 
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scheme had first heard about the LGS form other sources than their bank manager, e.g. from the financial 
and trade press as well as from support agencies. Nevertheless, bank managers in general influence the use 
of the scheme, as all LGS applications are mainly made through banks (or other lenders), who are 
responsible for assessing the creditworthiness of the applicant. In other words, the bank manager determines 
whether or not a LGS application is submitted, hence acting as a "gatekeeper" of the scheme. Thus, the 
banks as well as the bank managers attitude towards lending to SMEs is certainly of importance. For 
example, even if managers are interested in dealing with small loans, they may not consider it worthwhile 
to use the LGS. Moreover, in the case of small loans for established firms, banks might find it more sensible 
to lend unsecured than to bother with the scheme. This in combination with the above mentioned deficit of 
loan proposals were security is the only thing lacking, leaves a very small gap for the LGS to fill (CEEDR 
1995, Piasecki et al. 1998). 
Becoming more aware of the importance of SMEs in the process of transformation, the Polish government 
established a Loan Guarantee Fund in the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK - Bank of the National 
Economy) in December 1994. The programme, administered in co-operation with 12 large commercial 
banks, was designed particular for Polish entrepreneurs independently of their legal status employing up to 
250 persons, an aIillual turnover below 20 million ECU (70.000.000 ZLP) and total assets of no more then 
10 million ECU (35.000.000 ZLP) - the EC dcfinition of a small or medium sized enterprise in 1 99.t. The 
scheme can only be used in the case of credits for investment, credits for production, implementations of 
"know-how", purchase of property of privatised state enterprises, environmental protection , rise in export 
and in the creation of new jobs and enterprises. The programmc guarantees up to 60 per cent of the loan 
(some sources report 70 per cent) and the collateral requirement of the guarantees proportion of the credit is 
50 per cent. Maximum size of the loan is two million PLZ with a maturity of up to five years. The fee 
ranges from 1.2 to 2.0 per cent, calculated on the value of the loan (HUbner 1996, The Delegation of Poland 
1996, Suzuki 1996, Notes from a information board in the Incubator in Lodz in 1997). As in the UK, loan 
guarantee applications are not accepted by the BGK directly from businesses, but are submitted by one of 
the banks they co-operate with, provided this bank considered the proposal creditworthy (The Delegation of 
Poland 1996). 
Considering the strong demand for external finance among Polish entrepreneurs, their growth orientation, 
their solid educational background, their reported difficulties in obtaining bank finance due to insufficient 
collateral as well as the fact that banks do not tend to lend unsecured, one would expect to find a strong 
demand for the loan guarantee scheme. However the BGK bank had received only 17 loan applications by 
September 1997 (Chamber of Commerce, Nowy Sacz). One of the banks (Bank 2) at which the loan 
guarantee scheme is available mentioned that they had only one firm enquiring about the programme but 
that in the end it did not apply for the scheme. One reason for the low take up of the loan guarantee scheme 
might be the low awareness of it among the small businesses, due to lack of available information as 
mentioned in chapter 3.3.1. This seems not to be unique in Poland as the UK study also identified a need for 
more publicity. Moreover, a significant minority of UK borrowers under the LGS criticised the way in 
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which the access to the scheme is controlled, as they had to contact a number of banks before finding one 
that would help them (CEEDR 1995). Considering the face that the large commercial banks in Poland are 
much less interested in dealing with SMEs then their counterparts in the UK, they are (as in the UK) in a 
position to decide whether or not a proposal is submitted to the BGK. In other words, they are the 
"gatekeeper" of the scheme, which means it is not surprising that the level of take up of the scheme is rather 
low. This suggests that in order to increase the number of take ups the influence of the banks in the 
application of the scheme should be decreased. In Germany, for example, several private credit guarantee 
association operate in each region, formed by financial institutions, local authorities and trade associations. 
The associations are financially supported by the regional (Land) governments as well as the Federal 
govenlll1enl. Other sources of income include !,'Uarantee premiums paid by borrowers and profits from 
investments. The funds are used to provide guarantees for bank loan, however the creditworthiness of 
borrowers is not only assessed by the banks but also by the chambers and trade organisations. Similar bodies 
exist to guarantee equity investments in SMEs (Kayser & Ibielski 1986, Bannock & Albach 1991, Piasecki 
et al. 1998). In some regions, such as Hessen, a Land development agency deals with applications for loan 
guarantee schemes on behalf of the Land govenlll1ent as well as granting own credits and loan guarantees 
(Bennet & Krebs 1991). 
The Lodz Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation already started to think in that direction by 
preparing a local loan guarantee fund which will be provided by the local labour office and their foundation 
in association with banks. The programme aims at start ups and SMEs which are aiming to grow. It has 
already been accepted by the local labour office and the local government administration and the 
Foundation is now awaiting approve from the central labour office. According to the Foundation, finance 
for start ups is possible to find, but difficult to access. The labour office for example offers loans for start 
ups, however they are small (30.0000 - 40.000 ZLP) and therefore more suitable for start ups in the service 
or trade sector. The interest rate is quite attractive, about 75% of the average interest rate normally charged 
by banks. In theory the loan is easily accessible because the level of collateral demanded is not as high as 
that demanded by banks, but there is a queue of finns waiting to be funded. Moreover only those officially 
registered as unemployed are eligible for the loan which is a serious constraint for all working persons and 
which is why the Lodz Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation wants to set up the local loan 
guarantee scheme. 
Other loan guarantee funds set up with foreign or international aid are the Polish-British Enterprise Project 
(PBEP), the PHARE Local Initiative Programme and the Programme for Structural Development ill 
Selected Regions in Poland (STRUDER). The PfL4RE Local Initiative Programme has been founded in 
1993 in eight communities as part of the European PHARE Local Initiative Programme and is administered 
by the Co-operation Fund under the direction of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. The programme 
provides a whole support package of loan guarantees, loans, equity investments, education and training as 
well as assistance for the development of business support and incubation centres (Suzuki 1996). 
Nonetheless, due to the regional restrictions and problems with the managing bank, the flow of resources is 
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reported to be rather unsatisfactory (RWI 1994b). The PBEP started in autumn 1994 to provide an 
integrated support programme for SMEs, however it is operating in only two voivodships, Lublin and 
Bialystock (Hiibner 1996, Suzuki 1996). Instead of running several different loan guarantee schemes it 
might be more effective to co-ordinate different sources into larger funds which could be more easily 
promoted and which might be even more attractive for banks to get involved with. One the other hand, 
larger funds might increase bureaucracy and therefore influence the flexibility of support schemes in a 
negative way. A united guarantee fund which would co-operate with a number of banks is suggested by the 
Lodz Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation to be very useful. Their future model would include 
bank as well as non-bank funds and would, at least at present, need money from the government, the 
council and non-government institutions. Therefore a good regional policy and development funds are 
needed, but also other services such as information and advice, as the financial package should be only part 
of a bigger programme of support. 
In this context, the Foundation also pointed out that changes in the administrative structure would be 
necessary, e.g. the introduction of larger voivodships and of institutions which are operating on a regional 
rather then on a national level. Moreover in the current system only a small part of the govenunent revenue 
(15-20%) goes directly to the region, the rest goes to the central budget and is then redistributed to the 
regions. In the opinion of the Foundation most of the funds, about 70 per cent, should be kept in the region 
as the local government can locate the need more easily than the central government. Furthermore the 
Foundation remarked that local government recently started to change their way of thinking. They began to 
understand that with a rising number of firms the level of taxes revenues rise, the support necessary for the 
unemployed decrease, hence the social costs in general decline. Therefore they start to realise that if they 
support local businesses they are supporting the regional development and the people in the region. 
6.5 Key points in chapter 6 
The main findings of section two and three of this chapter are listed in table 6.3 and 6.4. 
Table 6.3: Main complaints of Polish SMEs in dealing with banks: 
Criticism: Comment: 
Banks are too security orientated. Appears to be justified. 
Interest rates are too high. Criticism appears to be addressed wrongly to 
the banks, as current inflation rate and 
corporate taxation system leave little room for 
reducing interest rates. 
! 
__ Ba~)<_s are_n~!!~!~r~~ted in dealing with SMEs._ ,,A.ppears_t()E~~()f~e_c~ .... _ .. ! 
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Table 6.4: Main complains of Polish banks dealing with SMEs: 
Criticism: Comment: 
Lack of assets to be used as collateral Might also stem from Polish banks being to 
collateral orientated in the first place. 
Low level of information given by small firms. Appears to be justified. 
Small firms usually try to hide their profits. Appears to be justified. 
Entrepreneurs have unrealistic business ideas. Difficult to assess with the data available. 
• Costs and problems in accessing information about small finns appear to be one of the main reasons for 
Polish batlks to apply a more capital-geared approach in their assessment of loan applications of SMEs. 
• Owner managers of small firms can contribute to overcoming these problems by sharing information 
with the batlk. 
• In order to be able to provide sufficient infornlation, small business owners should keep more 
sophisticated financial records. 
• Banks, providing they want to penetrate and develop the SME sector, need to train their staff in 
understanding the small business sector. 
• Considering the current disinterest of Polish banks in dealing with SMEs, government intervention in 
the financial market appears to be necessary. 
• The Polish govenunent established a Loan Guarantee Scheme in 1994 which is administered by 12 large 
conunercial banks, but which has had a low take-up. 
• Government intervention in the form of credit guarantees is useful, however the banks, even if they 
should be involved in such schemes, should not act as "gatekeeper" of the scheme as tIils appears to 
influence the number of take ups in a negative way. 
• Other loan guarantee schemes operating on regional level are set up with foreign or international aid. 
• Instead of running several different loan guarantee schemes it might be more effective to create larger 
funds which could be administered via small business support orland regional development agencies. 
Such funds might even be more interesting for banks to co-operate with. However, care should be taken 
that funds are not becoming too inflexible and bureaucratic. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter seven the main finding of the thesis will be smumarised with respect to the aims as specified 
under section 1.1, followed by recommendations to entrepreneurs, bank manager and policy-maker about 
the type of strategies that could be used to increase the rate of bank finance to SMEs. 
7.2 Factors influencing the decisions made by Polish SME owners with regard to 
their sources of finance 
The factors influencing the decisions made by Polish SME owners with regard to their sources of finance 
are of both internal and external nature. 
Internal factors include: 
1. the personal preferences of the owner manager 
2. the characteristics of the business 
Ex1ernal factors consist of: 
1. the situation in the market 
2. the availability of external finance 
3. the terms to which external finance is available 
4. level of information about available external sources of finance 
Polish firms appear to be more growth orientated than their counterparts in more mature market economies. 
The 1995 survey showed that 88 per cent of firms had been growth orientated in 1993-94, with 66 per cent 
considering growth as an important object. This might be explained by the fact that setting up a business 
has not only been seen as a possibility to seek independence and self-fulfilment, but also to increase income 
and the standard of living, especially against the background of declining large state companies in the 
newly emerging market economy and the limited possibilities of wealth accumulation in the past. This 
indicates that, even though currently growth orientated, the motivation of part of the Polish owner-manager 
might change as soon as their business generates income sufficient to realise an acceptable live style. 
The fact that small business ownership was restricted during communism, means that most exiting small 
firms in Poland have been set up after the political changes in 1989, hence are rather young when compared 
with western market economies. It is therefore not surprising, that statistics of the size stmcture of the 
private sector in Poland show a general deficit of medium sized firms employing between 51 and 249 
persons when compared with the private sector in the UK and Germany. Moreover, Polish small businesses 
are generally smaller in terms of the average number of employees than their counterparts in more mature 
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market economies. This supports the argument that growth ambitions of Polish small firms might decrease 
over time, as at a certain firm size internal funds might not be sufficient for further business ell.'Pansion. 
Therefore, the owner-managers wish to stay independent has to be offset against his/her interest for further 
increases of the personal income by accepting external finance. This might also explains why, as soon as 
external finance becomes necessary, debt finance provided by banks proved to be the main source of 
external finance for SMEs, as debt finance does not challenge the control the owner of the firm has over the 
business. This phenomenon is also typical for SMEs in more mature market economies. 
The 1995 study shows a high interest of Polish finns (80 per cent) in external finance, which might not only 
be explained by their strong growth orientation, but also by the fact that the majority of surveyed firms (87 
per cent) were constrained in their development by a lack of finance. Moreover, some firms are also pushed 
towards external finance, as they need to invest in order to keep up with rising competition in Poland. The 
median amount sought was 100,000 ZLP, the lowest about required was 5,000 ZLP and the highest amount 
was 11,000,000 ZLP. In 1995, no evidence could be found that a demand for long term debt finance exist 
among Polish SMEs. However, this might have changed with more years in a market economy, as evidence 
from the case study firms suggest that Polish businesses show an increasing interest in larger and longer 
term investments, for which they have difficulties to provide sufficient collateral and which banks are 
reluctant to grant. 
The amount of finance sought also depends on the particular characteristics of the business: 
• Firms in the food processing sector typically required twice as much finance as firnlS in the other sector, 
probably because of the expensive machinery needed in this sector (Smallbone et a1. 1996). 
• Older companies (firms that had started trading before 1989) showed a slightly higher demand for 
additional finance then younger finns. This might indicate that their internal resources had already been 
used for adjustments necessary to adapt to the new market economy. 
• Microenterprises needed the highest amounts per employee when compared with other size groups, 
probably due to their low level of internal sources and their backlog demand for investments. This might 
indicate that microenterprises need funds partly to raise their technical standard to that of their 
competitors, and hence to survive, whereas the larger firms in the study required further finance mainly 
for product development and growth. However, the larger sized firms were more likely to apply for debt 
finance than smaller businesses. Nevertheless, those microenterprises that did apply were more 
successful in obtaining debt finance than slightly larger finns. The reason might be that the private 
assets of smaller finns present sufficient collateral for the size of loan needed, whereas such security 
might not be enough to cover the amount sought by slightly larger finns. 
Even though Polish SMEs are highly interested in raising external finance, they rely to a greater extent on 
internal sources, both for start up and investments, than their counterparts in the UK. This might be 
explained by the fact that banks (even though they are the most usual providers of external finance to SMEs 
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in Poland, as indeed they are in the UK) proved to be rather reluctant to deal with small firms. Therefore 
Polish banks do not apply lending criteria design for SMEs, hence demand high level of collateral of up to 
500 per cent of the loan value. Another possible source of external finance for Polish SMEs are public 
support programs and venture capital funds. However, most support programs proved to be unsuitable for 
SMEs and the availability of formal venture capital funds is limited in Poland; those that exist are mainly 
interested in larger finns. Moreover, the flow of information about these sources of finance appears to be 
rather poor. Informal venture capital (provided by so called Business Angels) which have been become 
significant as an equity source for SMEs in the USA as well as in the UK could also be of interest for Polish 
SMEs. Indeed, not only do Polish SMEs show a high interest in venture capital, but could even be of 
interest to potential business angels in terms of their growth ambitions, growth potential and their level of 
education in their field. Surveys regarding the existence of business angels in Poland are not available, 
although it is not very likely that many of them exists in Poland. They are described in the western literature 
as typically to be high net worth individuals who have personal entrepreneurship experience, nonnally with 
background in industry and commerce (Harrison & Mason 1995). Bearing in mind the short period of time 
that entrepreneurship has been accepted in Poland, one would expect potential Polish business angels stilI to 
be in the phase of developing their own business. A solution might be to create business angel networks 
which could be operated by Polish small business support agencies, aiming to find foreign as well as Polish 
investors one via modern communication systems such as the Internet. This might be especially interesting 
for Polish emigrants who are now returning to Poland, some of whom have become wealthy entrepreneurs 
(Scase 1997). However, further research in this area would be needed, especially as the high interest of 
small firms in venture capital is likely to stem from the fact that Polish SMEs experience difficulties in 
accessing debt finance. 
Once internal sources are depleted, external finance becomes necessary. However, some firnls in Poland do 
survive without external finance by applying "bootstrapping" measures such as tight cost management or 
the employment of members of the family who work without e:\.'pecting regular wages. However, even 
though they might be useful in the short term, this certainly hinders the development of the firm in the long 
tenn. Moreover, it appears that Polish SMEs are also using illegal measures, which might put the existence 
of the finn on risk. 
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7.3 Factors influencing the policies of Polish banks and bank behaviour with 
respect to small firms in Poland. 
The factors influencing the policies of Polish banks and bank behaviour with respect to SMEs derive from 
the historical background Poland's as well as current external factors. 
The historical factor resulted at the beginning of the transformation in 1989 in: 
1. banks not being used to assess loan applications 
2. banks not being used to deal with small firnls 
These external factors include: 
1. the low level of competition in the banking sector 
2. the risk in dealing with smaller firms in general and in dealing with SMEs in a country in transition 
in particular 
3. the availability of other profitable forms of investment 
4. low level of information supplied by small Polish firnls 
5. government regulations regarding corporate tax 
When investigating the factors influencing the policies of Polish banks as well as their behaviour with 
respect to SMEs one has to bear in mind the characteristics of bank under communism, in other words that 
between the end of World War II and 1989 banks were not allowed to allocate credits to enterprises 
according to profit orientated decisions but had to follow central directives. As a result, banks had no 
experience in profit orientated approval of credit applications at the starting point of transformation. They 
were ine}.'PCrienced in dealing with small firms, as they almost exclusively, were used to serving large state-
owned enterprises. The fonner, in combination with more and more enterprises experiencing payment 
problems after the freeing of prices, the reduction of subsidies and the collapse of the RGW market, led to 
an increasing number of bad loans in Polish banks. The laUer might explain why banks do not actively 
differentiate between small and large firms in the sense of having policies or practices for the SME sector. 
Another factor is that while the number of banks increased after 1989, the competition in the banking sector 
remained at a rather low level. Foreign banks, which could have increased the competition in the banking 
market, showed only a limited interest in the Polish market in the beginning of the reform period because of 
economic factors, and subsequently because of restrictions introduced by the National Bank of Poland. 
However, this is likely to change in the filture, because market entry barriers for foreign banks will be 
removed at the latest by the year 2001. In such an environment of low competition it is understandable that 
the banks are more orientated towards larger finns, not only because they are more familiar in dealing with 
them but also because profit margins are more attractive and lending to larger firms is likely to be less risky 
then lending to small firms. Moreover, from 1992 onwards the Polish government issued securities, thus 
offering banks profitable investment opportunities without any risk involved. 
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Although the banks will not admit to discrimination against smail firms, the effect of the lending criteria 
which they apply to both small and large firms is to make it more difficult for small firms to raise bank 
finance than large firms in practise due to size related disadvantages. This is noticeable in the criteria 
applied in the lending decision of the banks, as well as in the level of collateral demanded and the interest 
rate charged. The lending decision criteria are mainly orientated at financial ratios, the analysis of the 
market, the history of the firms in dealing with banks as well as the existence of documents stating that the 
finn has no liabilities outstanding to the tax office and the national insurance institutions. The trading 
experiences and the characteristics of the owner-manager, which are of major importance in lending to 
smaller firms, are missing in the criteria list of the banks. Moreover, Polish banks appear to apply a more 
capital-gearing approach in lending to small firms, in other words emphasising the value of the collateral 
provided more than assessments regarding the ability of the firm to service the loan. The level of collateral 
demanded ranges between 100-500%, although the actual value of securities demanded depends on the 
liquidity of the collateral, the financial prospects of the firm or the risk involved in the project and the 
existence of fonner good co-operation with the customer. Therefore, small finns are likely to have to supply 
more collateral then larger firms, as they do not offer as many business opportunities as large firms. 
Assessment and monitoring cost, which are generally relatively high in dealing with small firms when 
compared with large firms (because of the fixed cost element) are certainly one of the reasons for this 
behaviour. However, in the case of Poland factors like a high inflation environment, the fact that smaller 
finns often only keep insufficient records of the business finances, and trying to hide part of their profits for 
tax reasons as well as the deficiency of institutions assisting creditors in risk evaluation, certainly adds to 
the problem. One the other hand, bank managers also appear to lack an understanding of the needs of the 
SME sector in the first place. 
The interest rates applied by batIks depend on the risk of the project, the repayment period, the overall profit 
the bank expects from dealing with the finn and the kind of collateral provided. Small firms, as they are 
usually more risky and offer less business opportunities when compared with large finns, have to pay higher 
interest rates when compared with their larger counterparts. For the same reasons, new start ups are likely 
to face higher interest rates than more established firms. However, it should also be noted that the interest 
rates applied by commercial banks were relative low in real terms (e.g. when taking the inflation rate into 
consideration) between 1990 and 1994, sometimes even negative in the cases of prime borrowers. 
Apparently, even rates charged to small firms were relatively low. By 1997 nominal interest rates for SMEs 
accounted for between 25 and 30 per cent (between 11,8 and 16,8 per cent in real terms). One reason for 
the high level of interest rates might be the low level of competition in the Polish batIking market. However, 
the fact that bank have to pay corporate income tax out of nominal profits, with account for a substantial 
amount in a high inflation environment, might even be of more importance. Indeed, banks in the UK 
receive higher real interest rates after tax than Polish batIks. 
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7.4 The role of the government and other organisations in relation to the supply of 
finance to SMEs in Poland. 
The main issues regarding the Polish government and other organisation in relation to the supply of finance 
to SMEs in Poland are as follows: 
1. Laissez-faire approach by the Polish government until 1995. 
2. First comprehensive SME policy programme launched by the government in 1995 
3. Various SME support organisations on regional level, most of which supported by foreign and 
international organisations. 
4. Establishment of a credit guarantee fund in the Bank of the National Economy (BGK), which is 
administered by 12 large commercial banks 
5. Low level of take-up of the credit guarantee scheme provided by the BGK. 
6. Financial assistance to SME is mostly provided by foreign and international organisations, especially by 
PHARE programmes of the European Union. 
7. Low awareness about support systems in general among SMEs and well as some support organisations 
Until 1995, the Polish government based their economic policy on the neo-liberal doctrine which considers 
state intervention in the market process as inappropriate. Nevertheless, various SME support organisations 
were established on a regional level after 1989, such as incubators, business support centres and innovation 
and technology centres. Many of these organisations were established through alliances including local 
businesses, community leaders and authorities and most of them were supported by foreign and 
international organisations. Most widely represented were the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), the 
majority of which were set up by a consortium of community governments, agencies, banks and other 
actors. However, the policy of the government as outlined above and the fact the regional authorities in 
Poland were not representative of regional interests but responsible for executing legislation initiated by the 
central government, meant that regional support was also rather weak initially. Moreover, as the majority of 
the national income in form of taxes and other levies were administered by the central government, the 
financial means available to regional authorities were limited. The absence of a government policy also led 
to a lack of co-ordination not only between the various support organisations but also among ministers due 
to conflicts over competencies. 
The Polish government launched their first comprehensive SME policy program in 1995, partly because of 
Poland's desire to enter the European Community, especially with regard to include the possibility to 
include Polish enterprises in EC programs (Ministry of Industry and Trade 1995). The policy intended to 
improve the accessibility for SMEs to financial sources, including legal regulations to stimulate the 
development of local guarantee and credit funds. This included the further development of the system of 
credit guarantees for SMEs on the basis of the credit guarantee fund established in the Bank of the National 
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Economy (Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego) in 1994 (which is administered by 12 large commercial banks) 
as well as the development of a credit re-guarantee system for local institutions granting guarantees for 
SMEs. The Ministry of Industry and Trade took upon the responsibility for SME development and policy, 
whereas the Polish Foundation for the Promotion and Development of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
had been established by the government to ensure the practical implementation and co-ordination of 
activities and programmes in this area. However, the financing (which included foreign funds, mainly from 
PHARE programmes) and the assessment of the policy proved to be difficult. Moreover, co-operations 
problems between ministers and others involved in the policy influenced the efficiency of the policy in a 
negative way. 
Therefore, financial assistance mostly was provided by foreign and international organisations, especially by 
PHARE programmes of the European Union, such as the Programme for Structural Development in 
Selected Regions in Poland (STRUDER) and the Local Initiative Programme. However, these programmes 
are regionally restricted and many of the other programmes initiated by international organisations were 
either overly bureaucratic or more interested in larger firms, hence unsuitable for SMEs. Even more 
importantly, there seems to be a rather low level of awareness about available support measures in general, 
not only among small firms but also among some support organisation, which might be one of the reasons 
why the BGK bank received only a few loan applications. On the other hand, considering the fact that the 
Polish banks are not interested in lending to SMEs, it might be counterproductive to entrust the banks with 
the decision whether or not a loan application is submitted to BGK. In other words, government 
intervention in the form of credit guarantees is certainly useful; although banks should not act as 
"gatekeeper" of the scheme as this appears to influence the number of take ups in a negative way. The Lodz 
Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation seemed to recognise this, as they started to prepare a local 
loan guarantee fund which would be provided by the local labour office and their foundation in association 
with banks, not by the banks alone. 
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7.5 Recommendations about the types of strategies that could be used to increase 
the rate of bank finance to SMEs 
7.5.1 Recommendations to entrepreneurs 
Even though it is a fact that Polish banks are currently reluctant to deal with SMEs, owner-managers can 
contribute to increase their accessibility to external finance. The key finding for Polish entrelweneurs to is 
to focus on their relationship with the SUl1lllier of credit. Business people should think of managing the 
"finance supplier (bank) relationship" in the same way that they think of managing suppliers and customers 
- as an essential business/management task that has its own demands and skills as well as benefits. 
These include: 
Understanding the position of banks 
Entrepreneurs should: 
• acknowledge that the position of banks in the economy has changed, that banks are now commercial 
businesses, depending on profit, and not administrators of the financial system on behalf of (and 
subsidised) by government. 
• understand the difficulties banks are facing, not only with respect to external factors such as the inflation 
rate but also regarding their difficulties in dealing with SMEs, especially the higher level of risk and 
associated higher costs for the bank. 
• realise that the above point is even more problematic for Polish banks, when compared to foreign credit 
suppliers, as after 1989 Polish banks had not only to learn how to assess credit applications but also how 
to deal with the small business sector in general. 
In practical ternls, this means that Polish owner-manager should change their attitude with regard to 
suppliers of external finance. Furthermore, entrepreneurs need a better understanding of the way market 
economies function (e.g. the importance of the inflation rate) and of the role of banks in this system. 
Contribution to the bank relationshill 
Entrepreneurs should: 
• contribute to reduce the information asymmetry that exists between the banks and the finns, therefore 
reducing the lending risk for the bank by: 
* reducing the level of costs involved in assessing their loan application by providing the bank 
with more detailed information. 
* developing a closer working relationship with the bank or loan manager and seeing this as a 
long term relationship, not one defined only by momentary financial needs. 
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In practical terms this means that Polish entrepreneurs should apply more sophisticated accounting system 
(i.e. not only keeping an records of sales), even though this might not be required by law, in order to be able 
to provide the bank with more accurate financial information. This might require some training for the 
owner-managers of Polish firms. 
Through a better relationship between Polish entrepreneurs and the banking sector can lead to: 
• an increase in the rate of bank finance to the SME sector 
• more favourable conditions of external finance once bank finance has been approved 
• more realistic expectations among SME owner-managers with regard to the terms of bank finance, thus 
enabling small finns to plan investment projects more efficiently. 
However, even though banks in Poland are now commercial businesses, their attitude towards small finns 
has not changed significantly, in other word, they are currently not very interested in dealing with SMEs. 
Therefore, the improvements listed above are probably rather limited. As SMEs are unlikely to be in the 
position to influence the behaviour of the banks, they should consider their strength with regard to their 
growing importance in the economy, hence try to influence government policy towards providing better 
access to external finance. Therefore, they should organise themselves in associations on local, regional and 
national level, thus creating a combined force to represent the SME sector to the state. 
7.5.2 Recommendations to bank manager 
The key findings for Polish banl{s are based on the fact that: 
(i) competition in the banking sector will increase as soon as market entry barriers for foreign banks are 
liberalised in the year 200 I. 
(ii) the private sector becomes increasingly important in the Polish economy. 
(iii) the private sector consists mainly of small firms. 
Therefore, banks should: 
• eliminate their old way of thinking (which is still present from the communism period were banks did 
not used to lend to SMEs) and regard the small business sector as an important sector of the lending 
market. 
• make a clear decision whether to enter and develop the SME market or to concentrate on other market 
sectors. 
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Strategies for banl{s that want to penetrate and develoll the SME market: 
Lending policy for SMEs 
Bank should: 
• recognise the special requirements of SMEs 
• provide a wider range of services that address the needs of these finns 
• develop a better understanding of small businesses in market economies 
Lending criteria for SMEs 
Bank should: 
• consider the trading experience of the owner-manager as critical in the lending decision to small 
businesses. 
• consider the ability of the entrepreneur to run a business IDlder the condition of a market economy, 
hence the ability of the owner-manger to find customer for his/her products or services. 
• realise that it is most important that the owner-manager of the small firms has the ability to do what he 
says he will do. 
In this respect, banks should also shift from a "collateral based" lending to a more "income base" lending, 
because: 
• collateral does not prevent the banks from the risk of adverse selection (the possibility to fund non viable 
projects) 
• the "income base" approach reduces the risk of adverse selection for the bank, as it concentrates more on 
the eX'pectation whether or not the firm would be able to serve the loan. 
• it increased the accessibility of bank finance for SMEs with viable projects, as the level of collateral 
demanded by the banks would be lower (which is the main barrier for small firms seeking bank finance). 
Therefore, it increased the number of viable projects in the customer portfolio, hence the profitability of 
the banks. 
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Worldng relationship with SMEs 
A good and long-term working relationship with small firms is desirable for banks, as this might reduce the 
information asymmetry between the bank and the firm, hence reducing the assessment and monitoring costs 
for the bank. 
Banks should: 
• establish small business departments (as has been done in the major banks in the UK) or, in the case of 
smaller batIks, assign special loan manager trained in dealing with SMEs 
As a result, banks could organise credit approval in a less bureaucratic manner (for example setting a 
maximum amount up to which the loan manager is allowed to approve credit applications), hence make use 
of the fact that the manager dealing with the owner-manager of the firm is most likely to be the best person 
to assess the creditworthiness of the firm. 
Training needs to understand SMEs 
To train bank managers and bank staff with regard to the specific characteristics and needs of Polish SMEs 
in the new market economy is one of the key factors for batIks to apply lending policies and criteria 
designed for SMEs and to establish good working relationships, if they are to be successful in dealing with 
the small business sector. 
Loan Guarantee Schemes for SMEs 
In order to increase their market share in the SME sector, banks could make more active use of Loan 
Guarantee Schemes, as: 
• bank themselves report about the lack of assets of SMEs to be used as collateral 
• collateral requirements one of the main barrier of bank finance to SMEs 
• the need for banks to require collateral from firms to secure loan might be reduced ifbanks apply a more 
income-geared lending approach, however is unlikely to be eliminated completely as information 
asymmetries are unlikely to be completely eliminated, especially in cases where the finns has no credit 
history (such as in the case of start ups). 
Therefore, banks should: 
• co-operate with providers of Loan Guarantee Schemes for SMEs or even administer such schemes. 
• inform small business owner about the availability of such schemes. 
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7.5.3 Recommendations to policy makers 
The key findings for Polish policy makers to increase the rate of bank finance to SME focus on the 
provision of a stable economic environment and a regulatory framework as well as direct intervention in the 
financial market in forms of support programmes. 
One of the main responsibilities of the government is to provide a stable economic 
environment and a regulatOlY framelvork which encourages the development of businesses. 
These include the: 
Inflation rate 
A low and stable inflation rate is necessary for all parties in the economy to calculate costs and risks of 
doing business on a long ternl basis, hence is needed to provide the basis for economic growth. Even though 
the inflation rate has been significantly reduced since 1989, it is still too high when compared with more 
mature market economies. 
Infrastructure 
• Polish SMEs, in tenus of their growth potential and their personal ability could well be of interest to 
informal venture capitalists. 
• Owner-managers of small firms are interested in venture capital. 
• In Poland, a stock market for SME shares does not exist, whereas two markets aiming at small firms are 
operating in the UK since 1995. 
Therefore, policy makers should: 
• establish an exit route for venture capitalists, by creating a stock market designed for dealing with SME 
shares. 
Regulations 
Policy makers should: 
• eliminate regulations that lead small businesses towards bootstrapping measures (e.g. high level of tax 
lead to small businesses have to hide part of profits in order to survive, and consequently have problems 
raising bank finance as banks can only use official profit data) 
• reconsider their regulations regarding corporate tax allowances for the inflation rate. Currently, banks 
have to pay corporate tax out of nominal interest rates, which (especially in a high inflation 
environment) increased significantly the level of interest rates banks have to charge their customers in 
order to receive positive real interest rates after tax. 
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Public support programmes constitute direct intervention in the market, therefore need 
justification. 
In the study the justification for policy support with regards to the supply of finance for SMEs rest on three 
main arguments: 
(i) The majority of Polish small firms applying for debt finance are growth orientated. 
SMEs have the potential to contribute in various ways to the development of the private sector in 
Poland, including contributing to employment generation. 
(ii) The Polish banking sector is protected form foreign competition by the government. 
The introduction of market entry barriers is understandable considering the need to allow the domestic 
banking sector to develop to a level that banks can compete with foreign competitors in a free market 
economy. However, this leads to size related disadvantages for smaller finns, as the low level of 
competition in the Polish banking sector encourages banks to continue to concentrate on dealing 
mainly with larger firms to whom they are used to from the communist period. Consequently, small 
finns eX"})erience difficulties in accessing bank finance, with might lead to viable projects not being 
funded. This again puts jobs at risk as well as delays and hinder the development of new employment. 
(iii) Polish banks are unlikely to sufficiently meet the financial needs of SMEs, even if they start 
senring the small business sector. 
Information asymmetries between the bank and the small finn can't be eliminated and the fact that 
loan assessment and monitoring cost are higher for banks when dealing with smaller finns compared 
with larger finns, requires public support programmes even in market economies with banks interested 
in SMEs such as the UK and Gemlany. 
Experiences with current financial support programmes show that those involved in the development of 
such schemes need to be more aware of the financial needs of SMEs as well as of suitable distribution and 
information channels to maximise the impact of the programmes. 
Qualifying criteria of Imblic SUl1llort Ilrogrammes 
Policy makers should: 
• investigate the need of SMEs regarding external finance. For example, firms employing up to 5 persons 
appear to be most constrained by a shortage of finance, hence need support programmes offering smaller 
amounts of finance. 
Distribution of public SUPllort programmes 
Policy makers should: 
• take into account the current lack of interested of banks in dealing with SMEs when looking for suitable 
channels of distribution for support programmes. Banks, even so they should be involved in such 
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schemes as potential source offlUlds, should not act as "gatekeeper" of the scheme as this appears to 
influence the number of take ups in a negative way. 
• consider entrusting other organisations outside the banking sector with the administration of financial 
schemes, as it is the case in Hessen (Germany). The existing Regional Development Agencies could be a 
starting point for such a network of organisations, as they are represented throughout the country. 
However, it would be necessary to ensure that those dealing with the support applications are properly 
trained in assessing the proposal, in order to avoid the experience the banks made in the early years of 
transition with bad debts. It might be possible to draw on the expertise of foreign support organisation 
that are already active in Poland. 
• co-ordinate existing loan guarantee schemes into larger funds which could be administered via small 
business support orland regional development agencies. This might be more effective (e.g. in terms of 
promoting the schemes) and might even be more interesting for banks to co-operate with. 
Information about public SUPI)ort Ilrogrammes 
Policy makers should: 
• inform small firms as well as support agencies about available programmes. This demands efficient 
channels of information between the issuer of the support progranmle, the organisations involved in the 
administration of the scheme, as well as other business advisers, banks and small firms. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The conditions for Polish SMEs with respect to accessing bank finance have certainly improved since the 
beginning of the reforms in 1989. The creation of two-tier banking system led to the establishment of 
commercial banks which are managed according to market economy rules, in other words operate profit-
orientated. A more stable macroeconomic environment led to an decrease of the inflation rate, which the 
banks passed on to their customers in form of lower interest rates. Moreover, in an attempt to distinguish 
more successfully between sound and unsound credit applications, Polish banks have improved their lending 
decisions over the last years. However, the level of competition within the banking system is still low and, 
even more important, institutional changes proved to be more easily achieved than changes in the attitudes 
of Polish banks. As a result, banks are still reluctant to deal with small firms, hence don't apply policies 
designed for lending to smaller firms. Therefore, small finns are still being discriminated against larger 
finns with respect to the availability of debt finance as well as with respect to the conditions of available 
credit (the level of interest rates and collateral). Government efforts to increase the accessibility of small 
firms towards external finance have been only of limited success, partly because such schemes were 
distributed via the banking system. Therefore, financial assistance was mainly provided by foreign and 
international organisation. However, such funds were often regional restricted or proved to be unsuitable for 
smaller finns. Consequently, is appears that the Polish SME sector still has only limited access to external 
finance, especially microenterprises and start ups. 
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Efforts to improve the financial market for SMEs in Poland have to come from the banks, owner-managers 
of SMEs and the government in combination with other organisations set up to support the SME sector. 
It is understandable that banks will only increase their interest in dealing with SMEs should this be 
profitable for them. However, as the SMEs sector becomes increasingly important in the Polish economy 
and the competition in the banking sector is expected to increase in the near future, it is likely that in future 
banks will recognise the SMEs sector as potential market. Nevertheless, in order for banks to deal with 
small finns effectively, small firms need to contribute to a good working relationship with the bank, among 
others by providing more accurate financial data about their businesses. The government, on the other hand, 
should make sure that Polish banks will be able to compete against future foreign competition by further 
stabilising the macroeconomic environment and by providing a framework of regulations (e.g. with regards 
to lax-regulations) similar 10 those applied in more malure market economies. Moreover, considering Ihe 
high interest of Polish SMEs in venture capital, the government should establish an exit route for shares of 
small businesses.· Even though the interest of small firms in venture capital is likely to decrease as soon as 
debt finance becomes more easily available, informal venture capital could still pay a significant role in the 
supply of equity finance to Polish SMEs. 
As changes within the banking system are unlikely to happen in the short-term, further support for the 
SMEs sector is needed to increase the accessibility of external finance in the meantime. However, public 
support programmes must take the needs of Polish finns into account (e.g. the amounts of finance needed by 
small firms) and should consider the lack of interest of banks in dealing with SMEs, hence should be 
distributed via organisations set up to support the Polish SMEs and not via the banking system. 
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APPENDIX I: PUBLIC SUPPORT PROGRAMMES IN POLAND 
BGK loan guarantee programme 
The progranune has been established by the Polish government and is administered by Bank Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego (BGK) in co-operation with 12 large commercial banks. It was funded by the Polish Ministry of 
Finance with PLN 45 million and aimed to support SMEs to increase export sales, to introduce new 
technology and for certain other purposes. The program guarantees up to 60 per cent of the loan The 
collateral requirement is 50 per cent of the guaranteed portion of credit 
the fee is 1.2 per cent in the first year and an additional 0.2 per cent each year thereafter 
(Suzuki 1996) 
Comments: Useful for SMEs, provided the involved commercial banks are interested in dealing with SMEs. 
STRUDER programme 
The Programme for Structural Development in Selected Regions in Poland (STRUDER) 
was implemented by the Polish Agency for Regional Development (PARD) in April 1994. 
Among others STRUDER provides financial support for SME creation and development in form of a grant 
scheme in six selected provinces of Poland. The main source of funding is the PHARE programme of the 
European Union. SMEs can apply for the grant in Regional Development Agencies (RDAS) in each of the 
six regions The grant is a non-repayable grant of up to 25 per cent of the cost of investment in mainly fixed 
assets. A minimwll of 20 per cent has to be contributed from the entrepreneur's own resources (a minimum 
of 15 per c~nt for projects over 200 000 ECU) with the balance coming either from more of the 
entrepreneur's own resources or from bank credit. The maximum level of grant for anyone project is 
100,000 ECU. 
To be eligible for the grant, firms have to: 
• be privately owned 
• employee no more than one hundred employees. 
• be active in the manufacturing or service sector, including transportation, tourism and agribusiness. 
• locate the investment (fixed assets only) in the region only 
• demonstrate sound management and evidence of project viability 
• have no tax or social security indebtedness 
At the end of April 1995 grants for over 200 projects had been approved, totalling nearly 7 million ECU. 
The total investment by the SMEs involved (all of which employ less than 100 people) accounted to almost 
30 million ECU in some of the most disadvantaged regions in Poland. 
Comment: Scheme appears to be overly bureaucratic for the smaller investment projects. 
(Kozak 1996) 
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The Polish-British Enterprise Project (PBEP) 
A regional development programme financed by the UK Know-how Fund. Total funding is US$2 million 
from the Interest Account in Stabilisation Fund, to which the British government contributes. PBEP started 
in autumn 1994 to provide an integrated programme of support for SMEs. Two provinces (voivodships) in 
eastern Poland Lublin and Bialystok have been selected for this programme. The five-year project combines 
technical assistance with funding of financial and enterprise support instruments. Among others, the fund 
guarantees up to 70 per cent of bank loans. The maximum size is US$ 70,000 and maturity is up to five 
years. The fee is on per cent of the guaranteed portion. 
(Suzuki 1996) 
Comments: Useful for SMEs, however regional restricted. 
Loan of Polish American Enterprise Fund 
Responsible organisation: Polish-Hungarian Enterprise Fund 
Duration: 
Interest: 





Credit volume paid: 
max. 3 years 






62 million US$ 
Comments: Positive assessment due to otherwise lacking short- and medium-term financing 
opportunities for SMEs 
(RWI 1994 b) 
Bank for Social and Economic Initiatives (BISE) 
Responsible organisation: Bank for Social and Economic Initiatives (BISE) 
Duration: 
Interest: 





Credit volume paid: 
Comments: 







2 billion zloty 
no info 
no info 




EIB Loan (EIB = European Investment Bank) 
Responsible organisation: EIB / Polish Development Bank 
Duration: 4 - 14 years 
Interest: EIB interest rate plus bank margin 




Maximwn 4 years and 8 months 
no info 
no info 
10 million US$ 
Public Support Programmes in Poland 
Assisted firms: 
Credit volume paid: 
All World Bank and EIB projects: 177 applications of which 31 approved 
75 million ECU (available) 
Comments: 
(RWI 1994 b) 
Irrelevant for SMEs as mainly considered for large investment projects 
PHARE Local Initiatives programme 
Responsible organisation: PHARE / Co-operation Fund 
Duration: 1 - 7 years 
Interest: LIBOR plus 3 - 4 per cent 










3.14 million ECU 
The programme is active in eight communities. The programme provides loan guarantees, loans, equity 
investment, education and training, assistance for the development of business support and incubation 
centres. Total budget is ECU 7.5 million. In 1994, the budget for guarantees was PLN 2.5 million. 
Businesses in the agricultural sector are eligible. Businesses must employ fewer 50 persons, have net sales 
of less then ECU 1 million, and be at least 51 per cent privately-owned. 
Comments: Despite guarantee option, highly unsatisfactory flow of resources due to problems with the 
managing bank and because of regional restrictions 
(R WI 1994 b, Suzuki 1996) 
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PHARE Equity programme 
Responsible organisation: PHARE / Co-operation Fund 
Duration: 
Interest: 





Credit volume paid: 
Comments: 
(RWI 1994 b) 





Max. 15% equity or 200,000 ECU 
o 
2 million ECU 
Only available for those finns which have received EIB loans. Small flow of 
resources as the involved EA"p0rt-Development Bank is mainly orientated to 
state companies 
World Bank loans for the development of the private sector 
Responsible organisation: World Bank / Polish Development Bank 
Duration: 
Interest: 





Credit volume paid: 
Comments: 
(RWI 1994 b) 
Maximal 7 years 
LIBOR / FIBOR plus bank margin 
Maximal 3 years 
no info 
50 per cent 
2 - 4 million US$ 
All World Bank and EIB projects: 177 applications of which 31 approved 
55 million US$ (available) 
Overly bureaucratic, as loan application only given following agreement with 
World Bank 
World Bank loan for privatisation and restructuring 
Responsible organisation: World Bank / Polish Development Bank 
Duration: 
Interest: 





Maximum 12 years 
LIBOR / FIBOR plus bank margin 
Maximum 1/3 of duration 
no info 
50 per cent 
10 million US$ 
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Assisted firms: 
Credit volume paid: 
All World Bank and EIB projects: 177 applications of which 31 approved 
125 million US$ (available) 
Comments: Irrelevant for SMEs, as mainly large privatisation projects considered 
(RWI 1994 b) 
Equity funds funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD): 
Alliance Scan East Fund 
The Fund makes equity investments in companies in which one of the industrial partners invests at the same 
time. Industries covered by the industrial partners are: telecoms, cables, construction materials, pulp and 
paper equipment, power generation, environmental technology, petrochemicals and plastics, oil and gas. It 
may invest in any of the EBRD's countries of operations. 
Alliance ScanEast Fund 
Aleksanterinkatu 15B 
EastMan Advisors OY 
00100 Helsinki, Finland 
Contact: Mr Ari Tolppanen, Chairman 
Tel: +358 9 615 5800 
Fax: +358 961558300 
(EBRD Interuet Home Page May 1998) 
Comments: Unlikely to be suitable for SMEs 
East European Food Fund 
This fund undertakes equity and equity-related investments in the food and beverage industry. Investments 
range from US$ 2 million to US$ 7 million. Allhough the Fund may invest in most of the Bank's countries 
of operations, it intends to focus its investments in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine. 
Jupiter Asset Management Limited 
Knightsbridge House 
197 Knightsbridge 
London SW7 IRE 
United Kingdom 
Contact: Mr Laurie Cannon, Director 
Tel: +44 171 4120703 
Fax: +441715813857 
(EBRD Internet Home Page - May 1998) 
Comments: Unsuitable for SMEs as investment start from US$ 2 million 
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Renaissance Fund 
This fund considers investing in emerging private enterprises, including start-up and young growth 
companies, management buy-outs and spin-offs of small state-owned businesses. It makes initial 
investments in the range ofUS$ 100,000 to US$ 500,000, and follow-on investments will be made as 
appropriate, with ultimate portions being in the range of US$ 1. 5 million to US$ 2.5 million. This fund can 
invest in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
Renaissance Fund, Warsaw Office 
Renaissance Partners 
ul. Lowicka 44 
02-551 Warsaw 
Poland 
(EBRD Internet Home Page May 1998) 
Comments: Might be suitable for medium sized enterprises as investments start form US$ 100,000 
Caresbac Polska SA 
This fund is particularly interested in existing companies in the agricultural and ancillary sectors. It makes 
investments on commercial terms in companies with at least 51 per cent Polish ownership, promising strong 
long-term business growth. Investment range is from US$ 75,000 to US$ 400,000. 
Caresbac Polska SA 
ul. Polna 40 
00-635 Warsaw 
Poland 
Contact: Mr Piotr Kalaman, Director General 
Tel: +48 22 25 62 OS/25 62 06/ 25 62 16/25 62 17 
Fax: +48 
(EBRD Internet Home Page - May 1998) 
Comments: Suitable only for SMEs in agriculture 
Pioneer Investment Poland 
This fund invests in private companies and companies undergoing privatisation in Poland. Main areas of 
interest are: food processing, construction materials and services, leather, wood production, distribution and 
retailing, transport, telecommunications and the computer servicing industry. Investments range from US$ 
500,000 to US$ 9 million. 
Pioneer Investment Poland 
INTRACO 
ul. Stawki 2 
00-193 Warsaw 
Poland 
Contact: Mr David Hartford 
Tel: +48 22 860 6600 
Fax: +48 22 860 6601 
(EBRD Internet Home Page - May 1998) 
Comments: Only for companies undergoing privatisation - more likely to be larger companies 
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Poland Investment Fund (Advent Fund) 
This fund provides finance and management assistance to companies in the private sector. Investments 
range from US$ 1 million to US$ 8 million. The Fund finances projects in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic. Please see listings below for individual fund addresses. 
Advent Fund 
123 Buckingham Palace Road 
London SWI W 9SL 
United Kingdom 
Contact: Mr Nicholas Callinan, Managing Director 
Tel: +44 171 333 0800 
Fax: +44 171 333 0801 
Poland Investment Fund (Advent Fund) 
Copernicus Capital Management Sp. z.o.o. 
Krakowskie przedmiescie 79 
00-079 Warsaw 
Poland 
Contact: Mr Neil Milne, Managing Director 
Tel: +48 22 26 85 80126 64 32 
Fax: +48 
(EBRD Internet Home Page - May 1998) 
Comments: More for medium sized and larger firms as investment start at US$ I million 
DBG Osteuropa Holding GmbH 
This fund invests capital in local companies as well as joint ventures in the four Visegrad countries. Typical 
investments range from US$ 5 million to US$ 10 million. 
DBG Osteuropa Holding GmbH 
Jungmannova 34 
11000 Praha 1 
Czech Republic 
Contact: Mr James O'Neil, Chief Executive Officer 
Tel: +420 2 2409 8400 
Fax: +420 2 2409 8444 
(EBRD Internet Home Page - May 1998) 
Comments: More for larger firms as investments start from US$ 5 million 
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Polish Private Equity Fund 
EBRD equity participation 
The fund is interested in new businesses ventures, small and medium-sized privatisation or restructuring 
and joint-ventures with foreign partners. in selected cases, it can provide debt financing in addition to 
equity. Investments range from US$ 500,000 to US$ 10 million. 
Polish Private Equity Fund 
Enterprise Investors 
uI. Nowy Swiat 6/12 
00-400 Warsaw, Poland 
Contact: Ms Barbara J Lundberg, Executive Vice President/General 
Director of the Warsaw Office 
Tel: +4822625 1868 
Fax: +48 22 625 7933 
(EBRD 1996) 
Comments: More for medium sized and large companies as investment start from US$ 500,000 
Baring Communications Equity Emerging Europe 
This fund considers equity investments in emerging private enterprises in the media and communications 
industry. It focuses its investments in companies operating in Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Hungary, Baltic states, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and the EBRD's other 
countries of operations. The preferred investment size is from US$ 1 million to US$ 5 million. However, 
smaller or larger investments are considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Baring Communications Equity Emerging Europe 
Warsaw Office 
VI. ChocilllSka 28, p. V #531 
00-791 Warsaw 
Poland 
Contact: Ms Heather Potters, Partner 
Tel: +48226274156 
Fax: +48 22 492 784 
Comments: More for medium sized and larger companies as investments start from US$ 1 million 
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APPENDIX II: CASE STUDY TOPIC GUIDE 
A. Firms that were successful in obtaining bank finance 
1. Introduction 
Name ofthe firm: 
Address: 
Name of the interviewee: 
Position of the interviewee: 
Interpreter: 
Date of Interview: 
2. What are the main problems for your business at present? 
3. What were your main resources of capital at the time the business started and what 
were your main sources of finance since then? 
Probe for percentages: Personal savings, capital from previous, family or friends, bank loan/credit, other 
loan (specifY), foreign investment, domestic equity partners, subsidies/loans (specifY). 
Bank loan: when received? 
4. What are your experiences with bank loans? 
How did you start the approach? 
Probe: Use of any business adviser (name),advise useful?, name of bank, since when existed bank(site), 
former contact with bank manager, nature of that contact. Personal or business account with the bank? 
What was offered by the bank? 
Probe: Overdraft loan, term loan (maturity period), interest rate - fixed (years) or floating (how 
calculated), was it possible to chose the type of interest rate?, if loan has not been paid back yet - what is 
current interest rate, are interest rates reasonable? If no-what would be reasonable? Change of sales 
prices of their products in the last year in percent? 
What did the bank require from you? 
Probe: Details about the finn (turnover, management structure, business plan, book-keeping etc.), 
securities (collateral, references, etc.), what kind of collateral, what value of collateral (too high?)., 
difficulties in providing the collateral, charges required by the bank, were charges appropriate, main 
point banks are looking for when deciding whether to grant a loan or not? 
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What are your main problems in dealing with the bank? 
Probe: Bank reluctant to lend to SMEs, complicated procedure, approval by the bank took too long (what 
problems caused that? - need to find other short-term finance, delay in expansion, etc.). 
5. What are your experiences with external equity? 
Did you ever rise external equity or would you like to raise any? , if yes where, main problems with 
external equity (not available, application to complicated, loss of control over the company) 
6. What are your experiences with business adviser orland external support schemes with 
respect to raising external finance? 
Used any, names, useful - in what way, if not useful why not? 
B. Firms that were not successful in obtaining bank finance 
1. Introduction 
Name of the firm: 
Address: 
Name of the interviewee: 
Position of the interviewee: 
Interpreter: 
Date of Interview: 
2. What are the main problems for your business at present? 
Financial problems (specifY), how is the business effected by these financial problems? 
3. What were your main resources of capital at the time the business started and what 
were your main sources of finance since then? 
Probe for percentages: Personal savings, capital from previous, family or friends, bank loan/credit, other 
loan (specifY), foreign investment, domestic equity partners, subsidies/loans (specifY). 
4. What are your experiences with bank loans? 
How did you start the approach? 
Probe: Use of any business adviser (name),advise useful?, name of bank, since when existed bank(site), 
fortner contact with bank manager, nature of that contact. Personal or business account with the bank? 
Martina Freiberg Page I~O 
Appendix II Topic guides for case studies interviews 
For what kind of loan did you apply? 
Overdraft loan, term loan (maturity period) ? 
Why did you not receive the loan? 
Bank refused to give it or did you not want it any more? 
Possible reasons: 
Interest rate What did the bank require, what would you have been accepted? 
Kind of collateral What was required, what would you have been willing to give? - Problems to 
provide the kind of collateral required? 
Value of collateral What was required, what would you have been willing to give? 
5. What are your experiences with external equity? 
Did you ever rise external equity or would you like to raise any? , if yes where, main problems with 
external equity (not available, application to complicated, loss of control over the company) 
6. What are your experiences with business adviser orland external support schemes with 
respect to raising external finance? 
Used any, names, useful - in what way, if not useful why not? 
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APPENDIX III: KEY INFORMANT TOPIC GUIDE - BANKS 
1. Introduction 
Name of the bank: 
Status of the site: 
Headquarter, branch 
Address: 
Name of the interviewee: 
Position of the interviewee: 
Date of Interview: 
2. What is the lending policy of this branch? 
Lending portfolio, amount of total lending, percentage of lending to SMEs in total lending. To what 
extend is the lending policy dictated by the headquarter? - What is decided by the branch? Are SMEs a 
special target group of the lending policy? Do you distinguish between different SME-groups in your 
lending policy? (Specify) 
3. What is your lending policy toward SMEs? 
What criteria are you using in the decision whether to lend to an SME or not? 
How do you assess the credit worthiness of SMEs? (Cash-flow, turnover, prospects of the project -how is 
that assessed? market research, help of other institutions, own expert, - documents of the tax office and 
the national insurance institute, book-keeping records, business plan, profitability, account history etc. 
What is you first and you second criteria in your lending decision? 
What kind of collateral and what value do you reqUire? 
Business premises, private houses, cars, machinery, etc. How do you assess the value of the collateral? 
(own e:\.'pert, external expert visit firm, compare with market value) If collateral >= 100 %, why is such 
a high level of necessary for the bank? 
What interest rate do you require from SMEs? 
What do you use as base rate? (Lombard, discount, WIBOR, other (specify) What margin do you require, 
how are these margins calculated (maturity period, evaluated risk of the project, etc.) Do you require 
different margins from different type of SMEs? (age of finn, number of employee etc.) 
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What is the decision procedure? 
Who decides (at branch or at headquarter)? Manager (what manager), group of manager (specify) etc. 
How long does the decision in average take? 
4. What are your experiences in lending to SMEs? 
Main problems (repayment, bad loan, percentage of bad loans in total loans to SMEs) Monitoring of the 
firm, how is that done? Problems with collateral? Does the new collateral law from December 1996 help 
to improve the lending to SMEs? Problems with a specific group of SMEs? - specify How would you 
describe the relationship between you and the SME-manager? (tension? . long-term relationship? Good 
flow of information?) 
5. Former surveys have shown that banks only playa minor role in the finance of business 
start ups as well as in further investments of SMEs. What is in you opinion the reason 
for that? 
SMEs to risky to lend to. What could SME manager do to increase bank lending? What could the 
government do to increase bank lending? (credit guarantee schemes etc.) 
6. Do you offer any other services apart from loans to SMEs? 
Product and market information, information about government and other grants, equity finance, etc. 
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APPENDIX IV: KEY INFORMANT TOPIC GUIDE - BUSINESS ADVISER 
1. Introduction 
Name of the institute/organisation 
Address 
Name of the interviewee 
Position of the interviewee 
Date ofthe interview 
2. To what extent do SMEs use your service? 
How many firms use your service at present? How many of these are SMEs? (If only as few what do you 
think is the reason for that?) How many of the SMEs who use your service require support in getting 
external finance? How do you get in contact with SMEs? (active - advertising specially of SMEs etc. of 
passive - wait for SMEs to contact them) 
3. What kind of support for SMEs seeking external finance do you provide? 
Support = information, advice, other? 
Support area = sources of finance (bank, international or national programmes etc. - specifY), different 
types of finance (loan, equity, other - specifY) - what is most suitable for the firm, requirements needed 
to access these funds, filling in of application forms, calculation of cost of finance for the firm, business 
plans, etc. 
Support schemes specialised for SMEs? Schemes distin!,'llishing between different groups of SMEs 
(which - size, sector, age, etc.)? 
Support free of charge? (if no, what do you charge?) 
4. What are your experiences in dealing with SMEs? 
Which of the services is most required by SMEs? 
Do different SME-groups (size, manufacture/service, age etc.) require different services - if yes, which 
group requires what? 
What do you think are the main problems SMEs have with respect to external finance? 
What do SMEs complain about most, what is their attitude towards banks (sceptical or trust them). 
Which type of SMEs are most successful in getting external finance, esp. bank finance, do firms who got 
more than one bank loan find it easier to get the second one, compared to the first one? 
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What are your main problems in dealing with SMEs? 
They do not know what they want, have unrealistic ideas about external finance (specify), etc. 
5. How would you assess the attitude of banks towards lending to SME's? 
Not interested in lending to SMEs (why), prefer certain types of SMEs (which). 
Has the institute/organisation any contacts to banks? (what is the nature of that contact). 
How would you describe the relationship between bank managers and SME managers (tension, good 
flow of information, SMEs reluctant to give infornlation about their business, bank managers arc not 
interested in contact with SME managers, do long-term relationships exist or do SME managers tend to 
change their bank quite regularly)? 
6. Former surveys have shown that banks only playa minor role in the finance of business 
start-ups as well as in further investments of SMEs. What, in your opinion, is the reason 
for this? 
Bank can make money with other investments (treasury bills etc.), etc. 
7. What could be done to improve bank finance to SME's? 
by SMEs (better flow of information, betler financial management, etc.) 
by banks (offer additional services to SMEs (what), acknowledge SMEs as a target group, etc.) 
by the government (credit guarantee schemes, co-ordination of support institutions, lease or sale of 
property under special conditions, providing better laws (what), etc.) 
New collateral law from December 1996 - did this have any influence on banks lending to SMEs? 
How should the support be delivered? (by the government or rather through non-state institutions, e.g. 
chambers, as SME managers may be sceptical about any governmental institutions.) 
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APPENDIX V: PROFILES OF CASE STUDY FIRMS 
Case 1 
Firnl 1 is a furniture manufacturer founded in 1982 by two partners. In 1995 they employed eight persons 
on a full time basis, at the time of the survey only one full time employee was left and the income was just 
enough to cover the costs. The main problems as quoted by the owner-manager are the low level of demand 
as well as delayed payments from customers. Being in business for so long. He could not remember how the 
start up of the finn was financed. At the time of the interview only internal sources of finance were used. 
The owner had applied for a loan at his bank, however did not succeed in obtaining it. 
Case 2 
This partnership consists of two persons and started trading in August 1991. They manufacture kitchen 
furniture and also have three retail shop through which part of the furniture is sold. Although having been 
successful in obtaining three loans between 1992 and 1993, they could not obtain another loan in 1997. One 
of the partners mentioned the lack of eAiernal finance as the main barrier for the development of the finn. 
The start up of the firm was entirely financed with personal savings and at the time of the survey the firms 
had to relied to 100 per cent on retained profits. 
Case 3 
Firm 3 manufacturing cookies and ice-cream started trading in August 1945. The products are sold through 
wholesale companies as well as through a small retail shop which belongs to the firm. Although being 
successful in receiving a loan from western credit lines in July 1991, the owner-manager experienced 
problems with new custom regulations when he tired to import machines he bought with the credit in 
Denmark. In 1992 the loan was taken over by a Polish bank, which whom the owner established a good 
working relationship. 
Case 4 
Seven partners established this firm in 1994, six natural persons and one finn. The main activity is the 
production of parts for hydraulic machines. Initially, the main problem of the firm was consisted of 
financial constrains, as they were unsuccessful in obtaining a bank loan. Nevertheless, they received a bank 
loan in 1995 and el~oyed the an overdraft limit on their bank account at the time of the interview. They 
could even have received a loan from the STRUDER foundation, however did not take the opportunity 
because of internal management problems. 
Case 5 
This firms started trading in 1992 and manufactures clothes. The owner-manager obtained a bank loan for 
the start up of the firm, accounting for 30 per cent of the resources. In the years to follow he received short-
term loans every year. At the time of the interview, the financial resources of the firm consisted mainly of 
retained profits and personal savings. However 10 per cent were covered through leasing arrangements and 
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5 per cent consisted of credits. The main problem, as quoted by the owner, was to obtain long term finance 
to build a production plant. 
Case 6 
The owner-manager of firm 6, a food producing company founded in 1990, cited unstable prices of raw 
materials as main problem. He also complained about the low level of information available for subsidised 
credits. The start up of the firm was financed entirely with internal sources. At the time of the survey the 
business was still mainly relying on internal finance, however a few machines were leased. The owner 
obtained a loan between start up and September 1997 but was unsuccessful when applying for a subsidised 
loan which was provided by the European Union in 1996. 
Case 7 
This finn manufactures furniture, mainly kitchen furniture. The main problem for the firms is that they are 
producing high quality products for which the market is rather small, especially in Lodz. The owner 
complained also about unfair competition form foreign finns, because of tax advantages they receive, and 
about difficulties in obtaining external finance. The father of the current owner founded the firm in 1985 
entirely with internal funds. At the time of the interview, between 12 and 13 per cent of the annual turnover 
was financed with external funds. The owner received the first loan in 1991 from a western credit line and 
enjoyed tluee loans form different banks in September 1997. 
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KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
Bank 1 has five branches and is mainly owned by a capital group from the Czech Republic, who at the time 
of the interview had just taken over the majority stake of the bank. One of the minority owner is the Lodz 
Province, holding about 6 per cent of the ownership. 
Bank 2 
Bank 2 is one of specialised state banks that were active during the communism period. It had been merged 
in November 1996 with three other stated banks into a large group, however remained entirely state owned. 
Bank 3 
Bank 3 is of mixed ownership. The majority stake of the ownership is hold by one of the state owned banks. 
Other shareholder are Polish public organisations as well as Polish and foreign finns. The bank holds 54 
branches. 
Bank 4 
Bank 4 is one of the regional state banks that merged in 1996 into Bank Pekao SA, hence is entirely 
slale owned. 
B. Business adviser 
Lodz Region Economic Redevelopment Foundation 
The fowldation, a local government organisation, was established in 1993 in order to provide financial and 
advisory services for the redevelopment of the Lodz region. Tn 1992/93 the foundation was mainly 
concerned with the restmcturing of large state owned enterprises, as these had a major impact on the labour 
market. More recently, they are also organised projects aimed to support smaller firms, such as training 
courses for entrepreneurs and the participation of small Polish firms in foreign trade fairs. They also took 
part in the establishment of Enterprise Supporting Centres in Lodz and Sieradz. At the time of the interview 
the foundation was in the process of preparing a loan fund aimed exclusively at SMEs. The project was 
planned together with the local labour office. The foundation co-operates with various other government 
institutions as well as non-government organisations, e.g. the Lodz Incubator. In fact, one member of the 
foundation is on the board of directors of the Incubator institution. Part of the activities of the foundation 
were funded by foreign organisations, for example the Know-how Fund, the European Union (PHARE 
programmes) and the World Bank. 
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Chamber of Commerce in Nowy Sacz (South Poland) 
The Chamber of Commerce (CCI) gives advice and information for entrepreneurs, both to members and 
non-members. The membership for entrepreneurs at the CCI is voluntary. 18-20% of their members are 
SMEs employing up to 99 persons Sometimes banks asked to become a member, because that indicates that 
they are part of the business community. The CCI is well known in the community. They have a monthly 
bulletin, place articles in the economic section of local newspapers, have discussions on TV and radio and 
partly fund trade fairs. The CCI also organises discussions with experts, government representatives and 
other business institutions. At the time of the survey, they could not offer any financial help, however 
offered advice for firm searching for external sources of finance. A loan guarantee fund was planned to start 
in November 1997. In the past three years the CCI could offer most of its services on a low cost basis, as 
they took part in a support program for private businesses and SMEs which was funded form the 
government and the European Union (PHARE). However, this programme ended in 1996. The CCI would 
have liked to continue taking part in a support programme, but the competition for such funds was very 
strong. 
Lodz Incubator Foundation 
The Incubator Foundation was founded in 1992 by the Lodz Regional Development Agency and the City 
Council ofLodz. The main aims of the foundation were to provide support for firtns in the Lodz region with 
regard to finance, promotion and training. The Incubator also provided premises for small firms on a low 
rent basis. For this project the Incubator owned three buildings in Lodz. A commission of experts decided 
which firtns were to be admitted to the Incubator on basis of business plans provided by applicants. Apart 
from office space the Incubator also provided access to secretary and book-keeping as well as technical 
support, e.g. phones, faxes and photocopying. Furthermore, firms within the Incubator had access to 
marketing and advertising services. 
Lodz Agency for Regional Development 
The Lodz Agency for Regional Development was established in 1992 as an initiative of the Lodz regional 
authorities with the support of national public institutions. Shareholders the City of Lodz Office, the Lodz 
Voivodship, the Agency for Industrial Development, the Town of Ozorkow Office, as well as eight banks 
and private enterprises, represented by the Lodz Club of Capital. The agency is a limited liability company 
aiming at the economic development of the region. The agency does not provide services directly of SMEs, 
but organises or administers projects which, among others, support small firtns in the Lodz regions. Some 
of these projects are funded by the PHARE programmes of the European Union. Other foreign organisations 
they co-operate with were, for example, the Lyon Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Foundation 
France Pologne, Infomest in Tries, Italy, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Gertnany, and the Edinburgh 
Consortium in Great Britain. 
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